Federalism and Regional Policy in Contemporary Russia by Starodubtsev, Andrey

Federalism and Regional Policy in 
Contemporary Russia
How do Russian leaders balance the need to decentralize governance in a 
socially and politically complex country with the need to guarantee political 
control of the state?
 Since the early 2000s Russian federal authorities have arranged a system of 
political control on regional elites and their leaders, providing a “police control” 
of special bodies subordinated by the federal center on policy implementation in 
the regions. Different mechanisms of fiscal federalism and investment policy 
have been used to ensure regional elites’ loyalty and a politically centralized but 
administratively decentralized system has been created.
 Asking clear, direct, and theoretically informed questions about the relation-
ship between federalism, decentralization, and authoritarianism, this book 
explores the political survival of authoritarian leaders, the determinants of policy 
formulation, and theories of federalism and decentralization, to reach a new 
understanding of territorial governance in contemporary Russia. As such, it is an 
important work for students and researchers in Russian studies and regional and 
federal studies.
Andrey Starodubtsev is a postdoctoral researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute, 
University of Helsinki, Finland. He collaborates with the Center for Moderniza-
tion Studies, European University at St Petersburg and the Department of Polit-
ical Science, National Research University Higher School of Economics – St 
Petersburg, Russia. His expertise covers the issues of federalism and regional 
policy as well as the problems of governance and modernization in contemporary 
Russia.
Studies in Contemporary Russia
Series Editor: Markku Kivinen
Studies in Contemporary Russia is a series of cutting- edge, contemporary 
studies. These monographs, joint publications and edited volumes branch out 
into various disciplines, innovatively combining research methods and theories 
to approach the core questions of Russian modernisation; how do the dynamics 
of resources and rules affect the Russian economy and what are the prospects 
and needs of diversification? What is the impact of the changing state–society 
relationship? How does the emerging welfare regime work? What is the role of 
Russia in contemporary international relations? How should we understand the 
present Russian political system? What is the philosophical background of mod-
ernisation as a whole and its Russian version in particular?
 The variety of opinions on these issues is vast. Some see increasingly less dif-
ference between contemporary Russia and the Soviet Union while, at the other 
extreme, prominent experts regard Russia as a ‘more or less’ normal European 
state. At the same time new variants of modernisation are espoused as a result of 
Russian membership of the global BRIC powers. Combining aspects of Western 
and Soviet modernisation with some anti- modern or traditional tendencies the 
Russian case is ideal for probing deeper into the evolving nature of modernisa-
tion. Which of the available courses Russia will follow remains an open ques-
tion, but these trajectories provide the alternatives available for discussion in this 
ground- breaking and authoritative series.
 The editor and the editorial board of the series represent the Finnish Centre of 
Excellence in Russian Studies: Choices of Russian Modernisation.
 For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com/series/
ASHSER- 1421
Authoritarian Modernization in 
Russia 
Ideas, Institutions, and Policies 
Edited by Vladimir Gel’man
Philosophical and Cultural 
Interpretations of Russian 
Modernisation 
Edited by Katja Lehtisaari and 
Arto Mustajoki
The Other Russia 
Local Experience and Societal Change 
Leo Granberg and Ann- Mari Sätre
Federalism and Regional Policy in 
Contemporary Russia 
Andrey Starodubtsev
Federalism and Regional Policy 
in Contemporary Russia
Andrey Starodubtsev
First published 2018 
by Routledge 
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge 
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2018 Andrey Starodubtsev
The right of Andrey Starodubtsev to be identified as author of this work 
has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or 
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now 
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in 
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing 
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or 
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation 
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-472-46150-6 (hbk) 
ISBN: 978-1-315-58206-1 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman 
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
To Anna Fomina, my best friend and partner, with love and 
gratitude

Contents
 List of figures viii
 List of tables ix
 Preface x
 Introduction 1
1 Tertius gaudens: what is wrong with Russian federalism? 20
2 Why has regional development in Russia failed? 61
3 Who, how, when, and how much? Factors of the 
redistribution of intergovernmental transfers in Russia 102
4 Decentralize but not federalize: coordination, subordination, 
and control in Russian territorial governance 125
 Conclusion 155
 Appendix 1 159
 Appendix 2 160
 Appendix 3 161
 Appendix 4 162
 Appendix 5 164
 Appendix 6 167
 Index 168
Figures
 I.1 The dynamics of freedom in the USSR and the Russian 
Federation 13
 2.1 Distribution of incomes between different governmental levels 
in 2011 in several federations 66
 2.2 Federal and regional shares of budgetary incomes in Russia in 
1992–1999 and 2003–2011 81
 2.3 The number of federal programs 83
 2.4 Share of intergovernmental transfers in the federal budget’s 
expenditures 91
 3.1 Average value of transfers from the federal budget to 
subnational budgets in republics and other types of subnational 
units 110
 3.2 Average value of gross regional product per 10 000 residents 
in republics and other types of subnational units 110
 3.3 The number of federal programs in the 2000s and 2010s 114
 4.1 Ratio of federal and subnational budget revenues in the 
Russian Federation in 1992–2011 134
 4.2 Number of officials at the national and subnational 
governmental levels in 2000–2013 135
 4.3 Dynamics of allocation of expenses in the field of education in 
2000–2015 144
 4.4 Dynamics of change in expenses for education in three 
Russian republics in 2001 and 2015 145
Tables
 2.1 Models of intergovernmental financial relations 68
 2.2 Decline in industrial production in the regions of Russia in 
2008–2009 88
 4.1 Sequences of decentralization and their effects on the 
intergovernmental balance of power 128
 4.2 Social expenditures of the Russian consolidated budget in 
2005, 2010, and 2015 (in billion rubles) 138
 A1.1 Descriptive statistics 159
 A2.1 Results of the regression analysis of annual distribution of 
intergovernmental budget transfers 160
 A3.1 Results of the regression analysis of distribution of annual 
intergovernmental budget transfers grouped in periods 161
 A4.1 List of the governmental programs and subprograms 162
Preface
In his classic book on federalism (1964), William Riker presented a brief two- 
page analysis of the process of the Soviet Union’s formation as a federal state, 
setting it alongside not only Yugoslavia, but also West Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland. In response to the obvious question from all those who were sur-
prised by the statement that an unfree state, one practicing mass terror and forced 
displacement of peoples, as a polity, complied with the principles of self- rule 
and shared rule, Riker noted:
Since 1923 the Soviet Union has been highly centralized and for that reason 
many scholars have refused to call it a federalism. This refusal is, however, 
merely the expression of the Amer ican- Commonwealth mythology that fed-
eralism ought to prevent tyranny. Since the Soviet Union preserved all the 
features of federalism, the mere fact that its federalism fails to prevent 
tyranny should not lead to casting it out of the class of federalism. Rather it 
should lead to a re- evaluation of what federalism means and implies.
(Riker, 1964: 39–40)
Although I completely disagree with the statement that “the Soviet Union pre-
served all the features of federalism,” I have always interpreted this paragraph as 
Riker suggesting that we should examine the features of territorial governance in 
states that are simultaneously complex (with a large territory, plural society, 
etc.), and not democratic. It is the desire to understand how one should manage a 
country that, though born to be a federation, has not realized the federal canon, 
that compelled me to write this work.
 This book is focused on Russia, a country that claims a federal structure in its 
constitution and its full name, but which has not for a single day been consistent 
with the classic principles of federalism. For many years, Russia has served as 
an example of the contemporary authoritarian state for the world of political 
science. The shift in politics research from studying the formation, development, 
and changes of its political regime to studying how that regime influences the 
functioning of the state and society has reserved Russia’s position as a “crucial 
case” for many years to come. For me, the Russian case is important because it 
clearly shows how the central government forms a territorial governance system 
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as the authoritarian regime grows stronger, how it solves its immediate adminis-
trative tasks, and what political constraints it frequently faces.
 The book is based on the materials of a number of studies of the political 
factors of territorial governance in Russia. The first of them, “Tertius gaudens: 
Circumstances of Formation of a Federal State in Russia,” was conducted in 
2002–2005 at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Petrozavodsk State 
University. The second, “The Political and Socio- Economic Factors of the 
Implementation of Regional Policy in the Russian Federation,” was carried out 
at the Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology, European University at St 
Petersburg (EUSP) in 2005–2009. Finally, the third project, on the problems of 
centralization and decentralization of public administration under the conditions 
of authoritarian institutions, was begun in 2009 with the support of the Center 
for Modernization Studies EUSP and continued in 2013 at the Aleksanteri Insti-
tute, University of Helsinki, within the framework of the “Centre of Excellence 
‘Choices of Russian Modernization’ ” project, and of the “Regimes, Institutions, 
and Change: Politics and Governance in Russia in a Comparative Perspective” 
project as part of the Finland Distinguished Professor Programme, implemented 
with the support of the Academy of Finland.
 I was fortunate enough to present and discuss the interim results of my work 
at the great research centers studying Russian politics from a comparative per-
spective. I am grateful to the encouraging staff of the Aleksanteri Institute, Uni-
versity of Helsinki, for their continued support and excellent organization of 
research activities, the Center for Modernization Studies, EUSP, for its interest-
ing discussions of development and political changes, and the National Research 
University Higher School of Economics (St Petersburg) for its wonderful 
students.
 I would like to thank Vladimir Gel’man, professor at the European University 
at St Petersburg and the University of Helsinki; his advice and support, as well 
as his articles and books, are regularly of significant help to me in my research 
activities. I also thank those who provided me with assistance at the various 
stages of the research and preparation of the manuscript: Maria Nozhenko, Grig-
orii Golosov, Irina Busygina, Mikhail Filippov, Andrey Zakharov, Markku 
Kivinen, Oleg Podvintsev, Alexander Sungurov, Anna Tarasenko, Dmitry 
Travin, Anton Shirikov, and Andrey Yushkov for ideas and comments that have 
allowed me to develop and specify important points; Natalia Shkaeva, Elizaveta 
Potapova, Viktoria Poltoratskaya, and Lyubov Altukhova for inspiring joint pro-
jects; Ivan Grigoriev and Anna Dekalchuk for their companionship and assist-
ance in data collection; and Alexei Stephenson for his thoughtful and patient 
linguistic assistance. I thank my parents, Vladimir Starodubtsev and Valentina 
Starodubtseva, for supporting all my endeavors. Of course, these people are not 
responsible for my inaccuracies, omissions, or errors. At the same time, I would 
like to share with them all of the best that the book has to offer.

Introduction
The relations between the federal center and regional governments have always 
been an integral part of the political process in Russia and an important factor in 
its outcomes. The collapse of the Soviet Union, two wars in Chechnya and 
peacekeeping in other ethnic administrative units, the political struggle between 
the pro- regional party “Fatherhood—All Russia” (Otechestvo—Vsya Rossiya, 
OVR) and the pro- centrist “Union” (Edinstvo), Vladimir Putin’s two federal 
reforms, and even the hostage crises in Beslan, North Ossetia—these and many 
other events have all drastically influenced the results of the political process in 
Russia since the beginning of the 1990s.
 From the perspective of the mid- 2010s, when the governors mainly play the 
role of the Russian President’s representatives in the regions, when regional 
elites compete with each other to demonstrate the highest degree of loyalty to 
the federal center, especially in the electoral process, when regional autonomy is 
discussed predominantly among scholars and oppositional politicians in Moscow 
and St Petersburg, but not in the regions, it seems surprising to see regional pol-
itics and intergovernmental relations as such significant independent variables 
when it comes to explaining the national political process.
 How did the federal center generate such changes in the political tactics and strat-
egies of the regional elites and gain their complete loyalty as a result? Scholars have 
scrutinized this question extensively. By the end of the 1990s, regional leaders had 
become politically strong actors able to influence the effectiveness of public admin-
istration in Russia (Stoner- Weiss, 1999, 2002), and even tried to seize the majority 
in the federal parliament, and the post of the federal president in 1999–2000. At the 
turn of the century, the Kremlin used the threat of terrorists from the Chechen 
Republic and the electoral popularity of Vladimir Putin to ensure the pro- centrist 
party’s majority in the parliament and then deprive the regional governors of admin-
istrative, financial, and political resources (Reddaway and Orttung, 2005; Gel’man, 
2009). The center’s strategy of the struggle with disobedient governors included the 
centralization of different components of intergovernmental relations (for instance, 
the system of law enforcement (Taylor, 2007)) and the realization of policy meas-
ures in the field of electoral and party systems (Golosov, 2011).
 These explanations place the center’s policy on the Russian regions within 
the context of forming and preserving the authoritarian political regime. While I 
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agree with the importance of political struggle and regime formation for the 
development of federalism and regional policy in Russia, I have to note that this 
approach reduces the factors and effects of intergovernmental relations to pure 
politics. At the same time, the particularities of intergovernmental relations in 
the spheres of fiscal federalism, regional policy, and administrative functions of 
each tier of government in Russia are left outside the frame of such an analysis.
 On the other hand, there is a wealth of literature that observes and analyzes 
intergovernmental relations in isolation from political factors and consequences. 
The authors examine the federal government’s measures in the fields of distribu-
tion of competences, fiscal flows and financial transfers, and special programs of 
regional development, without taking into account the particularities of regime 
changes and political struggle (De Silva et al., 2009; Zubarevich, 2010). In this 
case, ineffective and inconsistent actions by policy- makers are explained through 
the “bad governance” of the bureaucracy, which is unable to develop appropriate 
measures to achieve difficult objectives.
 Finally, there are many works devoted to political determinants of the finan-
cial dimension of intergovernmental relations (Treisman, 2001; Popov, 2004; 
Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2016; Turovsky and Gaivoronsky, 2017). These 
projects combine political and policy dimensions of intergovernmental relations, 
but they do not place this analysis in the context of causes and effects of federal 
relations and regional development policy.
 This book seeks to explain the dynamics of intergovernmental relations in 
Russia in the 1990s–2010s by combining the three dimensions of territorial gov-
ernance—dynamics of political relations between the center and the subnational 
units, particularities of the federal government’s regional development policy, 
and changes in the administrative system of intergovernmental control, coordin-
ation, and subordination.
 The puzzle at the heart of this book is derived from the ambiguous link 
between the type of political regime and the nature of the vertical distribution of 
power. A decentralized system is characterized by complex interrelations 
between a number of actors. As a result, such a system theoretically promotes 
competitive, polycentric, and unpredictable political outcomes. Authoritarianism 
urges politicians to prevent the appearance of alternative political actors, whom 
they would not be able to control. We can therefore expect that decentralization 
and federalism contradict the interests of authoritarian leaders, and that they 
would prefer to reduce, or even eliminate, decentralization within their states.
 However, we know that decentralization and federalism are not always a 
matter of choice for institution- builders. Federalism, for example, is often pro-
moted as a response to challenges concerning complex ethnic or religious com-
positions, an expansive territory, or economic disparities between regions. 
Consequently, authoritarian leaders are forced to accept decentralization while 
sustaining a monocentric political regime.
 How is this contradiction possible? What strategies do authoritarian leaders 
choose in order to balance the need to decentralize with the need to guarantee 
desired political outcomes? What elements of the political system do they use to 
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decrease the regional elites’ opportunities to challenge them? On the whole, 
what factors define intergovernmental relations and strategies in plural and eco-
nomically complex societies under authoritarian regimes?
Federalism, decentralization, and intergovernmental 
relations
Constitutionally, Russia is a federal state. Usually, federations are defined by a set 
of principles of relations between central and regional governmental tiers. It would 
be impossible to claim that all these principles are agreed on by most scholars and 
practitioners, but there is consensus about the minimum features of a federation.
 A classic definition of a federal state was formulated by William H. Riker 
(1964: 11):
A constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land 
and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is auto-
nomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in 
the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.
According to his definition, delegating just one sphere of competence to a lower 
governmental level is enough to make a country federal. Yet now—in the age of 
decentralization—it would be difficult to find a state that does not satisfy this 
minimal requirement. Thus, I believe that the most important part of Riker’s 
approach to federalism is the requirement to have a constitutional guarantee of 
the distribution of competences. While delegation of powers is a widespread 
practice of modern public administration, constitutional protection of regional 
autonomy in certain spheres is a necessary condition to define a state as federal. 
But it is not a sufficient condition.
 The existence of regional authorities’ responsibilities does not necessarily 
lead to their independence during political and policy decision- making. If gov-
ernors are appointed by the central government, they come under the federal 
center’s control. This means that the center has the opportunity to dictate its will 
to regional governments even if they possess all the rights needed to govern 
independently within a policy field.
 This is why Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova (2004: 
9) consider,
a state is federal if its governmental structure can be characterized by mul-
tiple layers (generally national, regional, and local) such that at each level 
the chief policy makers—governors, presidents, prime ministers, judges—
are elected directly by the people they ostensibly serve or (as with judges) 
appointed by public officials thus directly elected at that level.
The existence of own responsibilities together with the regional communities’ pos-
sibility to independently elect or appoint chief policy- makers form the full- scale 
4  Introduction
autonomy of a subnational government. This is indeed a key principle of fed-
eralism. At the same time, while agreeing with Riker’s requirement of guarantee-
ing subnational autonomy, Daniel Elazar (1987) develops the idea of “shared rule” 
in federations. According to this principle, subnational elites and communities can 
potentially control the central authorities’ decisions, and even have their interests 
represented through different channels in order to resist policy proposals that 
would centralize government within the country.
 Thus, three basic institutional features of a federal state are (1) constitutional 
distribution of responsibilities between national (central) and subnational govern-
ments; (2) election of policy chiefs at a subnational level; (3) subnational units’ 
participation in the national process of policy- making. Obviously, together these 
features constitute the rules of an extremely competitive game. Riker insists that 
federal relations should be seen as “bargaining” that includes a central government 
on the one hand, and regional elites on the other (Riker, 1964; Filippov, 2005). 
Hence, a federal arrangement does not assume subordination of one level of gov-
ernment to another. Federal relations are implemented through a process of negoti-
ation and collaboration. Elazar has developed a radical version of this idea: he 
suggests that one should speak of non- centralization instead of decentralization of 
power in federal states (Elazar, 1976).
 Such an understanding of federalism means its close connection with democracy 
as a system that supports political pluralism. While authoritarian regimes are char-
acterized by the reduction of the space of political competitiveness, federalism 
demands that alternative actors, often oppositional to the federal rulers, exist in the 
political system, and that some of them have the position of veto actors in specific 
policy fields. Numerous studies on maintaining “robust” federations explicitly or 
implicitly confirm the importance of democratic institutions to ensure the stability of 
federal bargains (Riker, 1964; Lijphart, 1977; Filippov et al., 2004; Bednar, 2009).
 This is why “federation” is a very narrow term for describing the great diver-
sity of decentralized systems in the world, particularly those that appeared in the 
second half of the twentieth century and those with authoritarian political 
regimes. Many countries have enjoyed decentralization, but not federalization 
(Litvack et al., 1998; Falleti, 2010).
 Out of the many definitions of decentralization, I follow Tulia Falleti’s, which 
describes decentralization as “a process of state reform composed by a set of 
public policies that transfer responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher 
to lower levels of government in the context of a specific type of state” (Falleti, 
2005: 328). This definition clearly distinguishes between decentralization and 
federalism. While federal relations concentrate on the political and administra-
tive dimensions of government, decentralization additionally covers fiscal rela-
tions (Prud’homme, 1995; Rodden, 2004; Treisman, 2007; Falleti, 2010).
 From this perspective, federalism can be seen as a form of decentralization, 
one of a number of options in the arsenal of a country’s policy- makers. This 
approach to federalism contrasts with another view, which analyzes a federal 
system as a union of former sovereign states that agree to transfer part of their 
powers to a higher level to provide for their own defense or favorable positions in 
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the world economy (the reasons for such behavior among states’ elites are wonder-
fully explained in The Federalist Papers). The fact is that, in the twentieth and 
twenty- first centuries, federalism has appeared mainly as a product of decentraliza-
tion, while examples of centralization are exceptional (Stepan, 2005).
 Usually national elites prefer centralized systems to decentralized ones. They 
are ready to limit their own power in favor of subnational governments only 
when facing truly harsh problems, ones that cannot be resolved without decen-
tralization. Studies demonstrate that decentralization (including federalization) 
happens as an attempt to overcome two sets of problems—ineffectiveness of 
public administration (Tiebout, 1956; World Bank, 2009; Rodden, 2004), and 
political instability caused by conflicts in plural societies (Lijphart, 1977; 
Horowitz, 1985). Tulia Falleti in her investigation of decentralization in the 
states of Latin America (2005, 2010) shows that central and regional govern-
ments bargain for the most beneficial conditions of decentralization (as Riker 
demonstrated the same type of bargaining in federalization). Every time, this 
competition leads to a distinct type of equilibrium that results from the resources 
and strategies of both players. This means that decentralization should not be 
seen as a process that works exclusively in regional governments’ interests. 
Central authorities seek to create relations with lower tiers that decrease real 
regional autonomy even within the frameworks of decentralization. Hence, it is 
an important research goal to study how both central and regional governments 
build their strategies to ensure an advantageous form of decentralization.
 Such an analysis demands that a researcher should not restrict himself or 
herself by studying a single dimension of relations between governmental tiers. 
The struggle for autonomy and control includes all dimensions—administrative, 
financial, and political. That is why I use the concept of intergovernmental rela-
tions developed by Deil S. Wright (1978), who defines them as a permanent 
process of interactions between officials (both politicians and bureaucrats) at dif-
ferent governmental levels (national, subnational, and local) in regard to public 
policy- making and implementation. Wright insists that intergovernmental rela-
tions should not be considered as limited to producing formal regulations in 
central, regional, or local agencies. Rather, they are realized through processes 
of officials’ formal and informal interactions.
 This book is about the development of intergovernmental relations in Russia 
through a series of particular political circumstances. I am going to revisit all the 
particularities of (de)centralization in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s in order to 
understand how they have influenced Russia’s balance of power. The existence 
of decentralized and federal systems should be confirmed in terms of a specific 
type of intergovernmental relations. I am seeking to find out what they are and 
how the political process in Russia has influenced them.
Anchored in politics and suffused with policy
Wright writes: “From its origins in the 1930s, IGR was recognized as anchored 
in politics and suffused with policy” (Wright, 1978: 3). It is this peculiarity of 
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intergovernmental relations that leads me now to outline theoretical insights into 
the complex relations between political struggle and public policy in modern 
political systems.
 In political science, one influential perspective is that policy is caused by 
numerous political factors. This tradition of thought is best embodied in Anthony 
Downs’s work An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), which develops the 
very popular thesis that politicians are mainly interested in maximizing electoral 
support for themselves or their political parties. According to this thesis, public 
policy is a tool used to achieve that goal:
Political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of 
gaining votes. They do not seek to gain office in order to carry out certain 
preconceived policies or serve any particular interest groups; rather they 
formulate policies and serve interest groups in order to gain office. Thus 
their social function—which is to formulate and carry out policies when in 
power as the government—is accomplished as by- product of their private 
motive—which is to attain the income, power, and prestige of being in 
office.
(Downs, 1957: 137)
Driven by their political interests, politicians tend to implement the policy meas-
ures that will be most popular with the electorate and/or influential interest 
groups. The role of ideologies and programs is completely utilitarian. As Downs 
writes, “lack of information creates a demand for ideologies in the electorate. 
[…] Each party invents an ideology in order to attract the votes of those citizens 
who wish to cut costs by voting ideologically” (1957: 142). If ideologies are 
interchangeable, one should not overestimate the significance of political and 
policy programs—their role is merely to help a voter differentiate one candidate 
from another. In theory, bureaucracy is meant to align public policy with the 
strategic goals of societal development, but in Downs’s perspective it is subordi-
nated to politicians: a political leader can dismiss a bureaucrat if his or her 
actions contradict that leader’s interests.
 The Downsian perspective has undergone criticism from both sides. Some 
scholars argue against the predominance of electoral interests in policy- making, 
while others insist that relations between politics and policy are more complex—
that politics is affected by policy as well.
 To explain the first line of the criticism I use the neoinstitutional approach to 
understanding public policy- making. Douglas North claims that political actors’ 
actions are directed by the combination of their interests and the institutional 
environment in which the actors have to make their decisions (North, 1990). 
Institutions are defined in North’s classic phrase as “the humanly devised con-
straints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (1990: 97), and 
perform a crucial function—they decrease an actor’s uncertainty as he or she 
makes a political or policy decision. Thus, institutions eliminate alternatives that 
do not correspond with existing formal and informal rules.
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 The second element of the neoinstitutional framework, actors’ preferences, 
can be analyzed from different perspectives. Downs and his supporters place 
politicians’ electoral interests at the center of their analysis. At the same time, 
Douglas Hibbs (1977) demonstrates that, in the USA, the “left- leaning” adminis-
trations traditionally develop a policy of lower levels of unemployment and 
higher levels of inflation, while the “right’s” policy is the opposite. This means 
that ideology matters in policy- making, at least in the context of a long- lived 
two- party democracy.
 Donald Wittman (1983) develops the idea of a “synthesis theory”: he sup-
poses that electoral victory is a means that allows a politician to realize his or 
her political program. Hence, politicians have to compromise their programs to 
make them more attractive for voters and, at the same time, sketch out principles 
of public policy that will be implemented if that politician wins an election.
 Following Alberto Alesina and his co- authors (Alesina et al., 1997), I will 
call Downs’s tradition the “opportunistic model of policy implementation.” The 
other tradition is usually named the “partisan model,” but in the context of the 
Russian political reality, where parties do not perform the same role as they do 
in the Western political systems, it would be more appropriate to call it the 
“ideological model.”
 Obviously, both models are drawn analytically. We can hardly expect that 
politicians and other participants in political and policy processes will keep the 
same motivations and political strategies over a long period of time. I believe 
that actors are able to alter them according to changing institutional and struc-
tural environments. Below I will present some theoretical models that explain 
the domination of the opportunist interests of actors over the ideological ones, 
and vice versa.
 The first important condition here is elections. According to William Nord-
haus, the content of a public policy is affected by the fact of how soon the next 
election will come: “within an incumbent’s term in office there is a predictable 
pattern of policy, starting with relative austerity in early years and ending with 
the potlatch right before elections” (Nordhaus, 1975: 187). This conception pre-
supposes Downs’s model. Elections here are the central element of the political 
process for an incumbent. However, they influence his or her behavior not 
throughout the entire term, but only during the period that is most important for 
being re- elected. The beginning of the term is the time of the highest level of 
electoral support, when the government can pursue a policy of austerity and 
implement even unpopular reforms. But the sooner the next election is, the more 
attention politicians have to pay to the electorate’s will in order to ensure elect-
oral success.
 Nordhaus’s conception is that all elections at the same governmental level 
influence actors identically. But the political reality demonstrates a difference 
between elections even if they are held at the same level. Let’s imagine that a 
forthcoming election is accompanied by a high level of uncertainty about the 
political future of a state. For example, in early post- Soviet Russia, many people 
feared that a victory by Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party 
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of the Russian Federation (“the communists,” KPRF ) would mean the revival of 
the command economy and the communist political regime. Under those circum-
stances, the behavior of all actors subordinated to the incumbent would be 
opportunistic. They would use all their resources to ensure the victory of the 
incumbent and save their current institutions. If an incumbent had good chances 
of being re- elected, or if a challenger’s program were quite close to the incum-
bent’s, other actors (including the bureaucracy) would keep a neutral position 
and implement an ideologically driven policy even in the pre- election period.
 Unlike Downs and Nordhaus, representatives of policy studies claim that pol-
iticians are not the only group of influential actors in the policy process. Theodor 
Lowi demonstrates that a policy is a result of connections between various 
groups of actors whose interests can be completely different (Lowi, 1964). At 
the theoretical level, this argument is often described with the image of “the iron 
triangle.” There are three functional groups of actors that design and implement 
a public policy: politicians (who make policy programs and specific decisions 
and control their implementation), bureaucrats (who implement these decisions), 
and interest groups (which represent groups whose interests are affected by a 
policy measure). Every side of this triangle reflects different interests: politicians 
want to be re- elected, bureaucrats seek to provide a stable and effective policy, 
and interest groups aim to successfully protect their interests.
 Downs insists that politicians are omnipotent: they completely control bur-
eaucrats and listen to interest groups only as far as the latter can provide elect-
oral support. Lowi responds that the bureaucracy should be considered as an 
independent political actor that is able to influence policy- making. The fact that 
the electorate elects a politician, but not the bureaucrats, is the main reason why 
bureaucracy has been growing stronger in contemporary democratic countries 
(Heady, 2001). Additionally, bureaucracy becomes stronger due to the increas-
ing complexity of management in modern states and, as a result, the aggravation 
of the principal–agent problem (De Groot, 1988; Weingast, 1984). Because of 
information asymmetry, politicians (principals) have to rely on bureaucrats 
(agents), not only delegating the process of implementation of decisions to them, 
but also widening the scope of bureaucratic discretion. Thus, sometimes an 
administratively strong bureaucracy is thought to be able to provide an ideologi-
cally, but not electorally, driven policy.
 The third group of participants in any political system is interest groups, which 
use all their resources to ensure the implementation of the most favorable policy. 
Scientists assess their role in the political system in extremely different ways: 
some (mainly political scientists) consider interest groups’ actions to be one of the 
main characteristics of democratic government (Dahl, 2000), while others (pre-
dominantly economists) proclaim them to be the cause of institutional sclerosis in 
developed countries (Olson, 1982). In short, influential groups can be analyzed as 
lobbyists who encourage the opportunistic behavior of politicians, or as experts 
who help a government provide the most effective policy decisions.
 The idea of “the iron triangle” presents politicians, bureaucrats, and interest 
groups as actors that produce public policy in the process of implicit or explicit 
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opposition to each other. At the same time, Paul Sabatier and his numerous fol-
lowers have found a number of policies to be based on the actions of “advocacy 
coalitions.” They include representatives of these three groups, along with 
experts and advisors, journalists, and other participants of the policy process in a 
specific policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Thus, 
Sabatier indicates that policy- making is the product of a struggle between coali-
tions of supporters and opponents of a specific policy decision. Different parti-
cipants in such coalitions can have different motivations. That is why every 
policy measure can theoretically satisfy both political and ideological interests at 
the same time.
 As such, it is obvious that the opportunistic potential of a decision depends on 
a number of participants included in the policy- making process. George Tsebelis 
(2002), Arend Lijphart (2007), and Simon Hix (2006) support this position. They 
propose answering two questions to analyze the policy process: how many actors 
are able to (1) initiate political decisions, and (2) block a change in policy? If 
there is a single actor who is able to change the agenda without consulting with 
other actors, this system should be called majoritarian. But if there are several 
actors who are able to initiate or block policy alternatives, and the consent of 
these actors is the single opportunity to adopt an alternative, this is a consensus 
system.
 A consensus system hampers politicians’ opportunistic strategies. Every influ-
ential actor is able to block a politically motivated decision by another parti-
cipant in the political process. Under these circumstances, collective decisions 
will be oriented toward solving social problems rather than satisfying actors’ 
political interests. There are a few pure consensus systems in the world, but 
many states use individual elements of consensus systems in their institutional 
designs—parliamentary and multi- party systems, federalism, the pluralistic 
model of interest representation, and so on. They all increase the number of 
participants in the policy process and create unfavorable conditions for oppor-
tunistic behavior. Majoritarian systems are favorable for incumbents’ use of 
opportunistic strategies.
 Thus, one line of discussion based on Downs’s view on political process 
draws a picture of complex interactions between numerous actors who pursue 
their own rational interests and own beliefs concerning the effectiveness of a 
policy alternative for public development. While the victory of one actor over 
another is explained by the resource opportunities of these participants in the 
policy process, the balance of rational interests and (ideological) beliefs in policy 
programs and specific measures proposed by an actor is affected by the struc-
tural opportunities and institutional environment that characterize a policy 
process and policy subsystem.
 Another line of criticism comes from the work Politics, Pressures and the 
Tariff by Elmer Eric Schattschneider (1935). He and his followers argue for the 
existence of a “policy feedback effect”: “Public policies are not merely products 
of politics but also shape the political arena and the possibilities for further 
policy making” (Campbell, 2012: 334). This is not a simple assertion that a 
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public policy implemented by politicians influences the results of subsequent elect-
oral cycles. Policy feedback studies demonstrate how public policies can be shaped 
to fit interests among actors, how different governmental measures change the 
balance of power in the political arena, and how policy transforms the tactics and 
strategies of influential players, including interest groups and political entrepren-
eurs, on the political field (Skocpol, 1992; Pierson, 1993; Campbell, 2012). In turn, 
these numerous changes are able to influence electoral results.
 These two traditions—Downsian and Schattschneiderian—by no means con-
tradict each other. I theorize that there is a cycle of politics–policy influence rel-
evant to both elite and mass levels. The results of an electoral cycle generate a 
specific type of public policy, which reflects the policy program of the new 
ruling party or politician and their electorates. Then these policy measures 
restructure the political arena and/or electoral attitudes, which go on to affect the 
results of the next electoral cycle.
 There is a condition that unites all of the theoretical conceptions briefly sum-
marized above—the fundamental importance of elections for the development of 
a political system. Strictly speaking, these theories analyze the relationship 
between public policy and politics in consolidated democracies. At the same 
time, in the 1990s and 2000s an increasing number of countries, including 
Russia, were forming and developing non- democratic regimes (Magaloni and 
Kricheli, 2010). To understand how the policy process works under non- 
democratic conditions is a challenge for contemporary political science.
 In the second half of the twentieth century, there was a popular idea among 
numerous observers that authoritarian states provide a better economic perform-
ance than democracies. This effect was supposed to be a result of the strong 
influence of politics on public policy- making in democratic countries. Demo-
cratic governments constantly suffer from pressures from the electorate, interest 
groups, coalition partners, and so on.
 On the other hand, authoritarian regimes are able to provide so- called insula-
tion of government (Evans, 1995), which is to say they are able to establish and 
promote political and economic institutions that allow government officials to 
implement desired policy and policy changes without considering political and 
institutional constraints. They create “pockets of efficiency,” special govern-
mental agencies of state- controlled companies, which operate within a deliber-
ately designed political and legal environment different from that of most of the 
business and governmental agencies in that country (Geddes, 1994). The success 
stories of rapid economic growth in such countries as Romania, Brazil, Chile, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and China inspire the supporters of this 
strategy of political development.
 However, the idea of authoritarian modernization was already being discussed 
in the 1990s. Adam Przeworski formulated this as follows: “The ‘tigers’ have 
tended to be dictatorships. But are dictatorships necessarily tigers?” (Przeworski 
et al., 2000: 4). Among many authoritarian states, few have demonstrated a high 
level of economic and social performance. On the contrary, most of them suffer 
from gradual deterioration of their economies and living conditions.
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 There are many explanations for this problem. Adam Przeworski and his col-
leagues have developed the position that the features of a regime do not influ-
ence economic development or public policy concerning it. The real factor is the 
initial level of economic development at the beginning of a modernization 
project (Przeworski et al., 2000: 178). Those arguing for a theory of rational 
choice find the reasons for the poor performance of authoritarian governments’ 
public policy in the rent- seeking behavior of dictators. They are ready to redis-
tribute private goods only among those who are able to help or hamper them in 
preserving their power. Thus, societies with larger winning coalitions are richer 
than societies with smaller ones (Olson, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005).
 Another explanation concerns the particularities of the authoritarian regimes 
that have been developing over the last half- century. Instead of classic authorit-
arian regimes, competitive (or electoral) authoritarianisms (i.e., regimes that, 
although authoritarian, incorporate elections that are meaningful, but unfair 
(Schedler, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2010)) have emerged in many countries 
including Russia (Golosov, 2011; Gel’man, 2015a).
 Recent studies demonstrate that the developmental potential of governments 
in these regimes is very limited. They face a situation where the worst features 
of democracies (the dependence of policy- makers on the electoral preferences of 
the population) are combined with those of authoritarianism (the absence of 
effective civic control, rent- seeking by both dictators and their bureaucracies, 
authoritarian patterns of decision- making). Forming pockets of efficiency under 
these circumstances is an expensive and dangerous strategy for a leader. He or 
she is able to apply it only to a few policy fields, those which are considered 
most important strategically. But the results of applying this strategy are again 
quite poor: an authoritarian leader is able to insulate the government from elect-
orate and interest groups but he or she cannot protect it from low quality of 
public administration or rent- seeking behavior by governmental participants in 
the policy process (Gel’man, 2017; Gel’man and Starodubtsev, 2016).
 Thus, contemporary authoritarianism does indeed complicate policy- making 
and public administration. Modern authoritarian governments face the same 
problems as democracies do, but the former can find few ways to overcome them 
using democratic mechanisms. From this perspective, this book’s question con-
cerns the problem of how leaders manage a policy process under the political 
circumstances of electoral authoritarianism.
Regime of (un)certainty
Russia is an authoritarian state. It is open for debate when the country underwent 
the shift from a very unstable and imperfect democratic regime to full- scale 
modern authoritarianism. Some insist that Russia has never been a democracy 
since the moment the Soviet Union collapsed (Gel’man, 2017); others contend 
that the regime change happened under the first presidency of Vladimir Putin.
 I would support the first opinion. To my mind, the dissolution of the Russian 
parliament and the subsequent creation and adoption of the new constitution in 
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1993 laid the foundations for non- democratic institutions of political delibera-
tion and competition. That is precisely why the presidential position—constitu-
tionally, the center of power in the Russian political system—has never been 
taken by an oppositional candidate. The relatively low level of the parliament’s 
influence on political and policy processes in Russia, the president’s control of 
the government, the absence of democratic standards of electoral campaigning, 
including formal and informal rules on support from the mass media and finan-
cial contributors—all these characteristics produced the necessary electoral 
results for the incumbent in 1996 and his successor in 2000.
 At the same time, I agree that, in the 2000–2005 period, Russia made a trans-
ition from one level of authoritarianism to another. While in the 1990s Boris 
Yeltsin’s advantages were based on the institutional foundation of the pro- 
presidential constitution and the absence of many democratic rules of the game, 
which could not possibly have been formed in a short period of relatively demo-
cratic government, during the 2000s President Vladimir Putin’s team strength-
ened existing authoritarian institutions and created new ones. If during the 1990s 
(especially after 1995) oppositional parties were able to achieve a parliamentary 
majority and use their position at least to criticize the government’s public policy 
and bargain for budget concessions, then in the 2000s and 2010s the president 
initiated a number of laws that significantly restricted opportunities for opposi-
tional parties to participate in electoral processes and win political positions 
without the president’s agreement (Remington, 2006). Finally, there is a dra-
matic difference between how much the governments did to maintain civil rights 
in Russia between the two periods: where since 1993 Boris Yeltsin himself pro-
tected citizens’ rights concerning freedom of speech and assembly, Vladimir 
Putin established control over most independent sources of information and sig-
nificantly limited freedom of expression.
 According to scholars who study political regimes from a comparative per-
spective, post- Soviet Russia is an example of electoral (or competitive) authori-
tarianism, i.e., the political system combines the existence of significant electoral 
procedures and the government’s systematic violation of political and civil 
rights, aimed at keeping power in the incumbent’s hands. To capture the differ-
ences described above, I will follow Freedom House (FH)’s terminology and 
label the Russian political regime in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s 
as “partly free” and the political regime since 2005 as “not free” (see Figure I.1).
 While acknowledging the various doubts concerning the methodology of the 
FH index, I believe that FH’s experts demonstrate the dynamics of freedom and 
political regime development in the most appropriate way. Figure I.1 shows that 
the Russian political regime has never satisfied the standards of free countries. 
But in 1998, 2005, and 2015, the political situation radically changed and the 
regime became more authoritarian than before.
 Authoritarian leaders and political elites are interested in keeping power in 
the hands of the authoritarian ruler as much as possible. This point does not con-
tradict the mainstream vision of politicians’ interests in democracies, which 
came into fashion due to Anthony Downs (1957). I theorize that, under the 
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 conditions of electoral authoritarianism, this goal plays a more important role 
than in democracies because the price of losing for authoritarian rulers is higher 
than for democratic politicians. Hence, both democratic and authoritarian rulers 
will make use of every option to ensure their political survival, but we can 
expect that they will use different methods and strategies to achieve this goal.
 This book does not claim to compare the strategies of political survival of 
democratic and authoritarian politicians. At the same time, the existing literature 
on contemporary electoral authoritarianism shows that a co- existence of demo-
cratic and authoritarian institutions leads to particular combinations of reactions 
from politicians to the challenges they face. This means that authoritarian rulers 
are able to choose instruments from both democratic and authoritarian reper-
toires of political action. These include repressions of various politicians and 
parties, the ability of ruling politicians to use the public administration for their 
own political purposes, and arbitrary changes in electoral and other institutions 
that restrict oppositional parties’ ability to participate in elections and win them.
 Under any regime, politicians are afraid of losing their power. They suffer 
from the significant political uncertainty that exists in every political system. 
Without doubt, uncertainty in democratic and authoritarian systems is different 
in essence. Valeri Bunce and Marja Csanádi find two types of uncertainty in 
democracies—procedural uncertainty and uncertainty of outcomes (Bunce and 
Csanádi, 1993). They propose that, in stable democratic regimes (“in a liberal 
setting”), “procedural certainty join[s] with uncertain outcomes,” and that during 
a transition from authoritarianism to democracy the level of procedural uncer-
tainty is very high as well (1993: 266–268). We can analyze how these two 
forms of uncertainty change when it comes to authoritarian environments. 
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Figure I.1 The dynamics of freedom in the USSR and the Russian Federation.
Source: Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/).
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Authoritarian rulers enjoy the use of all available political and legal instruments 
to provide the electoral results they need to control a political system. Thus, 
elections are run through a mix of formal and informal practices that place oppo-
sitional parties in an environment of uncertain procedures. At the same time, 
electoral and other politically significant outcomes are made certain, if not for 
ordinary people, then for ruling politicians.
 Andreas Schedler distinguishes two forms of uncertainty in electoral authorit-
arian states—institutional and informational. Institutional uncertainty suggests 
that rulers’ “hold on power is never secure” (2013: 1). Political opposition, 
potential betrayers among the members of their inner circle, a discontented soci-
ety—all exist in authoritarian regimes and are genuine threats to a dictator’s 
power. It is clear that a hegemonic authoritarian regime is less uncertain institu-
tionally than competitive authoritarianism, but neither can avoid this type of 
uncertainty.
 The other form is informational uncertainty. This means that authoritarianism 
naturally suffers from a lack of information. This deficit is reproduced at every 
level. Citizens are restricted in expressing their views in the public space. Con-
sequently, rulers do not know the real level of support for governmental actions 
in society. Authoritarian practices interfere with independent civic participation 
in policy- making. As a result, the government loses alternative means of control 
over officials, who are obliged to implement decisions formulated at a higher 
level. Authoritarian rulers face the classic principal–agent problem, which can 
be resolved through either the development of democratic mechanisms of 
accountability or the arrangement of a bulky and often ineffective apparatus of 
total control (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins et al., 1989).
 This discussion of regime uncertainty concerns not only politics, but public 
policy as well. Authoritarian rulers inevitably implement an opportunistic model 
of policy- making, since they are ready to use all resources and opportunities to 
protect their power. At the same time, authoritarian governments have to over-
come numerous challenges concerning informational asymmetry, exacerbated by 
authoritarian institutions. These challenges force them to establish a specific 
system of public administration, which attempts to find balance through a trade- 
off between authoritarian leaders’ political and policy interests.
The argument
The following analysis will focus on the Russian leaders’ strategies of arrange-
ment and management of intergovernmental relations. My key argument is that 
intergovernmental relations in Russia have been significantly determined by the 
dynamics of its political regime and the political interests of the representatives 
of the federal center, predominantly the Russian President. To prove this, I will 
observe the federal center’s policy in three areas of intergovernmental relations: 
(1) the distribution of responsibilities across levels of government in the 1990s 
and 2000s, (2) the practice of redistribution of federal financial transfers in the 
same periods, and (3) attempts to reform the patterns and principles of regional 
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policy in the 2000s. I will demonstrate how the center formulates the basic prin-
ciples of a policy, and consider not only the officials’ understanding of the most 
effective policy measures, but also federal politicians’ political interests in 
keeping power and full political control over the Russian territory.
 My research will demonstrate that, under the conditions of an authoritarian 
political regime, a level of political uncertainty affects the particularities of inter-
governmental relations. High levels of uncertainty lead to increasing politiciza-
tion of policies, while in a situation where federal politicians are surer of keeping 
their positions, they will allow federal bureaucrats to develop policy measures 
that reflect their beliefs concerning the most effective ways of governing.
 At the same time, the existence of uncertainty in an authoritarian political 
process makes a ruler drastically transform the system of intergovernmental rela-
tions. A struggle with governors as potential representatives of the opposition 
leads to eliminating the institution of autonomous regional power. The governors 
become agents of the federal government in the regions. But this solution makes 
the intergovernmental relations more complicated, and at the end of the day this 
only aggravates the informational uncertainty of the ruler.
 I will show how, over time, the logic of the authoritarian regime has forced the 
federal center to create an internally contradictory system of intergovernmental 
relations—decentralized, but unitary. I am sure that other actors could have used 
different strategies. The regional leaders, elites, and communities could have 
formed a real opposition to the federal center that deprived them of the rights of 
subnational units in a federal state. But this scenario was already rendered imposs-
ible during the Soviet period of Russian federal history. In the first chapter of the 
book I present a new approach to analyzing the development of federal relations in 
Russia from the 1980s through the 2000s. A comparison of Russian federalization 
with classic examples of federal states (the USA, Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, 
Nigeria) demonstrates that Russia has its own distinct pattern for the formation of 
a federal state. Unlike these other cases, the Russian center (but not regional or 
ethnic communities) was the initiator of federalization. The regional authorities 
exploited the political and financial weaknesses of their central counterparts in the 
1990s, but they did not form a constitutionally decentralized political system. The 
effect of this on the current federal system is that it is now characterized by a polit-
ically and administratively strong federal center, and this resulted in the inability 
of subnational authorities to protect their autonomy in the 2000s.
 The second chapter is devoted to how the formation of, and changes in, the 
Russian political regime have influenced federal relations since 1999. The polit-
ical struggle with the regional elites in 1999–2000 was Vladimir Putin’s first 
challenge as a head of state. The victory of politically strong governors allowed 
for a reduction in the number of alternative power centers and provided advanced 
control over electoral possibilities. I demonstrate that the logic of political sur-
vival of the federal elite was the primary reason for all (2000, 2004, and 2012) 
federative reforms in Russia.
 Intergovernmental relations are not limited to the political struggle between 
governmental levels. Besides political and administrative dimensions, there are 
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financial relations and the federal center’s policy on the economic development 
of regions (this policy is called “regional policy” in Russia). So, I show the 
dynamics of Russian regional policy during the 1990s and 2000s and how the 
political process and federal relations influence the federal center’s regional 
policy. The third chapter deals with the factors influencing redistribution of 
intergovernmental financial transfers. To achieve this, the chapter presents a sta-
tistical analysis of budgetary, electoral, and economic data. Finally, the fourth 
chapter contains case studies that concern the so- called “shared spheres of 
responsibility” of the federal center and subnational authorities. The analysis dis-
plays the mechanisms of the federal center’s control over regional authorities, 
and the strategies of regional elites in the context of a changing political regime.
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1 Tertius gaudens
What is wrong with Russian 
federalism?
On September 1, 2004, a group of armed terrorists took hostages in a school in 
Beslan, a small town in North Ossetia, one of the North Caucasus republics. A 
total of 1100 people, including 777 children, were captured. Three days later, 
during the rescue operation at least 314 hostages were killed.
	 This	act	of	terrorism	and	the	actions	surrounding	the	fearful	episode	reflected	
all	the	particularities	and	difficulties	of	intergovernmental	and	interregional	rela-
tions in Russia. The hostage- takers were members and supporters of the Chechen 
separatist	 and	 Islamic	 terrorist	 movement,	 which	 has	 battled	 with	 the	 federal	
forces	in	Chechnya	since	1999.	The	terrorists	were	known	to	have	declared	their	
demands	 to	 the	 federal	 government:	 the	 federal	 army	 was	 to	 withdraw	 from	
Chechnya, and the federal center was to recognize the independence of Ichkeria, 
as the separatists named the Chechen Republic.
	 As	 well	 as	 Chechens,	 the	 terrorist	 group	 included	 representatives	 of	 the	
Ingush	 people.	 This	 fact	 exacerbated	 a	 deep	 conflict	 between	 the	 Ingush	 and	
Ossetian	peoples,	which	had	broken	out	due	to	the	controversial	status	of	a	part	
of North Ossetia’s territory that had been Ingush land before that people was 
deported	by	the	Soviet	government.	Since	the	time	of	real	war	between	the	two	
republics	in	1992,	their	relations	have	remained	suspicious	and	hostile.	The	fact	
that the terrorist camp had been located in the territory of Ingushetia before the 
massacre	 strengthened	 such	 suspicions	 and	 could	 have	 led	 to	 a	 new	 phase	 of	
conflict	between	North	Ossetia	and	Ingushetia.
	 The	Beslan	tragedy	demonstrated	the	weakness	of	all	levels	of	government	in	
the	 North	 Caucasus	 in	 fighting	 terrorism,	 including	 the	 federal	 anti-	terrorist	
agencies.	 Yet	 Vladimir	 Putin	 blamed	 only	 the	 regional	 governments	 for	 this	
failure. On September 13, 2004 he declared that the power of special agencies 
had to be increased, and, at the same time, that the institution of popular election 
of	governors	had	 to	be	replaced	with	 the	mechanism	of	 their	de	facto	appoint-
ment by the Russian President. In this way, Putin used the massacre to dramatic-
ally limit the autonomy of the Russian regions.
	 The	governors’	reaction	to	these	decisions	was	unexpected.	Where	ten	years	
ago they had enjoyed an extremely autonomous, almost independent existence, 
and	five	years	ago	they	had	loudly	protested—unsuccessfully—against	the	presi-
dent’s	 idea	of	 replacing	 them	with	 their	 representatives	 in	 the	higher	house	of	
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parliament, now they demonstrated complete support for Vladimir Putin’s initi-
atives.	The	presidents	 of	Tatarstan	 and	Bashkortostan,	 probably	 the	 politically	
strongest	regions	in	Russia,	were	the	first	governors	to	express	their	agreement	
with	 the	president.	The	head	of	 the	Republic	of	Karelia	even	said	 that	he	con-
sidered	this	option	the	only	possibility	for	achieving	his	state’s	goals.
	 In	that	moment,	the	regional	leaders	gave	up	all	advantages	they	had	gained	
in the 1990s, the decade of the great Russian decentralization. Six years later the 
federal	 government	 replaced	 the	 presidents	 of	 Tatarstan	 and	 Bashkortostan	
without	 any	 effort.	 The	 powerful	 leaders	 of	 regional	 autonomy	 gave	 place	 to	
completely loyal appointees. The year 2016 started with an unprecedented 
decree	 by	 the	 Russian	 President	 concerning	 the	 governor	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	
Karelia.	 I	 will	 quote	 it	 verbatim:	 “Because	A. P. Hudilainen, the head of the 
Republic of Karelia, failed in his obligations to resettle citizens from emergency 
housing,	I	decree	to	rebuke	the	head	of	the	government	of	Karelia	A. P. Hudi-
lainen” (Decree,	2016).	Hudilainen	agreed:
It	is	obvious	that	the	criticism	is	completely	fair,	and	[I]	deserve	the	repri-
mand.	Karelia	has	many	problems.	Vladimir	Putin	has	heard	everything	and	
accepted our arguments. That is why only a reprimand was declared. Today 
I	have	made	a	tough	decision—the	government	of	the	Republic	of	Karelia	is	
dissolved.
(Glava, 2016)
On	 the	 same	 day,	 Konstantin	 Ilkovsky,	 the	 governor	 of	 Zabaykalsky	 Krai,	
another regional leader who had been blamed for the failure of housing policy in 
his region, asked the president to accept his resignation.
 Article 1 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation declares fed-
eralism to be a fundamental principle of the public administration in Russia. 
Subnational	governments	and	parliaments,	the	distribution	of	spheres	of	respons-
ibility between federal and regional authorities, and the upper chamber of the 
Russian parliament as a channel for representation of regional interests are estab-
lished	by	the	Russian	legislation.	At	the	same	time,	the	practice	of	intergovern-
mental relations in Russia in the 2010s is similar to relations between national 
and	 regional	 governments	 in	 a	 unitary	 state.	 How	 has	 this	 become	 possible?	
Why	did	the	regional	governments	in	Russia	reject	their	political	autonomy	and	
integrate	 themselves	 into	 the	 so-	called	 “power	 vertical,”	 the	 united	 system	 of	
government	that	includes	all	levels,	from	the	national	to	the	very	local?	What	is	
wrong with Russian federalism?
How is a federal state built and preserved?
The	presidential	reprimand	to	governors,	and	many	other	pieces	of	evidence	con-
cerning	 intergovernmental	 relations	 in	 the	 2000s	 and	 the	 2010s,	 demonstrates	
that	Russian	federalism,	if	it	exists,	differs	significantly	from	“classic”	cases	of	
federal states. Riker and his followers note that a federation is an extremely 
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fragile	 and	 unstable	 form	 of	 government.	 Federal	 and	 subnational	 politicians’	
interests	motivate	them	to	struggle	for	additional	spheres	of	responsibility,	finan-
cial resources, and political power. That is why such a state is at risk of trans-
formation into either a unitary state or a confederal union.
 This fact has led scholars to formulate one of the core research questions in 
studies	of	federal	states—what	institutional	safeguards	allow	for	a	stable,	robust,	
self-	sustainable	 political	 system	 (Riker,	 1964;	 Filippov	 et	 al.,	 2004;	 Bednar,	
2009)? These three authors see a federation as a set of constitutional norms, a 
specific	institutional	arrangement	that	is	able	to	provide	the	necessary	balance	in	
a political system.
 Later I will discuss these safeguards in detail, but for now it is important that 
these	 findings	 raise	 another	 question:	 why	 do	 some	 countries	 create	 such	 an	
institutional context, while others do not and as a result become examples of 
failed federations? In searching for the factors that contribute to understanding 
these outcomes, I follow historical institutional reasoning and seek them in the 
particularities of the origin and the process of federalization in such countries. 
My	 argument	 here	 is	 that	 a	 specific	 context	 of	 federalization	 (Faletti,	 2005)	
generates certain mechanisms that allow or force regional elites to struggle for 
their autonomy in federal states. I theorize that all institutional safeguards are 
results	of	such	mechanisms’	activity.
	 One	 of	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 reviews	 of	 ideas	 concerning	 causes	 and	
factors	involved	in	federal	states’	origins	is	contained	in	the	concluding	chapter	
of Ramesh D. Dikshit’s book The Political Geography of Federalism	 (1975).	
The	central	place	in	his	analysis	is	given	to	Riker’s	concept	of	two	conditions	of	
federal	bargaining.	Riker	insists	that	each	of	two	conditions	is	a	“necessary	con-
dition	for	the	creation	of	a	federalism”	(Riker,	1964:	13).	The	first	is	the	“expan-
sion condition,” which indicates the will of a state’s rulers to expand their 
territory	 peacefully.	 The	 second	 one	 is	 the	 “military	 condition,”	 which	 is	
engaged when politicians participate in federal bargaining to become stronger in 
the	face	of	a	dangerous	enemy.	Riker’s	point	is	very	radical:	he	is	confident	that	
the absence of at least one of these two conditions leads to the failure of a federal 
state. Dikshit does not agree with this assertion. His analysis demonstrates at 
least two cases (West Germany and Austria) that did not meet these assump-
tions. At the same time Dikshit supports Riker’s and many other authors’ focus 
on the military condition. He agrees that a foreign threat promotes the reinforce-
ment	of	the	central	government	and	support	for	a	federal	state	as	a	whole.
 Dikshit himself proposes a model that explains why some cases of federalization 
result	 in	 centralized	 federations	 or	 even	 unitary	 states	 while	 other	 cases	 end	 in	
decentralized federal models or confederal unions. Dikshit’s model pays attention to 
the entities that will ultimately become the subnational units of a future federal state. 
He writes that the six factors contributing to the creation of a more centralized 
system are the subnational units’ sense of common military insecurity, their simil-
arity of race, language, and culture, the interdependence of their economies, the prior 
existence of these communities as parts of the same political system (for example, as 
colonies of an empire), the existence of easy interregional communication, and their 
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compatibility in terms of social and political institutions. On the other hand, there 
are	six	factors	that	can	prevent	any	integration	processes.	They	are	the	existence	of	
regionally	 grouped	 diversities,	 the	 existence	 of	 communities	with	 independent	 or	
competitive	 economies,	 the	 communities’	 prior	 independent	 existence	 as	 political	
units,	the	absence	of	a	common	external	threat,	the	presence	of	conflicting	threats	to	
the	different	units	involved,	and	the	existence	of	groups	of	units	following	contrast-
ing	and	mutually	incompatible	“philosophies”	(today	we	would	say	“ideologies”).
	 Dikshit	believes	that	different	combinations	of	factors	from	both	groups	lead	
to	specific	 types	of	 federalism	(he	uses	Riker’s	distinction	between	centralized	
and	 peripheralized	 federations)	 or	 even	 transformations	 of	 federal	 states	 into	
unitary	ones	or	complete	disintegration.	For	example,	Dikshit	insists	that	“if	the	
first	factor	of	the	first	set	is	found	in	combination	with	the	first	three	factors	of	
the	 second	 set,	 the	 situation	 is	 confederal”	 (Dikshit,	 1975:	 229).	Additionally,	
there is a combination of factors that, according to Dikshit, contributes to the 
formation of a centralized federal state and its subsequent transformation to a 
unitary state. To reach such an outcome, all the factors of integration must be 
combined	with	one	factor	of	disintegration—the	units’	experience	of	being	inde-
pendent	 states	 or	 regionally	 autonomous	 provinces	 in	 an	 empire	 (Dikshit,	
1975:	232).
	 The	main	advantage	of	this	model	is	that	it	is	based	on	empirical	analysis	of	
at least 17 federations across the world. The thorough description of these coun-
tries	allows	Dikshit	 to	make	a	comprehensive	list	of	factors.	At	the	same	time,	
this	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 disadvantage.	With	 six	 factors	 involved	 in	 protection	 of	
autonomy	in	a	model,	it	is	very	difficult	to	understand	which	one	of	them	is	the	
most important and which others perform technical and supporting roles.
	 However,	the	most	significant	limitation	of	both	Riker’s	and	Dikshit’s	ideas	
lies	 in	Albert	Venn	Dicey’s	statement	 that	a	 federation	 is	born	when	“political	
communities in an area desire union without desiring complete unity” (Dikshit, 
1971:	101).	During	almost	the	whole	of	the	twentieth	century,	the	biggest	theo-
rists of federalism reproduced the idea that federations are products of the inte-
gration of independent states or autonomous parts of empires. That is exactly 
why the United States of America became a prototype and ideal type of fed-
eralism for many scholars.
	 Alfred	Stepan	(2005)	was	probably	one	of	the	first	authors	who	insisted	that	
we should distinguish between two types of modern federal states. He called 
them	 “coming-	together”	 and	 “holding-	together”	 federalisms.	 The	 USA,	 the	
exemplar of coming- together federalism, can be useful for understanding only 
those	federations	that	were	formed	as	a	result	of	the	integration	of	several	sover-
eign or partially independent states. They must bargain with each other to create 
a	supranational	government	and	design	an	institutional	environment	that	protects	
them from transformation of the federation into a unitary state. Hereafter I name 
this	process	of	federalization	the	“scenario	of	centralization.”
 Apart from the USA, other examples of this type of federalization are Argen-
tina, Australia, Canada, Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzer-
land.	Of	course,	they	all	are	very	different	cases,	but	the	particularities	of	their	
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federalization,	 I	would	argue,	 lead	 to	 the	development	of	 a	 specific	context	of	
intergovernmental	relations,	which	I	will	describe	later.
	 Most	of	the	newer	federations	have	formed	in	a	different	way.	They	are	the	
result	of	decentralization,	when	 the	central	government	of	a	unitary	state	dele-
gates	a	share	of	its	responsibilities	to	subnational	governments.	This	scenario	of	
decentralization	 develops	 into	 holding-	together	 federalism.	 Austria,	 Belgium,	
Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Nepal, and Nigeria were formed in accordance with this 
pattern.
 Later I will discuss basic differences in the content of coming- together and 
holding- together federalisms. Now I will examine the preconditions, causes, and 
particularities of federalization in both scenarios.
	 Due	to	the	Amer	ican	case,	the	scenario	of	centralization	has	been	extensively	
scrutinized.	 There	 are	 detailed	 descriptions	 of	 every	 stage	 of	 federalization	 as	
well	as	theoretical	interpretations	of	every	moment	of	this	process.
 The key moment in the scenario of centralization is the signing of the con-
stitutional contract between the states that will become subnational units in a 
future federal state. This contract transfers part of their responsibilities to the 
federal	 government	 that	 is	 formed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 this	 bargaining.	 This	 process	
must	provide	obvious	 advantages	 for	 the	 elites	of	 the	 future	 subnational	units,	
otherwise they would not agree to the loss of their independence. What are their 
incentives	in	this	process?
 The scenario of federalization follows the model of the social contract described 
in the works of Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes, 1998) and John Locke (Locke, 1999), 
which	 explain	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 state	 through	 the	 great	 disadvantage	of	 the	 “the	
state	of	nature,”	where	people	feel	a	lack	of	safety.	They	make	a	contract	to	over-
come	this	problem:	safety	and	law	replace	their	natural	freedom.
	 The	same	incentives	push	 independent	states	 to	give	up	 their	 independence.	
The Federalist Papers, the best source where the Founding Fathers of the USA 
thoroughly explain why they propose to establish a centralized state instead of 
the extremely weak confederal union, indicates two main reasons to centralize. 
Both	concern	issues	of	states’	safety,	because	“among	the	many	objects	to	which	
a	wise	and	free	people	find	it	necessary	to	direct	their	attention,	that	of	providing	
for	 their	 safety	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 first”	 (Hamilton	 et	 al.,	 2008:	 79).	On	 the	 one	
hand,	a	federation	allows	its	formerly	independent	units	to	avoid	wars	with	each	
other. On the other, a united state is a more powerful player in the international 
arena, as it can protect itself and its interests in relations with other states better 
than a set of small countries.
	 Of	 course,	 this	 finding	 is	 not	 novel	 for	 federal	 studies.	 Riker’s	Federalism 
states the same when the author describes the military condition of federalization 
(Riker,	1964:	12–13).	This	rationale	remains	effective	even	two	centuries	later.	
However,	 it	now	concerns	predominantly	economic	rather	 than	military	safety.	
For	 example,	 the	 successful	 development	 of	 the	European	Union’s	 integration	
can be explained by the same reasons.
 The numerous examples of federations that were created in accordance with 
this scenario allow one to formulate a model of the formation of such federal 
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states.	 In	 the	first	 stage,	 several	 independent	 states	with	 relatively	 small	 territ-
ories	and	limited	influence	on	international	affairs	make	an	agreement	of	collab-
oration and coordination in certain spheres. In the USA, that agreement was 
formalized in the Articles of Confederation, which was aimed at strengthening 
13	states	in	the	face	of	foreign	enemies.	But	five	centuries	before	the	Amer	ican	
experiment, in Europe the three rural communities of Uri, Schwyz, and Unter-
wald, which had gained independence from the Holy Roman Empire, arranged 
the	“Everlasting	Alliance”	to	provide	for	defense	against	 the	big	players	 in	the	
European	 arena.	Over	 the	 next	 half-	century	 five	more	 communities	 joined	 the	
confederation.
 Initially, a confederation can be managed by an assembly or other coordin-
ation organization, which represents all members of a confederation and does 
not	 make	 any	 decision	 without	 the	 consent	 of	 each	 member.	 However,	 quite	
soon the absence of a powerful center of decision- making, and numerous dis-
agreements between the members of a confederation, lead to discussions about 
the need to strengthen the union. As a result, the members of a confederation 
make	a	new	bargain	and	create	an	authoritative	federal	government	along	with	
an assembly, courts, and other components of a real centralized state. This 
process can take many years, but one day a federal state is declared by a new 
constitution, which includes all the requirements I discussed in the Introduction.
	 Of	course,	not	all	states	follow	this	path	of	federalization	in	every	detail.	For	
example, the British colonies in Australia and Canada bypassed the stage of con-
federation and went straight to the stage of centralized federations (although in 
the Canadian case this new state was called the Canadian Confederation, de facto 
it was a federal state). The federation formed in Germany in 1949 was designed 
not by independent states, but by the 11 regions of Germany, which had been 
deprived	of	their	national	center	as	a	result	of	the	Second	World	War.	Thus,	the	
scenario	of	centralization	is	confirmed	not	by	observing	a	process	of	step-	by-step	
centralization,	but	rather	by	the	absence	of	any	central	government	in	the	process	
of constitutional bargaining. The leading role is performed by the future subna-
tional	units:	they	agree	to	the	establishment	of	a	federation,	designate	the	spheres	
of	responsibility	that	will	be	transferred	to	the	federal	government,	and	provide	
institutions to protect the union from disintegration or complete centralization.
 As a result of the realization of this scenario, coming- together federalism 
emerges. Such a federation is symmetrical. During constitutional bargaining, its 
participants	are	able	to	demand	that	equal	rights	and	responsibilities	be	provided	
for	 each	 of	 them.	 Otherwise,	 deprived	 units	 can	 reject	 integration.	 A	 con-
sequence	 of	 this	 equality	 is,	 using	 Stepan’s	 terms,	 the	 “demos-	constraining”	
model	of	government,	where	the	interests	of	subnational	units	dominate	those	of	
the people of the federation as a whole. Again, not all federations created in 
accordance with the scenario of centralization are controlled by these institu-
tions,	but	compared	with	holding-	together	federations	they	fit	this	description.
	 Initially	 in	 such	 federations,	 subnational	 units	 have	 a	 fairly	 wide	 range	 of	
spheres of responsibility, but later they are forced to transfer more functions to 
the	higher	level	of	government.	There	is	a	wealth	of	literature	that	demonstrates	
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how the Amer ican federal politicians withdraw regional responsibilities step by 
step, using the decisions of the Supreme Court as the politically strongest federal 
actor.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 states’	 elites	 fervently	 protect	 their	 rights	 and	
responsibilities; they appeal to the US Constitution as the contract they made as 
independent states.
 Another model of federalization, which results from decentralization in a 
former unitary state, is explained by different reasons. Under normal circum-
stances,	the	central	government	of	a	unitary	state	would	hardly	agree	to	limit	its	
competences	 and	 political	 resources	 voluntarily.	 The	 only	 incentive	 that	 can	
encourage the central elites to share their power with regional ones is the threat 
of losing power completely. To clarify the nature of this threat, we can examine 
a	 couple	 of	 enlightening	 cases.	 The	 first	 is	Belgium,	 a	 classic	 example	 of	 the	
scenario of decentralization. I understand that the Belgian case is well known to 
scholars of federalism, but I would like to remind the reader of a few key points 
in its history.
 The Kingdom of Belgium, as we know it now, emerged on the political map 
of Europe in 1830 as a unitary state that was mainly inhabited by two linguistic 
communities—the	Flemish,	who	spoke	a	dialect	of	the	Dutch	language,	and	the	
Francophone	 Walloons.	 The	 first	 community	 comprised	 the	 majority	 of	 the	
population	(nearly	51	percent),	while	Walloons	were	in	the	minority	(33	percent)	
(Loh,	1975:	218).	In	spite	of	this	ratio,	the	political,	economic,	and	cultural	elites	
in Belgium stemmed from the Francophones. The Flemish population mainly 
included	peasants,	workers,	and	merchants.	All	Flemish	people	who	could	find	a	
place among the elites necessarily spoke French. This language became an 
important	condition	for	moving	up	the	social	class	ladder.
 The 1831 Constitution of Belgium declared the country to be a constitutional 
monarchy led by a parliament. But participation in elections was limited by the 
demand	that	voters	should	pay	a	specific	tax.	As	a	result,	the	electorate	consisted	
of	members	of	the	higher	economic	class,	and	the	Flemish	population	was	virtu-
ally	 deprived	 of	 political	 rights	 and	 could	 not	 participate	 in	 national	 policy-	
making.	The	constitution	did	not	even	mention	that	the	Belgian	population	spoke	
two languages. Only French was used in public affairs.
	 In	essence,	the	national	government	launched	a	policy	of	civic	nation-	building	
based on the Walloon community and the French language. The Flemish people 
felt	a	sense	of	alienation	from	Belgian	statehood.	They	were	dissatisfied	with	the	
resulting	governmental	system	and	societal	arrangement.
 As a result, by the middle of the nineteenth century, intellectuals and profes-
sionals from the Flemish middle class demanded that the French and the Flemish 
languages should be made equal in the public sphere. It was the beginning of the 
Flemish	national	movement	 (Dunn,	 1974:	 144).	Eric	Hobsbawm	characterized	
such	 groups	 in	 the	 following	 way:	 “The	 battle-	lines	 of	 linguistic	 nationalism	
were	 manned	 by	 provincial	 journalists,	 schoolteachers	 and	 aspiring	 subaltern	
officials”	 (Hobsbawm,	 1992:	 117).	 Representatives	 of	 these	 groups	 began	 to	
standardize	 the	 Flemish	 dialects	 and	 teach	 other	 Flemish	 people	 the	 unified	
Flemish	language.	Gradually,	the	idea	of	the	revival	of	Flanders	spilled	over	into	
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the political sphere. Hobsbawm described this transition with the help of Miro-
slav	 Hroch’s	 model	 (Hroch,	 1996).	 The	 cultural	 and	 linguistic	 renaissance,	
which	became	a	foundation	for	nationalistic	movements	in	Belgium,	is	evidence	
of	Hroch’s	phase	A.	Phase	B	refers	 to	 the	emergence	of	activists	who	provide	
“political	agitation	in	favor	of	the	‘national	idea.’	”	Finally,	phase	C	occurs	when	
“mass	 support	 for	 ‘the	 national	 idea’	 can	 be	 counted	 on”	 (Hobsbawm,	 1992:	
104).	 This	 model	 does	 indeed	 describe	 the	 development	 of	 the	 conflict	 in	
Belgium.	 Eventually,	 the	 national	 government	 bowed	 to	 the	 pressure	 of	 the	
Flemish	movement	and	steadily	increased	the	official	status	of	the	Flemish	lan-
guage up to the beginning of the twentieth century.
	 The	small	numbers	of	the	Walloons,	the	increasing	economic	development	of	
Flemish industrial companies, and the history of long- term opposition between 
the	 two	communities	 led	 the	Walloons	 to	fear	being	politically	deprived	in	 the	
new societal conditions. Thus, as a consequence of the sharp increase in the 
influence	 of	 the	 Flemish	 community,	 the	 Walloon	 citizens	 reacted	 by	 giving	
birth	 to	 their	 own	 nationalistic	 movement.	 Ultimately,	 Belgium	 experienced	
many	incidents	of	ethnic	conflict,	including	actual	riots,	which	were	initiated	by	
both sides. Considering these facts, it is no wonder that both Walloon and 
Flemish	 radical	 politicians	 have	 suggested	 separating	 Belgium	 into	 two	 inde-
pendent states.
	 The	problem	was	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	the	groups	in	conflict	had	dis-
persed	across	Belgium	when	settling,	although	 two	regions—Wallonia	and	 the	
Flemish	region—had	historically	existed.	The	most	obvious	problem	lay	in	Brus-
sels,	which	was	inhabited	by	representatives	of	both	groups.	Additionally,	there	
was a German- speaking population in part of Wallonia.
 Since the issues of culture and language were at the center of public debates, 
it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 first	 wave	 of	 decentralization	 in	 1970	 included	
forming three exterritorial cultural communities, Flemish-, French-, and German-
	speaking,	 which	 were	 given	 opportunities	 to	 make	 decisions	 in	 the	 fields	 of	
culture	and	education.	In	1980,	the	second	wave	of	reforms	recognized	the	com-
munities’	rights	to	govern	not	only	culture	but	also	human	rights,	healthcare,	and	
social	provision.	Additionally,	two	territorially	based	regions	were	formed—the	
Flemish	and	Walloon	regions.	All	five	subnational	units	had	a	legal	opportunity	
to form assemblies and cabinets, but the Flemish community and region decided 
to	 combine	 their	 governmental	 structures.	 The	 third	 wave	 of	 decentralization	
(1988–1999)	formalized	Brussels	as	a	distinct	bilingual	region.	At	the	same	time,	
the communities’ responsibilities were extended to educational policy, while the 
development	of	transportation	infrastructure	was	delegated	to	the	regions.
 As a result, Belgium became one of the most famous cases of an ethnic feder-
ation in the contemporary world. Its constitutional arrangement, which combines 
exterritorial and territorial subnational units, is an example of complex institu-
tional	design,	one	formed	by	the	central	authorities	in	order	to	avoid	the	collapse	
of the state. Sometimes, quite often, the future of Belgium is impugned, but the 
fact	is	that	Belgium	overcomes	new	political	crises	time	after	time	and	continues	
to	demonstrate	the	robustness	of	its	governmental	system.
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	 It	is	worth	noting	that	states	that	have	proceeded	far	along	the	path	of	decen-
tralization	often	refuse	to	recognize	themselves	as	federal	states	even	when	they	
satisfy	all	the	requirements	for	this	type	of	government.	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	
Belgium has enjoyed the basic features of federalism since 1970, those features 
were	only	 established	constitutionally	 in	1993.	We	can	observe	 the	 same	 situ-
ation in Spain, where the 1978 Constitution includes all the features of a federal 
system, but has no mention of federalism (Agranoff, 2006).
 In general, the Spanish case repeats the main features of the Belgian history 
of	 federalization.	 Francisco	 Franco,	 having	 just	 won	 the	 Spanish	 Civil	 War,	
abolished the territorial autonomy of the Basque Country and Catalonia, two 
regions	with	their	own	languages	and	cultures,	which	were	significantly	different	
from the Spanish ones. Franco not only forbade the use of these languages in 
public affairs, but also banned the practice of regional traditions (Shabad and 
Gunther,	 1982).	 These	 measures	 provoked	 real	 opposition	 from	 the	 Basque	
and	Catalonian	 communities,	 and	 several	 nationalistic	 armed	 groups	 appeared	
and	 made	 very	 radical	 demands,	 including	 for	 these	 regions	 to	 secede	 from	
Spain.	 After	 Franco’s	 death,	 the	 new	 democratic	 government	 provided	 broad	
autonomy	 to	 the	 two	 regions.	 It	 was	 a	 de	 facto	 federal	 system:	 the	 regions	
received	their	own	competences,	political	autonomy,	and	financial	resources	for	
development.	That	 the	central	government’s	policy	measure	was	compelled	by	
pressure	 from	 the	nationalistic	movements	 is	 proved	by	 the	 fact	 that,	 initially,	
only	the	two	problematic	regions	received	a	given	level	of	autonomy.	Addition-
ally,	there	is	a	univocal	statement	in	the	constitution	by	the	national	government	
that	 clearly	demonstrates	 its	 careful	 attitude	 to	 the	process	of	decentralization:	
“Under	no	circumstances	 shall	 a	 federation	of	Self-	governing	Communities	be	
allowed” (Constitution of Spain, 1978).
 So how can we describe the process of federalization in accordance with a 
scenario of decentralization? Initially, there is a heterogeneous society that con-
sists	 of	 several	 ethnic,	 linguistic,	 or	 religious	groups.	Later,	 one	of	 the	groups	
comes to occupy dominant positions in public sphere. This is usually accom-
panied by the policy of forming a nation- state based on the linguistic and cul-
tural characteristics of the dominant group. As a result, a transition from a 
heterogeneous	society	to	a	so-	called	“plural	society”	takes	place.
 The analysis of the Belgian and Spanish cases demonstrates that the plural 
society	 is	 the	 context	 that	 launches	 federalization.	 To	 define	 the	 term	 “plural	
society,”	I	follow	Harry	Eckstein	and	Arend	Lijphart,	who	define	it	as	a	society	
“where	 political	 divisions	 follow	very	 closely,	 and	 especially	 concern	 lines	 of	
objective	social	differentiation,	especially	those	particularly	salient	in	a	society”	
(Eckstein,	 1966;	 Lijphart,	 1977).	 These	 lines	 divide	 the	 segments	 of	 a	 plural	
society,	which	can	be	religious,	cultural,	racial,	or	ethnic.	This	definition	demon-
strates	that	a	plural	society	suffers	from	deep-	rooted	conflicts.
 If the segmented communities are concentrated in location, struggles between 
them	can	lead	to	territorial	disintegration	and	even	the	collapse	of	the	state.	But	
if	they	are	settled	in	a	dispersed	way,	civil	war	can	break	out.	Under	the	circum-
stances	of	a	plural	society,	the	central	government	has	to	take	measures	to	avoid	
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the state’s rapid disintegration. These often include forceful action against 
nationalistic	movements.	 Such	 actions	 can	 prove	 efficient	 in	 a	 short-	term	 per-
spective,	when	the	government	does	not	shy	from	applying	the	repressive	appar-
atus, and is less concerned with appeasing its citizens’ dissatisfaction with the 
violation	 of	 their	 rights.	 But	 in	 the	 long	 term,	 a	 government’s	 tough	 actions	
deepen	 conflict	 between	 the	 segments	 of	 a	 plural	 society.	 Soon,	 especially	 in	
democracies,	 the	 government	 has	 to	 succumb	 to	 moderate	 demands	 by	 the	
leaders of the minorities, and launch the process of decentralization.
	 Decentralization	can	be	implemented	in	one	of	two	ways.	The	first	 involves	
the	 delegation	 of	 authority	 and	 resources	 to	 governmental	 structures	 that	
represent the segments of plural society. Theoretical support for this strategy is 
provided	 by	 Arend	 Lijphart’s	 concept	 of	 consociational	 democracy	 (Lijphart,	
1977). It proposes that all segments of a plural society should be included in the 
national	 decision-	making	 process	 and	 possess	 a	 high	 level	 of	 autonomy.	Con-
sequently,	the	central	government	should	create	a	federation	where	each	segment	
becomes a subnational unit. Depending on the manner in which the segments are 
settled, the subnational units can be territorially or extraterritorially based.
	 An	 alternative	 to	 Lijphart’s	 model	 was	 developed	 by	 Donald	 Horowitz	
(1985),	 one	 of	 the	 most	 famous	 opponents	 of	 the	 consociational	 model.	 It	 is	
noteworthy that his solution is federal as well. The main difference between the 
two models is that Horowitz proposes forming subnational units without consid-
ering segmental differences, because if a segment is delegated competences and 
political	autonomy,	separatist	movements	will	gain	additional	resources	to	con-
tinue disintegrating the state. That is why following Horowitz’s idea protects a 
federation	 that	 would	 consist	 of	 administratively	 defined	 subnational	 units	
coupled with the presidential model of separation of power.
 The weakness of Horowitz’s argument is that he bases it on Nigeria, a case of 
a	federation	being	created	by	an	authoritarian	government.	The	first	constitution	
of a Nigeria independent from the British Empire’s control declared a federal 
territorial arrangement with three subnational units, which institutionally framed 
the	 three	main	segments	of	 its	plural	 society—Hausa-	Fulani,	Yoruba,	and	 Ibo.	
This	 constitution	 was	 consociational	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 federal	 arrange-
ment.	The	three	groups	controlled	the	federal	government	and	assembly	without	
considering	 the	 consociational	 rule	 of	 veto.	 That	 is	 why	 the	 Ibo,	 the	 smallest	
group, demanded that the competences of the federal center should be re- 
examined:	 the	 central	 government	 should	 possess	 only	 such	 authority	 as	 was	
agreed by all segments of Nigerian society. The dominant groups did not agree 
with	this	proposal.	In	1966	the	situation	gave	rise	to	a	demand	to	allow	Ibo	and	
its allies (the Biafra coalition) to form an independent state, and resulted in a 
full-	scale	civil	war	 in	Nigeria.	The	military	government	divided	 the	 three	sub-
national units into 13. In 1979 their number was increased to 19 (Horowitz, 
1985:	612–613),	and	in	1993	to	36	states	and	one	territory.
 Thus, the main reason to form a federal state within a scenario of decentraliza-
tion	 is	 to	find	an	 institutional	 solution	 that	defuses	 the	conflict	between	 the	seg-
ments of a plural society where some wish to secede and found an independent 
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state.	Lijphart	persuasively	demonstrates	that	under	democratic	conditions	central	
governments	 have	 a	 limited	number	 of	 strategies	 to	 influence	 the	 situation.	The	
segments of a plural society are so politically strong that they rarely allow 
the central authorities to weaken them using the tools of institution- building. At 
the same time, Horowitz draws our attention to the use of federal approaches by 
authoritarian	governments	to	solve	the	same	problem—that	is,	the	existence	of	the	
centrifugal intentions of distinct communities, which are dangerous for the whole 
state.
	 Federalization	here	represents	the	national	government’s	acquiescence	to	bot-
tom-	up	 demands,	 and	 something	 it	 would	 not	 have	 otherwise	 pursued.	 The	
intensity of such demands correlates with the degree of the communities’ auto-
nomy	and	their	willingness	to	gain	new	powers	and	resources	even	at	the	cost	of	
lives.
 This pattern explains why such federations are typically asymmetrical. The 
central	government	agrees	to	delegate	competences	and	resources	only	to	those	
communities that demand them. Based on the results of bargaining with each 
community,	 the	 center	 creates	 a	 special	model	 of	 intergovernmental	 relations,	
which	can	be	changed	again	if	one	of	 the	actors—either	the	center	or	a	subna-
tional	unit—acquires	new	arguments	for	a	new	wave	of	bargaining.
	 According	to	Stepan’s	logic	(2005),	such	a	federation	is	“demos-	enabling”	as	
well, since proportionality and consensus are the key elements of such a political 
system,	and	allow	for	the	representation	of	all	segments	in	every	influential	gov-
ernmental	structure,	as	well	as	effective	participation	of	minority	groups	in	the	
decision- making process.
	 As	far	as	observed	cases	demonstrate,	in	both	models	of	federalization	future	
subnational	units	perform	a	crucially	important	role:	they	initiate	the	process	of	
forming a federal state. In the scenario of decentralization, subnational units 
force	the	central	government	to	share	its	power,	while	in	the	scenario	of	centrali-
zation,	there	is	no	center	until	units	agree	to	create	it.	Their	active	role	includes	
the opportunity to establish an institutional system that protects their autonomy 
in	a	 long-	term	perspective.	It	 is	obvious—and	this	 is	an	important	note	for	my	
further	argumentation—that	if	a	subnational	unit	does	not	participate	in	bargain-
ing	 over	 a	 new	 constitutional	 arrangement,	 nobody	will	 provide	 safeguards	 to	
preserve	its	federal	relations	in	the	future.
	 Federalization	following	the	pattern	of	one	of	the	two	scenarios	gives	rise	to	a	
surprising consequence. Those federations that were formed due to centraliza-
tion keep centralizing further. The United States Supreme Court has recently 
compelled	 the	 states’	 governments	 to	 legalize	 same-	sex	 marriage.	 President	
Obama’s administration was able to impose a radically new health care system 
on the whole country. The possible introduction of general standards of educa-
tion in the United States is also a popular subject for policy debates in con-
temporary America.
 Switzerland is another federation that sees frequent strengthening of the 
federal	 government	 (Braun,	 2009).	 This	 tendency	 forced	 the	 cantons’	 govern-
ments	to	initiate	a	re-	examination	of	intergovernmental	relations	in	the	country	
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at the turn of the century. Such centralization does not turn a federation into a 
unitary state. The safeguards reliably protect subnational units against a one- way 
revision	 of	 federal	 bargains.	 But	 subnational	 elites	 are	 wary	 of	 this	 tendency	
toward	 centralization,	 which	 is	 fiercely	 debated	 at	 all	 levels	 in	 the	 aforemen-
tioned countries.
 A contrast to this can be found in those federations that were formed as a 
result of decentralization experience strengthening subnational units, which go 
on	to	demand	greater	levels	of	power	and	independence.	The	movement	toward	
a referendum on Catalonia’s independence in Spain and the ongoing discussions 
on the future of Belgium demonstrate the main danger of this scenario of feder-
alization,	namely	the	significant	possibility	of	such	a	state’s	disintegration.
 A scenario of federalization in a country is not something determined once and 
for all. Canada, which is traditionally described as an example of a holding- together 
federation, was created according to the scenario of centralization. Initially, the 
Canadian	Confederation	was	established	as	a	union	of	four	equal	provinces.	In	spite	
of	 the	active	 influence	of	Great	Britain	on	 this	process,	 representatives	of	United	
Canada,	 New	 Brunswick,	 Nova	 Scotia,	 and	 Prince	 Edward	 Island	 bargained	
between 1864 and 1866 to decide on the institutional design of the future state. 
However,	since	the	very	beginning	of	the	history	of	relations	between	the	provinces	
and	the	Crown,	one	province	has	demanded	special	privileges	in	relations	with	any	
central	government.	This	has	always	been	Quebec.	Two	conscription	crises,	in	1917	
and	 1944,	 the	Quiet	Revolution	 of	 1976,	 and	 two	 referenda	 on	 independence	 in	
1980	 and	 1995—all	 demonstrated	 a	 need	 to	 make	 a	 new	 bargain	 between	 the	
federal	government	and	Quebec.	As	a	result,	at	present	Canada	is	an	asymmetrical	
federal state with a politically and economically strong minority.
	 This	active	role	of	the	subnational	units	in	federalization	and	the	subsequent	
protection of their autonomy can be explained by the strategic actions of two 
groups of political actors. One group is the elites of subnational units, which act 
as	 strategically	 oriented	 players.	 They	 wish	 to	 have	 a	 federal	 state	 since	 this	
helps	them	to	achieve	the	benefits	I	demonstrated	above.	The	institutional	design	
of	every	federation	is	bargained	over	during	long	negotiations	where	subnational	
leaders	and	other	representatives	of	elites	are	important	participants.	This	agree-
ment includes a system of checks and balances, those safeguards that guarantee 
the	preservation	of	 the	federation	 in	 the	 long	 term.	Later,	 if	 the	center	violates	
the agreement without a new phase of bargaining, the subnational units are ready 
to	fight	for	their	autonomy	and	the	central	government’s	respect.
 At the same time, subnational units are not limited by the institutional 
arrangement set by political elites. Rulers are largely powerless if they do not 
have	the	support	of	a	population	ready	to	protect	the	unit’s	autonomy	by	force.	
That	is	why	Maria	Nozhenko	and	I	(Nozhenko	and	Starodubtsev,	2006)	define	a	
subnational unit in a federal state as a political community that possesses auto-
nomy in its relations with the federal center and other subnational units, as well 
as	its	own	governmental	structures	and	often	its	own	territory.
 Publius addressed each of his papers to such a political community when he 
wrote	“An	Address	to	the	People	of	the	State	of	New-	York.”	By	the	time	of	the	
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Constitutional	Convention	in	Philadelphia,	political	communities	existed	in	each	
state. Residents of former British colonies had been enjoying a completely or 
relatively	 independent	existence.	They	had	 fought	 for	 their	 independence	 from	
Great Britain, maintained established borders, and participated in establishing 
legitimate	authorities.	At	 the	convention,	 the	Founding	Fathers	 represented	not	
only their own political interests, but the people’s interests in their home states. 
This illustrates how, in the scenario of centralization, by the point of the con-
stitutional	 bargain,	 political	 communities	 exist	 in	 every	 unit	 that	 is	 going	 to	
integrate into the federal state.
 In the scenario of decentralization, political communities stem from the seg-
ments of a plural society. During the transformation of segments to nations their 
political	demands	change	as	well.	Along	with	overcoming	cultural	discrimina-
tion,	they	claim	the	right	to	live	independently	or	at	least	autonomously	within	
their own territory. This is the moment when a segment becomes a political com-
munity.	Federalization,	in	its	turn,	provides	this	community	with	a	governmental	
structure with competences of its own and, as a result, strengthens the communi-
ty’s cohesion.
 The core element of such a community is a political identity that unites all 
members of the community. During the emergence of the federation, this iden-
tity does not disappear but transforms into a regional one and adjoins with a 
national identity.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 [former]	 […]	 can	 dominate	 in	 the	 thoughts	 of	many	
citizens	of	a	federal	state.	“It	is	a	known	fact	in	human	nature,	that	its	affec-
tions	are	commonly	weak	in	proportion	to	the	distance	or	diffusiveness	of	the	
object”	 (Hamilton	 et	 al.,	 2008:	 165).	 That	 is	 why	 in	 any	 possible	 conflict	
between	 the	 federal	 center	 and	 subnational	 units	 “the	 prepossessions	 of	 the	
people	 […]	will	 be	more	on	 the	 side	of	 the	State	governments,	 than	of	 the	
federal	 government”	 (Hamilton	 et	 al.,	 2008:	 357).	 Keeping	 strong	 regional	
identity	undoubtedly	should	be	seen	as	a	factor	that	prevents	forming	a	single	
nation	in	the	boundaries	of	a	federation.	However,	the	existence	of	own	polit-
ical communities in the subnational units is an element of the checks and 
balances:	the	federal	center	is	not	able	to	usurp	power	in	the	country.
(Nozhenko	and	Starodubtsev,	2006:	62)
Thus,	only	politically	strong	subnational	units	are	able	to	save	a	federation	from	
transformation into a unitary state. My argument is that such strength is not 
formed	by	means	of	institutional	engineering	at	the	behest	of	the	national	gov-
ernment,	 which	 is	 hardly	 interested	 in	 providing	 the	 subnational	 communities	
with additional resources and rights. Federalism is supported by the opportunity 
of	 subnational	 units	 to	 achieve	 the	 most	 favorable	 institutional	 environment	
during the constitutional bargaining for a new country (the scenario of centrali-
zation),	 or	 compel	 the	 national	 center	 to	 give	 them	 both	 autonomy	 and	 safe-
guards under the threat of disintegration of a country with a plural society (the 
scenario of decentralization).
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How was the Russian Federation built and not preserved?
In 2004, when Vladimir Putin abolished the direct popular election of Russian 
governors,	the	most	famous	news	show	on	Russian	television	gave	this	explana-
tion:	 the	new	federal	system	was	closer	 to	 the	German	system,	where	 the	sub-
national	units’	populations	do	not	elect	their	own	top	officials;	instead,	the	officials	
are appointed by majorities in the Länder’s parliaments. The new Russian 
system,	 journalists	 insisted,	 transferred	 the	 right	 to	 elect	 a	 governor	 from	 the	
electorate	to	the	level	of	responsible	politicians	who	had	already	been	elected	by	
the population. At that moment, nobody had told the Russian population about 
one	significant	difference	between	the	German	and	Russian	models:	in	Germany,	
the	federal	center	could	not	propose	a	candidate	for	the	position	of	governor	to	a	
Land’s assembly, whereas President Putin’s idea empowered only the President 
of the Russian Federation to do so. This difference is crucial. It turns a federal 
state	into	a	unitary	one,	because	it	violates	one	of	three	characteristics	of	federal	
relations—the	political	autonomy	of	the	subnational	communities.
	 Russian	 journalists,	 following	 the	 lead	of	 the	Russian	government,	used	 the	
German	 case	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 conventionality	 of	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 federal	
reform	 and	 confirm	 that	 the	 new	model	 satisfied	 the	 constitutional	 declaration	
that Russia is a federal state. They likely selected Germany as a respected 
Western partner with a similar system of elections of regional heads, although 
there	 are	 several	 similar	 features	 between	 the	 federal	 systems	 in	 these	 two	
countries.
	 At	the	same	time,	I	am	confident	that	examining	the	Russian	case	in	a	com-
parative	 perspective	 could	 potentially	 be	 a	 very	 useful	 task.	 In	 the	 previous	
section	I	discussed	the	conditions	that	are	able	to	protect	or,	conversely,	destroy	
subnational autonomy in a federal state. Now, I would like to examine whether 
that	model	works	in	the	case	of	the	Russian	Federation	and	how	it	helps	to	reveal	
any	new	factors	and	mechanisms	of	Russian	intergovernmental	relations.
	 This	section	is	devoted	to	the	history	of	the	development	of	federal	relations	
in Russia. I will construct it according to the same analytical approach as the 
description of the scenarios earlier. I will study the conditions that encouraged 
decision-	makers	to	develop	federalism	at	the	beginning	of	the	1990s.	I	will	look	
for actors of federalization in Russia and make an attempt to understand what 
incentives	and	interests	forced	them	to	choose	between	different	models	of	inter-
governmental	relations.	Finally,	 I	will	describe	 the	basic	results	of	 the	Russian	
path to federalism and explain why the biggest country in the world became so 
close to the unitary model. The starting point of my chain of argumentation is 
that	a	stable	model	of	intergovernmental	relations	and	territorial	governance	has	
not	been	established	in	Russia	over	more	than	25	years:	short-	term	equilibriums	
have	replaced	long	periods	of	transformation.	These	changes	and	their	predictors	
are at the core of my analysis in this section.
 When did the history of Russian federalism begin? The contemporary territo-
rial arrangement was put into law by the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Fed-
eration.	Political	plurality,	a	market	economy,	territorial	disintegration—all	these	
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characteristics	of	the	“new	Russia”	were	very	different	compared	with	the	Soviet	
system. As a result, one might suggest beginning this analysis from the moment 
of	 the	 Soviet	Union’s	 collapse,	when	 a	 new	 system	was	 established.	 I	 cannot	
agree	with	this	approach.	I	will	demonstrate	that	the	Soviet	practices	of	territo-
rial	governance	influence	current	patterns	of	intergovernmental	relations	signifi-
cantly.	Moreover,	the	first	steps	on	the	path	of	decentralization	were	taken	when	
Russia	was	a	part	of	 the	Soviet	Union.	Thus,	 I	 can	 say	 that	 federalization	had	
begun prior to the emergence of an independent Russia.
	 The	 last	 constitution	 of	 the	USSR	was	 adopted	 in	 1977.	The	Soviet	Union	
was	declared	a	federal	state	 that	consisted	of	15	Soviet	republics	 including	the	
Russian	 Soviet	 Federal	 Socialist	 Republic	 (RSFSR).	 Various	 documents	 and	
academic	articles	asserted	that	the	Soviet	Union	had	realized	a	model	of	“social-
ist	 federation,”	while	 the	Western	 countries	 had	 developed	 a	 so-	called	 “bour-
geois federation.” The Great Soviet Encyclopedia	(n.d.)	notes:
Socialist federations, which differ radically from bourgeois federations, are 
based on another principle entirely. In the USSR and in socialist countries, 
for	 the	first	 time	 in	 history	 the	 state	 system	of	 federation	 has	 become	 the	
basis	for	resolving	the	national	question.	The	socialist	federations	are	based	
on the principle of national territoriality (natsional’no-territorial’nyi print-
sip)	and	the	voluntary	union	of	sovereign	and	equal	members	of	the	federa-
tion,	each	member	having	the	right	to	secede	from	the	federation.
(The Great Soviet Encyclopedia)
Every	Soviet	 republic	had	 its	own	constitution.	The	1978	RSFSR	Constitution	
declared Russia a federation as well. The RSFSR comprised different types of 
units—autonomous	 republics,	krais,	oblasts,	 cities	of	 republican	subordination,	
autonomous oblasts, and districts. The constitution highlighted the special status 
of	 autonomous	 republics:	 the	RSFSR	 “consisted	 of	”	 them	 and	 “had”	 all	 other	
types of subnational units.
	 Can	we	define	the	RSFSR	as	a	de	facto	federal	state?	I	insist	that	in	the	case	
of	 the	RSFSR	 at	 least	 two	 criteria	 did	 not	 apply.	 The	 first	 of	 them	 is	Riker’s	
	criterion—the	existence	of	at	least	two	levels	of	government	that	possesses	indi-
vidual	 responsibilities.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 autonomous	 republics	 satisfied	 this	
condition.	 But	 some	 evidence	 has	 led	me	 to	 doubt	 that	 they	 really	were	 sub-
national units of Russia. First, although only the RSFSR was declared to be a 
federal	soviet	republic	of	the	USSR,	another	Soviet	republic—Georgia—had	two	
autonomous republics (Abkhazia and Adzharia) and the same constitutional 
norms	 that	 regulated	 their	 relations	 with	 the	 Soviet	 republic.	 Second,	 Soviet	
republics and autonomous republics had the same constitutionally based respons-
ibilities.	This	evidence	shows	that	autonomous	republics	had	the	same	adminis-
trative	 status	 as	 Soviet	 republics.	 Hence,	 politically	 and	 even	 legally	 we	 can	
consider	them	subnational	units	not	of	Soviet	republics	but	of	the	USSR.
	 The	second	criterion—the	election	of	chief	policy-	makers	by	the	communities	
of	 subnational	 units—did	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 RSFSR	 (just	 as	 with	 the	 USSR).	
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	Elections	in	the	USSR	were	neither	free	nor	competitive.	From	the	perspective	
of federalism, subnational elections are not only a means to select rulers but also 
a	space	to	discuss	agendas	and	programs	for	the	better	development	of	a	region	
and	regional	community.	It	 is	obvious	that	such	a	space	cannot	exist	under	the	
conditions of an authoritarian political regime. Thus, there is no opportunity to 
legally and openly discuss the most pressing issues (which are often ones 
unpleasant for the federal center).
	 The	Soviet	Union’s	 government	was	 characterized	by	 “the	 co-	existence	 (or	
the	conflict)	of	a	dual	authority,	the	party	and	the	state”	(Arendt,	1966:	395),	a	
model	 that	 doubles	 the	 number	 of	 governmental	mechanisms.	Hannah	Arendt	
brilliantly	describes	how	in	the	USSR	official	governmental	agencies	performed	
the role of a façade (just as they did in Nazi Germany), while real power was 
concentrated	in	the	colossal	system	of	the	Communist	Party	of	the	Soviet	Union	
(CPSU)’s	organizations	(Arendt,	1966:	392–419).	The	head	of	the	party	organ-
ization	in	an	autonomous	republic	was	usually	appointed	by	the	central	govern-
ment.	The	appointee	could	be	a	representative	of	the	republican	elite,	but	the	fact	
of	 the	 appointment	 shifted	 his	 or	 her	 loyalty	 from	 the	 regional	 level	 to	 the	
national one. That is why popular elections remain a key feature that supports 
federal relations in a country (i.e., ones that are decentralized, with the genuine 
autonomy	of	the	regional	governments).
 Thus, neither the USSR nor the RSFSR was a federal country during almost 
the entire period of its existence. I will demonstrate that the process of federali-
zation	in	the	USSR	and	in	some	of	its	Soviet	republics	began	only	in	the	1980s.	
To show how this happened and explain what circumstances pushed politicians 
to	federalize	the	Soviet	Union,	I	have	to	explain	the	main	features	of	the	political	
and economic situation in the country during that period.
	 Mikhail	Gorbachev,	who	 had	 just	 been	 appointed	 as	 the	 new	General	 Sec-
retary of the CPSU, faced tremendous and deep- seated problems of public 
administration	and	economic	development.	The	second	half	of	the	1970s	and	the	
first	half	of	the	1980s	was	a	period	of	gradual	and	steady	decrease	in	the	Soviet	
Union’s	economic	power.	The	Soviet	economy’s	systemic	problems	(inefficient	
economic	production,	a	deficit	of	 labor	 force	and	 food,	dependence	on	 trading	
oil), exacerbated by a sharp drop in the international markets’ oil prices, 
demanded	 that	 the	 Soviet	 government	 offer	 measures	 to	 overcome	 the	 crisis	
(Gaidar,	2007).	Gorbachev	was	forced	to,	and	ready	to,	launch	a	set	of	economic	
reforms,	but	their	effectiveness	would	be	restricted	by	the	extremely	ineffective	
and clumsy management system of the framework of the command economy.
	 To	overcome	these	problems	the	Soviet	government	decided	to	partially	lib-
eralize the economic system. One of its measures was the so- called hozraschet-
nyi sotsialism, a system where all enterprises (which were public, because there 
were	 no	 business	 enterprises	 under	 other	 forms	 of	 ownership	 in	 the	 Soviet	
Union) had to be managed in a new way. Instead of implementing annual plans 
formulated	by	the	government,	their	managers	were	now	responsible	for	finding	
the	partners—customers	and	suppliers—who	would	provide	the	most	profitable	
contracts for the company (Sogrin, 2001).
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	 This	reform	launched	a	discussion	on	the	responsibilities	of	all	levels	of	gov-
ernment	 in	 the	 economic	 sphere.	 In	 June	 1987,	 Gorbachev	 said	 that	 regional	
governments	 “should	 be	 responsible	 for	 overall	 economic	 and	 social	 develop-
ment	 in	a	region”	(Gorbachev,	1987).	 I	believe	 this	was	 the	first	 time	a	Soviet	
leader	declared	a	need	for	real	decentralization	in	the	Soviet	Union.
	 Estonia	was	the	first	of	all	republics,	both	Soviet	and	autonomous,	to	initiate	
a broad discussion of this slogan. Soon, the project of respublikanskii hozraschet 
was	publicized.	Its	key	element	was	a	shift	of	public	management	in	the	Soviet	
Union	from	the	departmental	model	(when	a	whole	country	is	governed	as	a	set	
of	policy	fields	through	ministerial	mechanisms)	to	a	territorial	one.
	 A	year	 later,	 the	Soviet	government	accepted	this	 idea	and	began	to	discuss	
“the	 Estonian	 project”	 (Raig,	 1988:	 3).	 Soon,	 the	 Soviet	 central	 government	
agreed	to	delegate	responsibilities	for	earning,	distributing,	and	spending	finan-
cial	 resources	 to	 the	 regional	 governments.	 In	 this	 way,	 it	 forced	 the	 Soviet	
republics	 to	 solve	 the	 increasing	economic	problems	on	 their	own,	as	 it	previ-
ously had with the industrial companies. Thus, the economic crisis in the union 
was	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 context	 that	 pushed	 the	 administrative	 and	 financial	
decentralization forward.
 The decentralization was also encouraged by another type of liberalization in 
the	Soviet	Union.	In	addition	to	the	slow	and	very	careful	introduction	of	market	
mechanisms,	Gorbachev	 declared	 glasnost, a policy of supporting freedom of 
speech and expression. In the republics the resulting discussions led to demands 
to change the established model of relations between subnational units at dif-
ferent	levels.
	 The	first	example	of	such	a	political	conflict	was	Nagorny	Karabakh,	a	small	
part	of	the	Azerbaijani	SSR	populated	mainly	by	Armenians	(75.9	percent	of	the	
population	(Starovoitova,	1999)).	The	conflict	between	the	two	ethnic	groups	was	
deeply rooted. In spite of an Armenian majority, the Azerbaijanis had controlled 
Nagorny	 Karabakh	 for	 a	 long	 time.	 The	 situation	 could	 have	 been	 resolved	 in	
1920–1921,	when	both	Azerbaijan	 and	Armenia	were	 integrated	 into	 the	Soviet	
state.	The	Soviet	 government	 decided	 to	 include	 the	 territory	 in	 the	Azerbaijani	
SSR	as	an	autonomous	unit.	But	 this	 status	did	not	provide	 the	Armenians	with	
any	protection	of	their	cultural	and	other	rights.	The	status	of	“autonomous	oblast”	
was	lower	than	that	of	“autonomous	republic”	and	equalled	that	of	all	other	types	
of subnational units. In early 1988, Nagorny Karabakh’s authorities declared that 
the oblast was going to be integrated with Armenia. This act led to a war between 
the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians within the territory of the autonomous oblast.
 A similar situation arose in Georgia, where the Abkhazian Autonomous 
Soviet	Socialist	Republic	declared	itself	part	of	the	RSFSR.	The	Georgian	popu-
lation protested against this decision. The situation was exacerbated when, in 
1989,	 the	 Soviet	 Army	 suppressed	 a	 protest	meeting	 in	 Tbilisi,	 the	 capital	 of	
Georgia. Twenty Georgians were killed. As a result, the loyalty of the Georgian 
population	to	the	Soviet	system	was	undermined	(Sogrin,	2001).
	 The	Soviet	government	had	to	react	in	some	way	to	the	process	of	degrada-
tion	of	the	well-	established	model	of	Soviet	federalism.	In	the	summer	of	1988,	
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Gorbachev	 held	 the	 19th	 Conference	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party.	 Its	 resolution,	
titled	 “On	 relations	 between	 ethnic	 groups”	 (O mezhnatsional’nykh otnosheni-
iakh),	was	to	strengthen	the	socialist	federation:
We	are	speaking	of	broadening	the	rights	of	the	Soviet	republics	and	auto-
nomous republics, decentralization, delegating (peredacha na mesta) a set 
of	 governing	 functions,	 and	 strengthening	 self-	governance	 and	 responsib-
ility	 in	 the	 spheres	 of	 economy,	 social	 and	 cultural	 development	 and	
environmental	protection.
(Rezolyutsiya, 1988)
It	was	 the	first	 step	 toward	 providing	 administrative	 autonomy	 to	 autonomous	
republics	 along	 with	 the	 Soviet	 republics.	 This	 decision	 concerned	 all	 auto-
nomous	republics,	wherever	they	were	located.	Let	us	keep	this	fact	in	mind	in	
order to understand the particularities of Russian federalization later.
	 In	September	1989,	the	Communist	Party	adopted	“The	National	Policy	of	the	
Party in the Current Circumstances”1 (Natsional’naya,	1989:	1–2).	In	its	ideological	
part,	the	document	justified	the	process	of	decentralization	in	the	Soviet	Union.	In	
accordance with the pattern of the scenario of centralization, the federal center 
admitted	that	the	Soviet	Constitution	was	a	contract	that	stipulated	the	union’s	and	
the	Soviet	republics’	lists	of	responsibilities.	The	USSR,	the	documents	said,	was	
created	 by	 the	 will	 of	 future	 Soviet	 republics	 that	 had	 agreed	 to	 delegate	 some	
responsibilities	to	the	union’s	level,	but	reserved	a	right	to	govern	absolutely	inde-
pendently	 when	 it	 came	 to	 the	 rest.	 Ideologically,	 this	 meant	 that	 Gorbachev’s	
reforms	were	a	way	to	bring	to	life	the	original	model	of	the	Soviet	Union.
	 At	the	same	time,	the	document	included	several	measures	aimed	at	strength-
ening	autonomous	republics.	First,	the	Soviet	government	agreed	that	the	sphere	
of the autonomous republics’ responsibility should be expanded. Second, the 
center	 guaranteed	 the	 transfer	 of	 control	 over	 companies	 and	 organizations	
located	in	autonomous	republics	to	their	level.	Third,	the	autonomous	republics	
received	 the	 right	 to	 propose	 legislative	 initiatives	 to	 the	 parliaments	 of	 the	
Soviet	Union	and	Soviet	republics	and	the	right	to	legally	protest	against	legisla-
tion	by	the	higher	level’s	governments	and	parliaments.
 Another consequence of glasnost was discussion on the annexation of the 
Baltic	States	by	the	Soviet	Union	in	1939.	Glasnost	revealed	the	states’	will	to	
change	their	relations	with	the	Soviet	Union.	As	a	result,	 in	1988	the	Supreme	
Council	 of	 the	 Estonian	 Soviet	 Socialist	 Republic	 changed	 Article	 74	 of	 the	
republican constitution. Before this change, the constitution had included the fol-
lowing	principle:	“The	 laws	of	 the	USSR	are	obligatory	within	 the	 territory	of	
the	 Estonian	 SSR.”	 Afterwards,	 it	 was	 replaced	 by	 a	 different	 phrase:	 “The	
Supreme	Council	of	the	Estonian	SSR	is	able	to	prevent	or	limit	the	implementa-
tion	of	a	legislative	or	other	act	of	the	USSR.”
	 The	 Soviet	 government’s	 reaction	 was	 ambiguous.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Gor-
bachev	criticized	Estonia’s	decision.	On	the	other	hand,	for	the	first	time	he	for-
mulated	the	possible	limitations	of	potential	decentralization	in	the	country:
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Can	we	even	think	of	breaking	up	railroads,	aviation,	the	energy	industry,	the	
system of oil and gas production and the big metallurgical and engineering 
industries? On the one hand, it is economically useless. On the other hand, it 
is politically unfeasible. But the light, food and some other industries of the 
agricultural sphere, local transportation, trade, health care organizations and 
schools,	public	catering—all	of	 these	 should	be	 the	 republics’	 and	even	 the	
oblasts’, cities’ and municipal districts’ spheres of responsibility.
(Vystuplenie, 1988)
In	May	1989	Gorbachev	proposed	a	full-	scale	reform	of	federal	relations	within	
the	USSR:
In	 the	political	 sphere,	 this	 is	 a	 significant	broadening	of	 the	 rights	of	 the	
Soviet	and	autonomous	republics	and	other	ethnic	units,	delegating	a	greater	
number	of	governing	 functions	and	strengthening	 the	 republican	and	 local	
governments’	 self-	government	 and	 responsibilities.	 In	 a	 federal	 state	 we	
should strictly understand which competences belong to the Union, and 
which	are	sovereign	rights	of	a	republic	or	an	autonomous	unit.	We	should	
design	 legal	mechanisms	 for	 resolving	 potential	 collisions	 in	 the	 relations	
between them.
 In the economic sphere, we should harmonize relations between the 
Union and the republics on the basis of an appropriate combination of eco-
nomic	 self-	government	 and	 active	 participation	 in	 the	 division	 of	 labor	
within	 the	 Union	 as	 a	 whole.	 […]	 In	 the	 spiritual	 sphere	 (v dukhovnoi 
oblasti)	we	proceed	with	the	diversity	of	ethnic	cultures	as	a	great	social	and	
historical	value,	a	unique	asset	of	the	whole	of	our	Union.	We	do	not	have	
the right to lose any one of them.
(Ob	Osnovnykh,	1989)
This	 quote	 demonstrates	 the	 Soviet	 government’s	 elite’s	 understanding	 of	 the	
danger	of	such	avalanche-	like	decentralization:	the	possibility	of	fragmenting	the	
Soviet	Union	and	losing	internal	cohesion	within	the	state.	In	response	to	these	
challenges,	Gorbachev	declared	the	need	to	form	mechanisms	that	would	fruit-
fully	resolve	the	increasing	number	of	conflicts	at	different	levels	of	the	Soviet	
system	of	government.
	 In	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	union’s	center	presented	a	policy	of	intergovern-
mental relations as a return to the principles of coming- together federalism (i.e., 
the	USSR	was	seen	as	a	union	of	Soviet	republics	that	agreed	to	form	a	central	
government	 and	 delegated	 a	 set	 of	 responsibilities	 to	 the	 upper	 level),	 these	
reforms are correctly described by the scenario of decentralization. Hence, the 
center’s policy contributed to arranging a holding- together federation. As I noted 
before,	while	it	 theoretically	agreed	with	this	scenario	at	 the	very	beginning	of	
the	process,	the	national	government	was	barely	able	to	control	it	thereafter.	The	
factors that launch transformations remain in effect as long as subnational elites 
possess	 enough	 resources	 to	 change	 the	model	 of	 intergovernmental	 relations	
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and	find	a	new	point	of	equilibrium	in	this	political	field.	Additionally,	the	scen-
ario of decentralization is often accompanied by a nation- building process at the 
subnational	 level.	 It	 creates	 subnational	 political	 communities	 and	 thereby	
weakens the regional elites’ potential for negotiation, making bargaining 
between	the	center	and	the	subnational	units	more	difficult.	All	these	character-
istics	apply	to	the	case	I	am	observing.
	 The	Soviet	Union’s	government	 fell	 into	 this	 trap.	 Initially,	 the	Soviet	gov-
ernment	 delegated	 additional	 competences	 and	 responsibilities	 to	 the	 Soviet	
republics	in	order	to	manage	the	consequences	of	the	very	deep	economic	crises	
in	the	USSR.	At	the	same	time,	due	to	rising	conflicts	between	different	ethnic	
groups, it had to expand these institutional changes to autonomous republics and 
autonomous oblasts. The pattern of decentralization pushed the center, forced by 
the republics’ actions, to propose new decentralizing measures.
 In March 1990 the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR declared its deci-
sion	 to	 leave	 the	 Soviet	Union	 and	 abolish	 the	 Soviet	Constitution	within	 the	
republic’s	 territory.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 Soviet	 government’s	 protests	 and	 its	
demand that a referendum should be held, the republic presented the following 
position—“the	question	of	a	referendum	can	be	formulated	in	the	following	way:	
does Lithuania want to be integrated into the USSR?” (Lithuania, 1990).
	 The	Soviet	Union’s	reaction	took	the	form	of	adopting	two	new	laws	in	April	
1990—“On the foundations of economic relations between the USSR and auto-
nomous and Soviet republics”	(Zakon,	1990a)	and	“On the division of respons-
ibilities (predmety vedeniya) between the Union of SSR and the subnational 
units”	 (Zakon,	1990b).	These	 laws	created	a	new	system	of	 intergovernmental	
relations	 in	 the	USSR,	which	 at	 the	 time	was	 quite	 controversial.	On	 the	 one	
hand,	for	the	first	time	these	laws	provided	a	single	title	for	both	Soviet	and	auto-
nomous	 republics,	 namely	 “subnational	 units”	 (sub’ekty federatsii). All eco-
nomic competences were distributed between the union on the one side, and all 
the	 republics	 on	 the	 other.	The	 autonomous	 republics’	 status	was	 significantly	
raised due to the requirement that union agencies of public administration could 
be established on the territory of a republic only with the republic’s consent. On 
the	other	hand,	the	laws	did	not	recognize	the	sovereignty	of	autonomous	repub-
lics.	This	meant	that	the	republics	did	not	have	the	right	to	secede	from	the	union	
and	 have	 relations	 with	 foreign	 states.	 Additionally,	 social	 and	 other	 non-	
economic	competences	were	divided	between	the	union	and	the	Soviet	(not	auto-
nomous) republics.
 It is noteworthy that neither the RSFSR nor its autonomous republics or its 
autonomous	oblasts	featured	among	the	main	actors	in	the	decentralization—the	
Soviet	Union’s	 government	 and	 the	CPSU,	 the	Estonian,	Lithuanian,	Azerbai-
jani,	 Armenian,	 and	 Georgian	 Soviet	 republics,	 the	 Nagorny	 Karabakh	 auto-
nomous oblast, and the Abkhazian autonomous republic. By 1990, the RSFSR 
did	 not	 act	 as	 an	 active	 supporter	 of	 decentralization.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
USSR’s	measures	 toward	 federalization	 influenced	Russia’s	 intergovernmental	
relations as well. The Russian autonomous republics’ economic and partial polit-
ical	autonomy	increased	due	to	the	Soviet	Union’s	reactions	to	the	disintegrating	
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impact	 of	 the	 economic	 problems,	 the	 ethnic	 and	 territorial	 conflicts,	 and	 the	
actions	of	a	few	Soviet	republics.
	 However,	for	the	RSFSR	the	Soviet	Union’s	decentralization	and	federaliza-
tion resulted in an unintended consequence. Due to the union’s laws of 1990, the 
RSFSR de jure	 lost	 control	 over	 its	 autonomous	 republics,	 which	 gained	 the	
same economic competences as Russia itself. This was especially painful for 
Russia since it had the most autonomous republics and oblasts in the USSR.
 The Russian center intended to protect the integrity of its territory. In the 
summer of 1990, the Supreme Council of the RSFSR adopted the Declaration on 
the	Sovereignty	of	the	RSFSR.	Boris	Yeltsin,	the	Chair	of	the	Supreme	Council,	
justified	this	political	step	by	citing	the	flawed	and	even	dangerous	nature	of	the	
USSR’s	 law	 “On	 the	 division	 of	 responsibilities”	 for	 Russia.	 The	 declaration	
established	 the	 Supreme	 Council’s	 power	 over	 the	 entire	 territory	 within	 the	
bounds	of	the	RSFSR.	However,	the	Soviet	policy	forced	the	Russian	center	to	
continue	the	process	of	decentralization.	The	declaration’s	article	9	declared	“a	
need	 for	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 rights	 (rasshirenie prav) of autonomous 
republics, autonomous oblasts, autonomous districts, and krais and oblasts of the 
RSFSR” (Declaration, 1990). Thus, Russia’s center reacted to the danger of dis-
integration on the one hand, but selected the same strategy as the union’s center 
on the other, i.e., it continued decentralization within the bounds of the Russian 
Republic.
	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 version	of	decentralization	concerned	not	only	 auto-
nomous	 subnational	 units	 but	 administrative	 regions	 as	 well.	 The	 declaration	
was	 the	first	official	document	 that	 committed	 to	 raising	 the	political	 status	of	
administrative	(not	ethnic)	units	in	the	RSFSR.	Russia’s	center	implemented	this	
strategic measure in order to smooth the territorial political asymmetry that had 
been	created	by	 the	Soviet	governments.	The	Supreme	Council’s	decision	was	
also	 significant	 in	 terms	 of	 building	 a	 pro-	Russian	 (and	 probably	 anti-	Soviet)	
coalition.	The	fact	 that	 the	Soviet	Union	made	equal	 the	statuses	of	 the	Soviet	
and	 autonomous	 republics	 ensured	 the	 republican	 elites’	 loyalty	 to	 the	 Soviet	
Union.	The	Russian	government	needed	its	regions’	support	as	well,	and	so	was	
ready	to	reward	the	rest	of	the	units	with	administrative	and	fiscal	autonomy.
 With this in mind, it is no surprise that the declaration led to retaliation from 
the autonomous republics. One by one, they declared their independence and 
sovereignty.	In	early	August	1990,	The Declaration on Sovereignty of the Kare-
lian ASSR was adopted; on August 30, The Declaration on Sovereignty of the 
Tatar SSR.	 In	October	 1990,	 at	 least	 five	 autonomous	 republics	 declared	 their	
sovereignty.	They	were	the	Buriat	SSR	(October	8),	 the	Bashkir	SSR	(October	
11), the Kalmyk ASSR (October 18), the Mari ASSR (October 22), and the 
Chuvash	ASSR	(October	24).	On	October	25,	The Declaration of Sovereignty of 
the Gorno- Altai Autonomous Oblast was declared, an oblast that would soon be 
transformed	 into	 the	 Republic	 of	 Altai.	 In	 November	 the	 Checheno-	Ingush	
Republic	adopted	its	own	declaration.	Some	of	the	republics—Tatarstan,	Buryatia,	
and	Bashkiriya—raised	 their	status	 in	 these	documents,	while	others	preserved	
the	word	“autonomous”	in	their	names.
What is wrong with Russian federalism?  41
	 The	Russian	declaration	on	sovereignty	was	a	strike	against	the	union’s	integ-
rity. In response, the union’s center decided to hold a referendum with only one 
question:	“Do	you	believe	that	the	USSR	should	be	preserved	as	a	renewed	fed-
eration	of	equal	sovereign	republics,	where	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	persons	of	
any nationality would be guaranteed?” Four days before the referendum, the 
government	 presented	 the	Agreement on the Union of Sovereign Republics to 
the	mass	media.	According	to	this	project,	“the	republics,	the	participants	of	the	
agreement,	enter	into	the	Union	directly	or	as	part	of	other	republics”	(Dogovor,	
1991:	 2).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 every	 republic	was	 declared	 to	 be	 sovereign	 and	
equal	with	 the	others.	Thus,	 this	version	of	 the	union’s	agreement	 transformed	
all	republics	into	Soviet	ones.
	 The	 referendum	 was	 held	 on	 March	 17,	 1990	 in	 nine	 Soviet	 republics.	
Armenia,	Estonia,	Georgia,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	and	Moldova	did	not	participate	
in	 the	voting.	 In	 spite	 of	 this,	 the	 referendum’s	 turnout	was	79.5	percent.	The	
proportion of the union’s supporters comprised 76.43 percent.
 On June 12, 1991, Yeltsin was elected President of the RSFSR. A year earlier, 
he	had	 invited	 the	autonomous	 republics	“to	 take	as	much	sovereignty	as	 they	
could	 digest.”	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 several	 autonomous	 oblasts	 of	 the	 RSFSR	
raised	their	status	to	the	level	of	autonomous	republics.	For	example,	the	Adygea	
autonomous	 oblast	 became	 the	 Soviet	 Socialist	 Republic	 of	 Adygea	 in	 the	
RSFSR, the Gorno- Altaisk autonomous oblast became the Gorno- Altaisk SSR in 
the RSFSR, and the Karachay- Cherkessia autonomous oblast became the 
Karachay- Cherkessia SSR in the RSFSR.
 By 1991, the union’s center had created a particular institutional context that 
forced	 Russia’s	 central	 government	 to	 act	 in	 a	 certain	 way.	 The	 autonomous	
republics’	 status	 equaled	 that	 of	 the	 Soviet	 republics	 and	 so	 was	 capable	 of	
launching the disintegration of Russian statehood. That is why Russia’s center 
had	to	seek	to	ensure	the	autonomous	republics’	loyalty	by	providing	them	with	
special high political status.
	 Clear	evidence	of	such	a	strategy	can	be	seen	in	the	Supreme	Council	of	the	
RSFSR’s	 response	 to	 the	 August	 1991	 Soviet	 coup	 d’état	 attempt.	 Regional	
elites	reacted	to	the	coup	in	different	ways—some	of	them	openly	opposed	the	
GKChP (Gossudarstvennyi Komitet po Chrezvychainomu Polozheniyu), while 
others preferred to stay silent and wait for the coup’s results. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Supreme Council empowered President Yeltsin with the ability 
to	dismiss	the	heads	of	regional	parliaments	and	appoint	new	ones	(Postanovle-
nie, 1991). But that decision did not affect the republics at all. Their autonomy 
remained	 inviolable,	 while	 all	 other	 subnational	 units	 became	 part	 of	 unitary	
intergovernmental	relations.
	 In	 1991,	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 finally	 collapsed.	 The	 RSFSR	 became	 an	 inde-
pendent	sovereign	federal	state	with	an	asymmetric	model	of	intergovernmental	
relations.	 The	 RSFSR’s	 republics	 were	 so	 strong	 that	 the	 federal	 government	
could	not	prevent	them	from	seeking	a	new	model	of	relations	with	the	federal	
center. In March 1992, the Supreme Council of Tatarstan (the former Tatar SSR) 
held	a	 referendum	 in	 the	 territory	of	 the	 republic	with	only	one	question:	“Do	
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you	agree	that	the	Republic	of	Tatarstan	is	a	sovereign	state,	an	actor	according	
to international law that manages its relations with the Russian Federation and 
other republics and states on the basis of equitable agreements?” A total of 61.3 
percent	of	Tatarstan’s	voters	supported	this	formulation.	Soon,	 the	Republic	of	
Tyva	and	the	Republic	of	Sakha	(Yakutia)	declared	that	they	also	would	not	be	
subordinated to the Constitution of the RSFSR.
 The described processes demonstrate that Russian federalization happened in 
accordance with the scenario of decentralization. Russia’s federal center had to 
decentralize	governance	and	arrange	an	asymmetric	model	of	intergovernmental	
relations.	 In	 1992	 the	 federal	 government	 initiated	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Federal	
Agreement (Federativnyi Dogovor), a document that would establish a new 
system	 of	 intergovernmental	 relations	 in	 Russia.	 It	 did	 not	 form	 a	 new	 state;	
rather,	it	delimited	the	competences	of	different	levels	of	government	within	the	
state that already existed. The most important aspect of the agreement was that 
all Russian regions could sign it. That meant republics, krais, oblasts, cities of 
federal	 subordination,	 the	 autonomous	 oblast,	 and	 autonomous	 districts—all	
became	“subjects	of	the	federation,”	subnational	units	of	the	federal	state.
 At the same time, the agreement stipulated asymmetry in federal relations. 
The	document	consisted	of	 three	parts:	 an	agreement	between	 the	RSFSR	and	
the republics, an agreement between the RSFSR and krais, oblasts, and cities of 
federal subordination, and an agreement between the RSFSR and the auto-
nomous oblast and autonomous districts. Each of those documents included a 
different set of powers and competences that would be delegated to those types 
of subnational unit. The asymmetry was strengthened by an additional protocol 
that	provided	at	least	50	percent	of	seats	in	one	of	the	parliamentary	chambers	of	
the Russian Federation for republics, autonomous districts, and the autonomous 
oblast. Thus, the Federal Agreement created a new federal structure, where 
ethnic federalism was replaced by asymmetrical federalism with different types 
of subnational unit.
	 In	1992–1993	the	agreement	reflected	an	equilibrium	that	was	suitable	for	all	
actors in the political process. Russia became a truly federal state, the federal 
center	 could	preserve	 the	 integrity	of	most	of	 its	 territory,	 and	 the	 subnational	
units	agreed	with	the	established	system	of	intergovernmental	relations.	But	the	
fate	 of	 this	 model	 was	 less	 fortunate.	 Two	 subnational	 units—Tatarstan	 and	
Chechnya—refused	to	participate	in	the	agreement.	They	insisted	that	their	rela-
tions	with	the	Kremlin	should	be	unique,	and	that	 they	deserved	special	agree-
ments.	 Moreover,	 since	 the	 agreement	 was	 an	 initiative	 of	 the	 federal	
government,	the	center	believed	that	it	could	alter	the	agreement’s	provisions	as	
soon	as	external	circumstances	changed.	This	possibility	was	realized	quite	soon:	
the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation completely eliminated the 
Federal Agreement.
	 By	the	end	of	1992,	the	Russian	political	system	felt	the	destructive	results	of	
a	conflict	between	the	executive	and	the	legislature	at	the	federal	level.	This	con-
cerned the sphere of federal relations as well. In October 1991, the Supreme 
Council stripped the president of the right to appoint the heads of regional 
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	governments.	But	Yeltsin	disregarded	the	law	and	continued	appointing	regional	
leaders and thereby controlling the regional elites.
	 The	problem	of	double	legitimacy	gave	rise	to	an	open	struggle	for	power	and	
competences. The regions’ support became one of the main resources in this 
process.	This	especially	concerned	politically	and	administratively	strong	repub-
lics.	The	president	had	 the	use	of	financial	 instruments	for	bargaining	with	 the	
regions.	The	parliament	also	adopted	many	laws	providing	financial	support	for	
the	latter.	But	only	the	executive,	controlled	by	the	president,	had	genuine	oppor-
tunities	 to	find	money	or	other	ways	 to	appease	 regional	elites.	 In	1992–1993,	
Yeltsin	 signed	many	presidential	decrees	on	“urgent	measures	aimed	at	public	
support” of different regions, mainly republics. At the same time, the Supreme 
Council’s acts were targeted at autonomous districts, krais, and oblasts, but they 
did	not	bring	any	real	profits	for	these	regions.
 The parliament’s main resource was the ability to change the Constitution of 
the RSFSR that had been adopted as far back as 1978. Initially, the constitution 
had	not	specified	the	position	of	the	Russian	President	or	rules	of	interrelations	
between the president and the republican parliament. The introduction of the 
institution of the presidency demanded that some important constitutional 
changes	be	made	in	1990.	But	later,	to	solve	the	problem	of	double	legitimacy,	
the parliament made some constitutional alterations that strengthened the legisla-
tures’	 control	 over	 the	 executive.	 The	 president,	 in	 turn,	 insisted	 that	 a	 new	
constitution	 should	 be	 designed	 and	 adopted,	 one	 that	 would	 reflect	 Russia’s	
modern reality.
	 A	new	constitution	became	the	main	way	to	stop	the	conflict.	Both	sides—the	
Presidential Administration and the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme 
Council—proposed	 their	own	versions	of	 the	 constitutional	project.	They	con-
tained	two	different	models	of	intergovernmental	relations.
	 The	presidential	project	reflected	the	executive’s	policy	in	the	field	of	inter-
governmental	relations	in	1992	and	at	the	beginning	of	1993.	The	president	sup-
ported the Federal Agreement, which was supposed to be incorporated into the 
text of the new constitution (Constitution,	1993a).	This	meant	that	diverse	types	
of	subnational	units	would	have	been	responsible	for	implementing	different	set	
of competences. Although the parliament’s project admitted the importance of 
the	Federal	Agreement	as	well,	it	sought	to	equalize	the	administrative	statuses	
of subnational units (Constitution, 1993b). There is a quote by Viktor Sheinis, 
the	 executive	 secretary	 of	 the	 Constitution	 Commission,	 which	 brilliantly	
describes	the	situation	during	that	phase	of	constitutional	bargaining:
The current situation looks like a game on two chessboards simultaneously. 
But this is not chess; this is poddavki	 (“losing	 chess,”	 a	 game	where	 the	
main goal is to lose and let the opponent take all one’s pieces). There is a 
game	between	 the	 former	 autonomous	 units	 and	 the	 president	 on	 the	first	
board, and there is another game between the former autonomous units and 
the parliament on the second board.
(Interview,	1993)
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The	republics,	which	had	become	politically	strong	in	the	last	seven	years,	were	
against	even	the	president’s	project,	which	was	quite	loyal	to	them.	The	Supreme	
Council	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Bashkortostan	 claimed	 that	 this	 proposal	 “openly	
ignores	the	declarations	on	the	republics’	sovereignty”	(Eksperty,	1993).	By	that	
time,	the	republics’	power	was	so	significant	that	the	center	could	not	disregard	
their position.
 Thus, the process of designing the new constitution was blocked. That 
problem	was	 resolved	 by	 a	 decree	 from	Yeltsin,	which	 dissolved	 the	Russian	
parliament in October 1993. Later, the president declared that all regional parlia-
ments	in	Russia	should	be	dissolved	except	republican	ones.
	 This	 seemed	 like	a	new	victory	 for	 the	 republics,	but	 then	Yeltsin	used	 the	
parliament’s	defeat	 to	 suppress	 the	 republican	elites’	 influence	and	neglect	 the	
negative	effects	of	his	previous	measures	aimed	at	gaining	the	republics’	loyalty.	
The	president’s	 team	prepared	a	new	version	of	 the	constitution.	The	constitu-
tion’s concluding section de facto annulled the Federal Agreement. In this 
project	all	types	of	subnational	units	received	the	same	responsibilities.	The	two	
features	unique	to	the	republics	were	their	right	to	have	their	own	constitutions	
and the statement that the republics were states. As a result, the 1993 Constitu-
tion established the new federal system, which has been functioning until the 
present	day.	Unlike	the	previous	system,	this	one	is	symmetric.	The	differences	
in titles and means of formation of the different types of subnational unit were 
not	 loaded	with	 special	 administrative	 or	 political	meaning.	This	was	 the	 first	
attempt to build a federation with equal rights of all subnational units.
	 If	 we	 trace	 the	 full	 process	 of	 Russia’s	 federalization,	 we	 discover	 that	 it	
resembles	 the	scenario	of	decentralization.	However,	 the	1993	Constitution	does	
not	fit	into	the	picture.	While	the	scenario	of	decentralization	is	known	to	produce	
asymmetric systems, Boris Yeltsin designed a symmetric constitution. How can 
this difference be explained? I argue that the main reason was the absence of 
demands for autonomy from most of the subnational units. In the 1980s, Russia’s 
republics	 did	 not	 threaten	 the	 USSR	 or	 the	 RSFSR,	 but	 received	 a	 significant	
volume	of	responsibilities	and	very	high	political	status.	The	same	situation	was	
repeated in the early 1990s. The transformation of the Russian regions into sub-
national units of a federal state was a by- product of other processes that often had 
not	even	touched	the	regions	that	became	autonomous	subnational	units	later.	Gor-
bachev’s	actions	against	the	ethnic	conflicts	and	secessionist	movements	in	certain	
Soviet	 republics,	 the	 struggle	 between	 the	 USSR	 and	 the	 RSFSR	 for	 the	 auto-
nomous	republics’	loyalty,	the	clash	between	the	national	executive	and	legislature	
in	the	early	post-	Soviet	Russia,	and,	finally,	the	attempt	to	curb	the	federal	asym-
metry	established	as	a	result	of	earlier	actions—all	were	situations	where	conflicts	
between	 politically	 strong	 actors	 favored	 Russia’s	 regions	 and	 their	 autonomy.	
They acted as a tertius gaudens,	“literally,	‘the	third	who	enjoys’,	that	is,	the	third	
party	which	in	some	fashion	or	another	draws	advantage	from	the	quarrel	of	two	
others”	(Simmel	and	Wolff,	1950:	154).
 As with other scenarios, the tertius gaudens	significantly	affects	the	particu-
larities	of	intergovernmental	relations.	When	regional	autonomy	is	given	rather	
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than	won,	 regional	 communities	 do	 not	 perceive	 it	 as	 something	valuable	 that	
they	need	to	protect.	Hence,	regional	elites	do	not	have	a	rational	interest	in	sup-
porting federal relations at all. I will demonstrate below that this distinction 
between tertius gaudens	and	“classic”	scenarios	dramatically	influenced	the	sur-
vival	of	the	Russian	federal	state	in	the	2000s.
	 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 development	 of	 intergovernmental	 relations	 in	 the	
1993–1999	period	mainly	displays	the	realization	of	the	scenario	of	decentraliza-
tion. The center’s attempts to render all regions’ statuses equal did not meet with 
success. New formal institutions did not take into account the actual positions 
that the republics had taken by the end of 1993. Although politically the pres-
ident	and	his	government	were	the	strongest	actors	after	the	parliament’s	disso-
lution,	 economically	 and	 administratively	 the	 federal	 government	 continued	 to	
be extremely weak (Treisman, 2001). As a result, informal rules that often con-
tradicted the constitution dominated in day- to-day interactions between the 
center and many subnational units.
	 In	1994,	a	new	process	in	Russian	intergovernmental	relations	was	launched:	
the	federal	government	and	some	of	the	subnational	units	signed	so-	called	bilat-
eral agreements. Tatarstan became a pioneer of this. Two years earlier, this 
republic had refused to sign the Federal Agreement and then de facto ignored the 
referendum on the new constitution. The republican leaders refused to hold elec-
tions of Federation Council members and State Duma deputies without an agree-
ment	 on	 “the	 redistribution	 of	 responsibilities	 and	 mutual	 delegation	 of	
competences” between the Russian Federation and the republic. To integrate 
Tatarstan into the Russian legal and political space, the center agreed to establish 
a	specific	pattern	of	intergovernmental	relations—in	fact,	one	that	looked	like	an	
agreement between two independent states.
	 Although	such	agreements	should	have	been	made	as	exclusive	measures	for	
two	republics—Tatarstan	and	Chechnya—the	center	could	not	avoid	expanding	
this practice to other subnational units. Soon, Kabardino- Balkaria, Bashkorto-
stan, and many other republics of the Russian Federation concluded similar 
agreements with the federation. The titles of three of the agreements included 
mention	of	“mutual	delegation	of	competences,”	but	all	of	them	included	norms	
that	violated	the	constitutional	rules	of	distribution	of	responsibilities	in	Russia	
(Rabko et al., 2001).
	 By	1995,	due	to	the	unfavorable	economic	situation	and	political	instability	at	
the	 federal	 level,	 the	 center	 was	 characterized	 as	 an	 extremely	weak	 political	
actor.	The	federal	government’s	main	political	objective	was	that	Yeltsin	be	re-	
elected in 1996. As the president’s and his public policy’s popularity were 
extremely	 low,	 regional	elites	became	one	of	 the	main	 resources	 for	achieving	
the center’s electoral goals. In order to seek the regional elites’ loyalty, the 
center	was	ready	to	guarantee	that	 it	would	abstain	from	any	attempts	to	influ-
ence internal political processes in the regions by any means. Another price for 
the regional leaders’ loyalty was the center’s agreement to hold gubernatorial 
elections	in	the	administratively	based	subnational	units,	which	had	been	denied	
this	right	since	 the	moment	of	 the	1991	coup	d’état	attempt.	This	achievement	
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raised such regions’ and their leaders’ political status. The elections allowed 
them to acquire their own legitimacy and establish the complete control of 
regional communities and political systems.
 The regional leaders’ lobbyist potential was also strengthened as a result of 
changes	in	how	Federation	Council	members	were	appointed	after	1995.	Instead	
of direct popular elections, as in 1993, in accordance with the new system, two 
representatives	of	each	region—a	governor	and	a	speaker	for	the	regional	legis-
lature—came	 into	 the	 upper	 chamber	 ex	 officio.	Until	 2000,	 they	 successfully	
used	 this	 channel	 to	present	 and	protect	 their	 and	 their	 regions’	 interests:	 they	
“defied	the	president’s	will	on	a	number	of	issues,	rejecting	some	of	his	nomi-
nees for the Constitutional Court as well as his candidates for Procurator- 
General”	(Remington,	2007:	133).
	 At	 times,	 the	 center	 attempted	 to	 restrain	 regional	governments	 from	explicit	
violations	 of	 the	 constitutional	 order.	 For	 instance,	 in	 1996,	 the	 Constitutional	
Court of the Russian Federation abandoned some norms of the Altaiskii krai’s and 
Chitinskaya oblast’s constitutions (called ustavy in the non- republican subnational 
units	in	Russia).	The	two	units	claimed	that	the	regional	executives	were	control-
led	by	the	legislatures,	and	allowed	the	latter	to	appoint	the	governors	(Gel’man,	
1998).	At	the	same	time,	the	center’s	attempts	to	dislodge	the	directly	elected	gov-
ernors faced tough resistance from the Council of the Federation, and a lack of 
legal procedures to implement these measures (Gel’man, 1998).
	 The	 period	 of	 1994–1996	was	 the	 time	 of	 the	 first	 war	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	
Chechnya,	which	 also	 sent	mixed	 signals	 for	 intergovernmental	 relations.	The	
case	of	Chechnya	deserves	 to	be	analyzed	as	a	notable	exception	to	 the	 tertius 
gaudens scenario in Russia. In 1990, the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya and 
Ingushetia	declared	its	sovereignty,	as	many	other	republics	did	at	the	same	time.	
They	 took	 advantage	 of	 the	USSR’s	measures	 aimed	 at	weakening	 the	 Soviet	
republics, particularly in the RSFSR. As early as 1991, radical nationalists 
headed	 by	Dzhokhar	Dudayev,	 a	 former	 officer	 of	 the	USSR	Army,	 captured	
government	 offices	 and	 began	 to	 govern	 in	 the	 republic.	 Since	 these	 people’s	
initial	 actions	 were	 against	 Soviet	 governmental	 structures	 in	 Chechnya,	 the	
Russian	government	and	parliament	did	not	prevent	the	increasing	influence	of	
the	nationalists.	By	the	autumn	of	1991,	when	Dudayev	demonstrated	his	com-
plete	independence,	the	Soviet	and	Russian	authorities	could	not	coordinate	their	
efforts to stop the centrifugal processes in the republic.
 Unlike most of the Russian regions, in Chechnya an ethnically based political 
community was formed and mobilized in a short period of time. In 1990, the 
Congress	 of	 the	 Chechen	 People	 declared	 two	main	 goals:	 elimination	 of	 the	
deprived	status	of	the	Chechens	in	the	territory	of	the	republic	and	strengthening	
the Chechen nation through the expansion of the republic’s territory at the 
expense	of	other	subnational	units’	territories	(Tishkov,	2001).	Dudayev’s	sup-
porters	were	ready	to	protect	Chechnya’s	independence	at	the	cost	of	their	lives.	
The	 Russian	 government	 was	 frightened	 by	 such	 determination	 from	 the	
Chechen	population	and	consequently	did	not	enter	open	conflict	with	Dudayev	
until	1994.	As	a	result,	Chechnya	became	a	true	enclave	within	the	territory	of	
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the Russian Federation and a crucially important factor in the destabilization in 
the	North	Caucasus.	At	the	very	end	of	1994,	the	Russian	Army	finally	invaded	
Chechnya and became bogged down in a long and bloody war.
	 The	 influence	of	 this	 step	by	 the	 center	 on	 intergovernmental	 relations	was	
contradictory. On the one hand, the center demonstrated to all republics in 
Russia that it would use its military forces to protect the country’s territorial 
integrity.	On	the	other	hand,	the	federal	government	turned	out	to	be	incapable	
of	achieving	a	victory	in	a	short	timeframe.
	 The	 war	 involved	 casualties	 from	 many	 different	 parts	 of	 Russia.	 It	 was	
extremely unpopular among the general population and the elites. International 
human	rights	organizations	successfully	lobbied	for	the	Russian	government	to	
stop	 the	war,	 doing	 so	 through	 the	governments	of	European	countries,	which	
pressed	those	claims	onto	the	Russian	government.	Right	before	the	1996	pres-
idential campaign, the Chechen war was one of Yeltsin’s weak points as a can-
didate for re- election. Before the second round of elections, Yeltsin declared that 
the	Russian	Army	had	defeated	Dudayev’s	regime,	and	the	soldiers	could	leave	
Chechnya. And as a result, the republic again became an independent but unrec-
ognized state.
 The case of Chechnya demonstrates how successful the regional elites could 
be	 if	 they	 fought	 for	 full	 autonomy	 and	 even	 sovereignty	 in	 the	 1990s.	 The	
Russian	 government	 would	 struggle	 to	 wage	 wars	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	
country. Due to its economic and political weakness it was ready to make con-
cessions to regional elites’ demands. At the same time, most of the Russian 
regions	 used	 the	 situation	 to	 increase	 their	 rent,	 but	 not	 to	 achieve	 radical	
changes	in	intergovernmental	relations.	For	example,	the	regions	did	not	launch	
a campaign for adopting a new constitution that would include more decentral-
ized patterns of federal relations.
	 After	Yeltsin’s	 victory	 in	 the	 1996	 presidential	 campaign,	 the	 center	 again	
tried	to	reduce	the	regions’	autonomy.	The	federal	government	initiated	a	discus-
sion on a need to align regional legislations with the federal legislation. Yet there 
was no single approach to implementing this task among the political elites. The 
heads of krais and oblasts supported the idea of equalizing all subnational units’ 
rights and responsibilities, while the republics’ presidents insisted that the 
federal laws had been imperfect and had not taken into account the particulari-
ties	of	territorial	development	in	Russia	(Zorin	et	al.,	1999).	A	compromise	was	
formulated	 by	Vladimir	 Zorin,	 then	Chair	 of	 the	 State	Duma’s	Committee	 on	
nationalities:	 “The	 alignment	 of	 local	 legislation	 with	 the	 Constitution	 of	 the	
Russian	Federation	is	a	two-	way	street”	(Zorin	et	al.,	1999:	335).	But,	at	the	end	
of the day, the founding constitutional principle of regional legal spaces’ con-
formity to federal legislation was not realized until the beginning of the 2000s.
 By 1999, the opposition between the center and the regions became explicit. 
This	 was	 influenced	 by	 two	 factors.	 First,	 the	 1998	 financial	 crisis	 in	 Russia	
forced	the	federal	government	to	revise	the	existing	pattern	of	intergovernmental	
relations.	 In	 Chapter	 2,	 I	 will	 demonstrate	 how	 significant	 the	 government’s	
measures	were	in	the	economic	and	financial	spheres	in	that	period.	Politically,	
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they faced the discontent of the economically strongest regions’ elites. Second, 
the coming 1999 electoral campaign opened a window of opportunity for the 
regional	leaders	to	radically	change	the	system	of	intergovernmental	relations.	A	
group	of	regional	leaders,	headed	by	Yury	Luzhkov,	Moscow’s	mayor,	and	Min-
timer	 Shaimiev,	 the	 President	 of	 Tatarstan,	 founded	 the	 political	 coalition	
Fatherland—All	Russia	 (Otechestvo—Vsya Rossiya, OVR), which sought both 
to take the majority of seats in the State Duma and to nominate a candidate for 
the 2000 presidential campaign. In other words, the regional elites declared their 
intent	to	control	all	important	positions	at	the	federal	level.
 The regional leaders’ coalition was a real threat for Yeltsin and his team. 
During	 the	 1990s,	 the	 governors	 had	 established	 well-	functioning	 political	
machines in the regions, which were completely obedient to them. Unlike the 
communist opposition, the regional leaders had real resources to win against the 
unpopular	and	economically	weak	federal	government.
	 However,	 the	 regional	opposition’s	 actions	were	 implemented	 too	 late.	The	
federal	 government	was	 able	 to	 form	 an	 alternative	 union	 of	 regional	 leaders,	
mainly	including	the	heads	of	administratively	based	subnational	units	and	small	
political parties. Its name, Unity (Edinstvo), clearly demonstrated the main polit-
ical	division	in	 that	electoral	campaign.	The	main	source	of	Unity’s	 increasing	
popularity	was	support	from	Vladimir	Putin,	the	new	head	of	the	Russian	gov-
ernment. Another factor contributing to the results of the elections was the popu-
lation’s reaction to a chain of acts of terrorism in three Russian cities including 
Moscow. Vladimir Putin declared the start of the second Chechen campaign to 
eliminate the subnational regime that was a source of terrorist groups in Russia. 
Thus, both the federal center, with Vladimir Putin as its face, and Unity were 
presented as the main defenders of the Russian population.
 Under these circumstances, OVR failed in the 1999 elections. It took third 
place,	while	the	Communist	Party	and	Unity	took	first	and	second.	This	failure	
should	be	considered	a	key	factor	in	the	further	development	of	intergovernmen-
tal relations in Russia. Indeed, the OVR campaign was the only real attempt by 
the	regional	elites	to	impose	their	agenda	on	the	center	and	revise	the	constitu-
tional	 foundations	 of	 relations	 between	 governmental	 tiers.	 They	 attempted	 to	
increase	 their	political	 status—and	failed.	The	subsequent	merger	of	OVR	and	
Unity in United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) emphasized that the regional leaders 
had admitted their defeat.
 At the same time, the 1999 electoral campaign became an important lesson 
for	 the	 center.	 Before,	 the	 governors	 had	 been	 seen	 as	 rent-	seekers	who	 used	
every	opportunity	to	extract	additional	benefits	from	the	federal	center.	But	now,	
the center recognized some regional leaders as political challengers who were 
able both to control political processes in their home subnational units and to 
influence	political	outcomes	at	the	federal	level.
 Near the end of 2000, Boris Yeltsin resigned, and Vladimir Putin became the 
acting president of the Russian Federation. While the Communists were the main 
political	opponents	for	Yeltsin’s	government,	Putin’s	rise	to	power	was	character-
ized	by	his	struggle	with	the	strong	regions.	As	a	result,	one	of	his	first	presidential	
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decisions	was	aimed	at	achieving	the	old	goal	of	aligning	regional	legislation	with	
the	 federal	 constitutional	 norms.	 The	 first	 measure	 to	 accomplish	 this	 was	 the	
establishment	of	 seven	 federal	districts	headed	by	 the	presidential	 envoys	 (titled	
Plenipotentiary	 Representatives	 of	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 in	 a	
Federal	District)—the	Northwest,	Central,	Southern,	Volga,	Urals,	Siberian,	 and	
Far Eastern districts.
	 The	 institution	 of	 the	 presidential	 representative	 was	 nothing	 new	 to	 the	
Russian	federal	system.	The	Russian	President	had	had	his	own	representatives	
in	each	subnational	unit	since	1991,	when	Boris	Yeltsin	was	able	to	fire	all	the	
regional	 leaders	who	had	supported	 the	1991	coup	d’état.	But	soon	 the	federal	
center	 faced	 a	 classic	principal–agency	problem:	 the	 representatives	 integrated	
with the regional elites and became a channel for the representation of regional 
interests	at	 the	federal	 level.	Now,	the	former	presidential	representatives	were	
demoted	and	 re-	subordinated	 to	 the	presidential	envoys	 in	 the	 federal	districts.	
Many	observers	agreed	that	the	main	goal	Putin	was	trying	to	accomplish	was	to	
ensure	 control	 over	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 in	 the	 regions.	 That	 was	 the	
purpose	for	which	the	system	of	management	in	this	field	was	transformed.
	 Brian	 Taylor	 (Taylor,	 2011:	 112–155)	 describes	 the	 process	 perfectly.	 In	
2000, special departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Procurator 
General’s	 Office	 were	 established	 in	 each	 federal	 district.	 These	 agencies	
received	not	only	special	 interregional	cases	to	investigate,	but	also	the	task	of	
controlling	how	their	regional-	level	departments	worked.	Together	with	the	new	
practice	 of	 rotation	 of	 regional	 departments’	 top	 officials	 (Petrov,	 2007),	 the	
change	 was	 a	 severe	 blow	 to	 the	 links	 between	 governors	 and	 heads	 of	 law	
enforcement agencies, which had been strengthened during the 1990s.2
	 Over	two	years,	 the	envoys,	together	with	regional	procurators,	successfully	
forced	 regional	governments	 and	 legislatures	 to	 edit	 regional	 constitutions	and	
laws. In 2000, Putin, just elected as the Russian President, pushed two other 
initiatives	 that	 radically	 reduced	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	 regional	 elites.	 The	 first	
allowed	 the	 president,	with	 the	 permission	 of	 the	 court,	 to	 fire	 governors	 and	
dismiss	 regional	 legislatures	 if	 they	 violated	 federal	 legislation.	 The	 second	
changed the procedure for appointing the members of the Federation Council. 
Instead	of	 the	heads	of	 regional	executives	and	 legislatures	being	appointed	 to	
the	 council,	 their	 representatives	 would	 be	 appointed	 to	 work	 in	 the	 upper	
chamber	of	the	Russian	parliament.	This	measure	deprived	the	regional	leaders	
of	 their	 only	 official	 channel	 for	 representing	 their	 interests.	 As	 such,	 they	
fiercely	resisted	 the	adoption	of	 these	 initiatives.	However,	Putin	used	the	pro-	
centrist	majority	in	the	State	Duma	to	overcome	the	upper	chambers’	veto.
	 The	 new	 procedure	 led	 to	 a	 significant	 change	 in	 the	 membership	 of	 the	
council. The regions chose different models for the selection of their 
representatives:
Some	 regions	 chose	 prominent	 national	 political	 figures	 to	 serve	 as	 their	
voices	in	Moscow;	others	named	high-	ranking	business	executives;	in	other	
cases	 they	 sent	 former	 governors	 and	 legislators	 with	 deep	 roots	 in	 their	
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home regions to represent them. About half of the members were Moscow 
based,	the	other	half	came	out	of	the	regions	that	sent	them.	[…]	It	is	also	
generally	believed	that	at	least	some	members	have	“bought”	their	seats	by	
bribing	the	governors	or	regional	legislators	who	selected	them.
(Remington,	2007:	132–133)
Even	 if	 some	 of	 the	 regions	 were	 ready	 to	 continue	 using	 the	 council	 as	 a	
channel	 for	 representation	 of	 interests,	 most	 of	 them	 were	 driven	 by	 other	
motives.
 Finally, in September 2004, the president used the Beslan tragedy to de facto 
eliminate gubernatorial elections. Putin proposed that regional legislatures 
should select the heads of regions from candidates nominated by the president. 
Publicly,	the	president	initiated	this	change	to	“increase	the	governmental	agen-
cies’	effectiveness”	(Putin,	2004).	At	the	same	time,	the	measure	corresponded	
with the center’s strategy aimed at weakening the political independence of the 
regional	elites.	Despite	the	federal	government’s	policy	at	 the	beginning	of	the	
2000s,	 the	governors	preserved	 their	 influence	over	 internal	 regional	processes	
and protected their own interests. For instance, they resisted the center’s attempts 
to	secure	United	Russia’s	majority	in	the	regional	legislatures	(Golosov,	2011).	
In	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 the	 governors	 supported	 regional	 parties	 and/or	 regional	
branches	 of	 the	 federal	 political	 parties	 so	 as	 to	 dissolve	 the	 influence	 of	 the	
president’s	party	at	 the	regional	 level.	For	 the	Presidential	Administration,	 this	
was	a	sign	that	the	political	autonomy	of	the	regional	governments	could	not	be	
eradicated	 without	 asserting	 the	 center’s	 control	 over	 the	 process	 of	 the	 gov-
ernors’ appointment.
	 This	 initiative	 was	 completely	 supported	 by	 the	 new	 Russian	 parliament	
elected in 2003. Now, United Russia gained the constitutional majority in the 
lower	 chamber,	 while	 the	 regional	 representatives	 in	 the	 upper	 chamber	were	
obedient	 to	 the	Presidential	Administration.	Thus,	 the	center	achieved	the	gov-
ernors’ complete loyalty to the president personally.
	 In	 2004,	 the	 federal	 government	 initiated	 one	 more	 change	 in	 the	 federal	
system	in	Russia—it	 launched	 the	process	of	merging	 the	regions.	The	discus-
sion	on	the	need	to	decrease	the	number	of	subnational	units	became	very	active	
after	 Putin’s	 first	 federal	 reforms.	 Many	 believed	 that	 the	 formation	 of	 the	
federal	districts	was	the	first	step	toward	radical	changes	in	the	Russian	political	
map. But at the end of the day, this merger included subnational units with 
complex relations between autonomous districts and other regions.
	 The	autonomous	districts	 are	a	new	example	of	 the	 specific	 scenario	of	 the	
Russian regions’ federalization. They belong to the group of subnational units 
formed on an ethnic basis (along with the republics and an autonomous oblast). 
In	the	early	Soviet	Union,	the	autonomous	districts	were	formed	in	the	territory	
of	certain	oblasts	and	krais	to	provide	additional	support	for	small	ethnic	groups,	
which	needed	to	be	protected	by	the	state	in	order	to	preserve	their	unique	cul-
tures.	At	the	same	time,	they	did	not	have	any	autonomy	in	their	relations	with	
both	 the	 central	 government	 and	 the	 region	 that	 shared	 the	 territory	 with	 the	
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	district.	The	1992	Federal	Agreement	was	the	first	document	that	referred	to	the	
federal	districts	as	“subnational	units”	 (sub’ekty federatsii). Compared with all 
other types of region in the Russian system, the federal districts and federal 
oblasts had the lowest statuses. In the 1993 Constitution their rights and respons-
ibilities were made equal, but in reality the links between the districts and the 
regions	were	 strong,	 especially	 in	 the	 sphere	of	finances,	 and	have	been	 regu-
lated by special agreements between the subnational units.
 Some autonomous districts were located in territories rich with oil, gas, and 
minerals,	giving	them	the	potential	to	become	successful	and	prosperous	regions.	
Other	units	did	not	have	any	economic	advantages	and	were	depressed	areas—
they	became	the	first	that	had	to	be	unified	with	other	regions.
	 During	 the	 three	 years	 of	 2005–2008,	 six	 autonomous	 districts	 (the	 Komi-	
Permyak Autonomous District, the Taymyr (Dolgano- Nenets) Autonomous Dis-
trict,	the	Evenk	Autonomous	Area,	the	Koryak	Autonomous	District,	the	Ust-	Orda	
Buryat Autonomous District, and the Agin- Buryat Autonomous District) were 
absorbed	by	larger	subnational	units.	But	that	experiment	was	interrupted—not	all	
autonomous	districts	underwent	mergers	during	the	campaign.	The	federal	govern-
ment ran the experiment in order to identify the opportunities and risks associated 
with such mergers, and found that the socio- economic effects were quite modest, 
while	the	political	risks	were	very	high	(Zubarevich,	2006).
 The last part of the strategy for weakening the Russian regions was a change 
in electoral formula for the State Duma. The parallel system, where half of the 
deputies were elected in single member districts, was replaced by a proportional 
system in the only multi- member district. Before, the deputies from the constitu-
encies	had	often	come	into	conflict	with	the	governors.	But	at	the	same	time,	due	
to the need to be re- elected, they used their positions to lobby the regions’ inter-
ests	in	the	federal	parliament.	It	is	noteworthy	that	they	did	not	have	close	rela-
tions	with	 political	 parties,	 since	 their	 electoral	 perspectives	were	 affected	 by	
personal popularity among the electorate. That was why the transformation of 
the electoral system led not only to strengthening the Russian party system and 
the	president’s	control	over	 the	parliament,	but	also	 to	further	centralization	of	
intergovernmental	relations	(Golosov,	2011).
	 Overall,	I	believe	that	all	the	measures	implemented	by	the	federal	center	in	
2000–2005	were	parts	of	a	strategy	aimed	at	limiting	the	regions’	autonomy	and	
revising	 the	 pattern	 of	 intergovernmental	 relations	 that	 had	 formed	 during	 the	
1990s.	But	the	most	important	issue	is	that	those	revolutionary	changes	did	not	
raise	any	real	protests	from	the	regional	elites	and	communities.	In	2000	the	gov-
ernors	publicly	demonstrated	their	discontent	and	refused	to	approve	the	presi-
dent’s	 laws.	 However,	 even	 then,	 the	 governors	 admitted	 the	 futility	 of	 their	
attempts.	 Mikhail	 Prusak,	 the	 governor	 of	 Pskov	 Oblast,	 explained	 their	
behaviour	at	 that	 time:	“We	should	just	relax	and	enjoy.	We	failed,	 that’s	why	
we	 should	 leave	with	 dignity”	 (Sovet,	 2000).	As	 a	 result,	 the	members	 of	 the	
upper chamber managed to bargain for minor changes in the president’s projects 
and in the end agreed with the reform of the Federation Council. Three years 
later,	when	the	president	declared	that	the	governors	would	not	be	elected	by	the	
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regions’	populations,	Yury	Luzhkov	and	Mintimer	Shaimiev,	the	leaders	of	the	
regional	rebellion	at	the	end	of	the	1990s,	were	the	first	to	proclaim	their	support	
for the president’s proposal.
	 Thus,	during	his	first	presidential	term,	Vladimir	Putin	was	able	to	dramatic-
ally	 change	 intergovernmental	 relations	 in	 Russia.	 The	 president	 became	 the	
dominant actor across the whole territory of the country. He possessed complete 
control	over	the	regional	elites,	who	were	deprived	of	any	ability	to	impose	their	
interests	 on	 the	 federal	 government	 or	 even	 influence	 the	 decision-	making	
process	at	 the	 federal	 level.	The	elimination	of	 the	popular	gubernatorial	 elec-
tions	was	so	severe	a	blow	to	regional	autonomy	that	during	the	next	eight	years	
Russian federalism, at least institutionally, was dead.
	 Putin’s	federal	reforms	led	to	significant	administrative	strengthening	of	federal	
governmental	 agencies	 and	 their	 territorial	 departments.	 The	 governors,	 com-
pletely controlled by the center, performed the roles it prescribed them. Con-
sequently,	 the	 Kremlin	 did	 not	 have	 to	 intervene	 in	 internal	 regional	 political	
processes	often.	Initially,	the	president	reappointed	most	of	the	previously	elected	
governors.	 In	 2005,	 44	 governors	 were	 appointed	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 new	
model.	The	 governors	were	 changed	 in	 only	 12	 regions.	 In	 2006,	 nine	 cases	 of	
governor	appointment	led	to	four	instances	of	new	regional	heads.	The	leaders	of	
the regional rebellion in the 1990s kept their positions for a long time. Mintimer 
Shaimiev,	Yury	Luzhkov,	 and	Murtaza	Rakhimov	 resigned	 only	 in	 2010,	when	
Dmitry	Medvedev,	 the	next	Russian	President,	was	in	power.	The	federal	center	
had	 not	 previously	 needed	 this	 to	 be	 done,	 since	 the	 governors	 had	 brilliantly	
managed	 the	 tasks	 it	 had	 assigned	 them.	As	 soon	 as	 the	 center	 decided	 to	have	
these people resign (due to operational needs and bad relations between President 
Medvedev	and	Yury	Luzhkov),	it	could	make	it	happen	without	any	serious	effort.
 Simultaneously, the center weakened formal channels of representation of 
regional interests. Since 2000, two structures had been responsible for this func-
tion:	 the	constitutionally	approved	Federation	Council	and	the	State	Council,	a	
consultative	assembly	of	governors	headed	by	the	president.
 The latter was established in 2000 to comfort the regional leaders who had 
been supplanted as members of the upper chamber of the parliament. In the 
beginning, the State Council was empowered to discuss different directions for 
public reforms and propose recommendations for the president and the federal 
government.	During	 the	 first	 three	 years,	 the	 State	Council	 participated	 in	 the	
designing	of	a	new	law	on	redistribution	of	governmental	tiers’	responsibilities	
and	competences	(this	was	headed	by	Mintimer	Shaimiev)	and	in	proposing	an	
alternative	to	the	education	reforms	(a	working	group	was	led	by	Sergei	Katan-
andov,	 then	head	of	 the	Republic	of	Karelia).	While	 the	State	Council’s	 influ-
ence	on	the	process	of	administrative	decentralization	was	conspicuous,	its	ideas	
on the modernization of the education system in Russia were not taken into 
account	 by	 the	 government	 (Starodubtsev,	 2016).	 After	 2004,	 when	 Vladimir	
Putin	was	re-	elected	for	a	second	term,	the	council	took	on	a	decorative	function	
and did not possess enough resources to so much as express the regions’ will in 
the	process	of	decision-	making	at	the	federal	level.
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	 The	Federation	Council	was	significantly	damaged	by	the	2000	reform.	Very	
soon, it became a mechanism for the unquestioning acceptance of bills that had 
been	approved	by	the	lower	chamber	of	the	parliament.	As	a	result,	the	regional	
elites lost their interest in struggling for the appointment of candidates to the 
council.
	 In	2009,	President	Dmitry	Medvedev	proposed	a	new	model	 for	appointing	
members	 of	 the	Council	 of	 the	 Federation:	 now,	 only	 a	 person	who	 had	 been	
elected	in	regional	or	municipal	elections	could	seek	to	become	a	“senator.”	In	
theory, the measure was aimed at strengthening the upper chamber of the 
Russian	parliament.	Participation	in	regional	or	municipal	elections	would	have	
established a link between the politician and the regional political agenda.
	 Soon,	in	the	first	year	of	the	new	model’s	implementation,	Valentina	Matviy-
enko,	former	deputy	prime	minister	of	the	Russian	government	and	the	governor	
of	St	Petersburg,	 took	part	 in	 the	municipal	elections	 in	St	Petersburg.	Having	
won, she became eligible for nomination to the Federation Council, and once 
nominated she was immediately elected its chair. Other candidates all around 
Russia also used the same strategy to become federal parliamentarians.
 The reform did not lead to the empowerment of the Federation Council. First, 
the	nature	of	the	Russian	political	regime	significantly	limits	the	opportunity	for	
oppositional	candidates	who	had	not	been	approved	by	 the	government	 to	win	
elections.	Even	though	electoral	processes	at	the	municipal	level	are	often	more	
competitive	than	at	regional	and	especially	at	federal	levels,	they	work	in	accord-
ance with the general political rules, when such elections are used by federal 
players	to	achieve	their	own	significant	goals.
 Second, the council suffered (and continues to suffer) from an institutionally 
weak	 position	 in	 Russia’s	 constitutional	 system:	 while	 its	 control	 functions	
(including the right to decline a draft law adopted by the State Duma) are quite 
significant,	 its	abilities	 to	propose	and	push	alternatives	are	negligible.	 Indeed,	
when the State Duma is under the president’s complete control, any attempts by 
regional	 representatives	 to	 defend	 territorial	 interests	 are	 fruitless,	 since	 the	
lower	house	is	able	to	overrule	the	council’s	protests.
 This is why Russia is characterized by the degradation of the institutional 
environment	of	 regional	 interest	 representation	 in	 its	 federal	system.	Certainly,	
such	 conditions	 have	 strengthened	 informal	 institutions.	 However,	 if	 in	 the	
1990s	such	informal	relations	were	in	the	regional	leaders’	favor,	now	they	act	
against those leaders’ interests. In the next chapter I will show how the central 
government	changed	intergovernmental	financial	relations	to	dramatically	reduce	
the regions’ opportunities to act independently.
	 In	 2009,	 President	 Medvedev	 declared	 that	 the	 current	 model	 of	 the	 gov-
ernors’ appointment would be able to exist for more than 100 years (Medvedev, 
2009). By the 2010s, both the elites and the Russian population demonstrated a 
consensus	on	the	current	state	of	federal	relations.	In	2010–2012,	the	Gorbachev	
Foundation	 and	 the	 TSIRKON	Group	 conducted	 a	 study:	The State and Pro-
spects of Russian Federalism’s Development in the Mass Consciousness and 
Experts’ Assessments.	According	to	their	conclusions,	“in	the	mass	consciousness	
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and	experts’	assessments	there	is	no	consistent	position	on	regional	autonomy:	
there	is	no	significance	dominance	of	federalist,	decentralist	or	regionalist	atti-
tudes”	and	“today,	neither	citizens	nor	 regional	elites	 formulate	a	demand	 for	
political	and	administrative	autonomy	of	the	subnational	units	(sub’ekty feder-
atsii)” (K Novoi,	2011:	5–7).
	 Surprisingly,	President	Medvedev	had	to	change	the	system	of	gubernatorial	
elections by the end of his presidential term. In 2011 and 2012, between the 
parliamentary	and	presidential	 elections,	Russian	 society	underwent	 a	wave	of	
political protests (Gel’man, 2013). As a result, the Kremlin, headed by 
Medvedev,	 took	 certain	 reformist	 steps;	 one	 of	 these	was	 the	 return	 of	 direct	
general	elections	of	governors	in	the	regions.
 That situation again reproduced the logic of tertius gaudens. The main slogan 
of	the	protests	in	2011–2012	had	been	“free	and	fair	elections.”	The	opposition	
saw the return to gubernatorial elections as a way to increase political competit-
iveness	 in	 the	 regions,	 but	 not	 as	 an	 important	 step	 toward	 the	 political	 auto-
nomy of the regional communities. In its turn, the center intended to use the 
regional	elections	to	divert	regional	protesters’	attention	away	from	support	of	a	
nation-	wide	oppositional	movement.
	 To	reduce	possible	risks	to	intergovernmental	relations	from	gubernatorial	elec-
tions,	Vladimir	Putin,	who	had	been	prime	minister	of	the	Russian	government	in	
2008–2012	and	who	would	be	the	next	Russian	President	from	2012,	declared	that	
there was a need to establish special mechanisms to control the lists of candidates 
in the gubernatorial elections. United Russia supported him in this. Soon, they sug-
gested	 two	mechanisms,	which	were	 shamelessly	 called	 “filters.”	The	first—the	
presidential	filter—empowered	the	president	to	“consult”	with	candidates.	The	law	
did	not	explain	what	these	consultations	meant	and	how	they	were	able	to	influ-
ence the list of candidates, but all participants in the political process understood 
them to express the president’s right to reject candidates on his or her own.
	 The	second	filter—the	municipal	one—was	proposed	by	the	mayor	of	Saratov	
when the law was being discussed in the State Duma. According to that idea, a 
candidate	 for	 governorship	 should	 collect	 agreements	 from	 a	 significant	 part	
(5–10	percent)	of	the	deputies	of	municipal	councils	and	elected	heads	of	muni-
cipalities in order to be registered and able to participate in the elections.
	 The	 first	 regional	 electoral	 campaigns	 demonstrated	 that	 even	 under	 such	
severe	conditions,	the	gubernatorial	elections	visibly	revived	political	competit-
iveness	in	the	regions.	In	fall	2012,	the	campaigns	were	held	in	five	subnational	
units.	 In	 two	of	 them—the	Ryazan	and	Bryansk	oblasts—oppositional	 candid-
ates had a real chance to win. The incumbents had to bargain with the opposition 
to	save	their	positions.
 For example, in Bryansk Oblast, Mikhail Marchenko, the Liberal Democratic 
Party	 of	 Russia	 (LDPR)	 candidate,	 received	 Federation	 Council	 membership,	
while	Andrei	Ponomarev,	a	candidate	from	the	Yabloko	party,	became	a	deputy	
governor	for	economic	policy.	As	a	result,	Nikolai	Denin,	the	incumbent,	could	
beat his main challenger, the Communist Vadim Potomsky. It is noteworthy that 
two	years	later	Putin	appointed	Potomsky	acting	governor	of	Oryol	Oblast	and	
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permitted	him	to	be	elected	governor.	This	evidenced	that	the	center	was	strug-
gling	with	 uncertainty	 resulting	 from	 competitiveness,	 but	 not	with	 politically	
strong and popular candidates if they were ready to pledge allegiance to it.
	 In	Ryazan	Oblast,	 Igor	Morozov,	 a	 candidate	 from	Russia’s	 Patriots	 party,	
was	the	most	popular	out	of	all	candidates.	Even	so,	after	negotiations	with	Gov-
ernor	Oleg	Kovalyov,	Morozov	was	also	appointed	the	region’s	representative	in	
the	Federation	Council.	He	explained	his	decision	by	the	need	to	save	the	region	
from	“a	cleavage	in	society,	a	cleavage	in	the	elite,	including	the	political	elite”	
(Favorit, 2012).
	 The	first	wave	 of	 the	 gubernatorial	 elections	 confirmed	 the	 federal	 center’s	
fears:	the	electoral	campaigns	were	accompanied	by	a	growth	in	the	popularity	
of oppositional politicians, potentially making them harder to negotiate with in 
the future. In addition, in some regions, particularly in the North Caucasian 
federal district, elections could amplify the effects of plural societies and 
uncover	ethnic	conflicts	that	had	been	frozen	by	the	federal	center’s	policies	in	
previous	times.	That	was	why,	at	the	beginning	of	2013,	a	new	law	on	guberna-
torial elections was adopted. It allowed the regional parliaments to return to the 
model that had been in place between 2004 and 2012. By this point, six 
regions—Dagestan,	 Ingushetia,	 Kabardino-	Balkaria,	 Karachay-	Cherkessia,	
North	 Ossetia,	 and	 Adygea—rejected	 general	 gubernatorial	 elections.	 At	 the	
same time, with the dominance of United Russia in the regional legislatures, the 
center was able to cancel elections in any region in any time.
 Vladimir Putin blocked all proposals capable of increasing uncertainty in the 
political	system,	even	if	they	were	initiated	by	a	member	of	his	team.	In	2011,	
Valentina	Matviyenko,	the	chair	of	the	upper	chamber	of	the	Russian	parliament,	
proposed	a	bill	that	could	have	introduced	general	elections	of	one	of	two	repre-
sentatives	 from	 a	 region	 to	 the	Council	 of	 the	Federation.	However,	 the	Pres-
idential	 Administration	 replaced	 it	 with	 its	 own	 alternative.	 According	 to	 the	
president’s	conception,	a	candidate	for	the	position	of	a	governor	should	declare	
the names of three potential senators before the gubernatorial elections. Then, 
after	his	or	her	victory,	he	or	she	would	be	obliged	to	appoint	one	of	them	to	be	
a member of the Federation Council. As a result, the center again blocked the 
way for politicians elected by the regional communities to represent regional 
interests	at	the	federal	level.3
	 All	this	history	of	the	development	of	Russian	federal	relations	leads	to	some	
important conclusions.
	 First,	we	see	the	effectiveness	of	William	Riker’s	idea	of	federalism	as	a	very	
unstable kind of institutional design, an unsteady equilibrium affected by internal 
and	 external	 shocks.	 Central	 governments	 are	 not	 interested	 in	 sharing	 their	
responsibilities and delegating political autonomy to lower tiers. They do so only 
under	 significant	 pressure	 and	 roll	 the	 situation	back	 as	 soon	 as	 favorable	 cir-
cumstances	allow	it.	Given	this,	the	subnational	units’	elites	have	to	constantly	
build and realize strategies aimed at strengthening and defending their auto-
nomy. Their actions should include demands to form constitutional frameworks 
that	will	protect	their	rights	in	the	long-	term	perspective.
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 Second, the federal constitutional design in Russia was formed not as a result 
of bottom- up demands, but as the by- product of political processes that did not 
directly	concern	intergovernmental	relations	and	statuses	of	subnational	units.	In	
1985–1993,	the	federalization	of	the	Russian	political	space	was	affected	by	the	
escalation of political struggles in which future subnational units did not parti-
cipate.	Further,	during	the	1990s,	intergovernmental	relations	were	characterized	
by	the	formula	of	“loyalty	in	exchange	for	autonomy.”	The	regional	elites,	which	
controlled electoral results in their regions, blackmailed the center in order to 
rule without regard for federal laws, gain additional federal money and keep the 
subnational	political	regimes	they	wanted.	From	their	viewpoint,	these	were	not	
actions	in	the	support	of	(con)federalization—the	regional	leaders	merely	bene-
fited	 from	 the	general	weakness	of	 the	central	government	and	 tried	 to	extract	
from	that	situation	as	much	profit	as	they	could.	Their	motivation	probably	only	
changed	 in	1998–1999,	when	 the	most	prosperous	among	 them	challenged	 the	
center and attempted to capture the parliament and the presidential position. But 
their	 struggle	 was	 limited	 by	 the	 parliamentarian	 electoral	 campaign—and	 its	
failure	led	to	the	subsequent	abandonment	of	all	winnings	that	had	been	received	
during the 1990s.
 The centralization of the 2000s supports the conclusion that all the decentrali-
zation of the 1990s could be explained by the center’s political and economic 
weakness,	 rather	 than	 the	 regional	 elites’	 strategic	 behavior.	 Both	 Vladimir	
Putin’s popularity and the economic growth in the beginning of the 2000s 
quickly	broke	up	intergovernmental	relations	into	unitary	patterns	that	resembled	
the	practices	of	territorial	governance	in	the	Soviet	Union.
Notes
1	 Hereafter,	“national	policy”	should	be	understood	as	“ethnic	policy.”
2 In the future, in 2014, the Ministry of Internal Affairs would eliminate the federal dis-
tricts’	agencies	everywhere	except	the	North	Caucasus	district.	In	private	talks	experts	
had noted that the departments often duplicated the other structures’ tasks. At the same 
time,	the	need	to	provide	control	was,	first,	not	as	severe	as	it	had	been	at	the	beginning	
of	the	2000s,	and,	second,	was	successfully	provided	for	by	the	regional	departments	
of	the	Procurator	General’s	Office.
3 In 2014, Vladimir Putin proposed a constitutional amendment that empowered the 
president	 to	 appoint	 “the	 Russian	 Federation’s	 representatives	 in	 the	 Federation	
Council.”	The	total	number	of	such	representatives	cannot	be	more	than	10	percent	of	
all	regional	representatives	in	the	council.
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2 Why has regional development in 
Russia failed?
The political centralization that happened in the 2000s shifted responsibility for 
well- being and development in the regions to the central level. That period was 
when the federal government tried to find new models and mechanisms of 
regional development in Russia.
 In March 2007, the federal government declared a plan for building a railway 
from Kuragino to Kyzyl. It could have connected the Republic of Tyva with the 
greater part of Russia. Tyva is one of the poorest regions in the country, with tre-
mendous economic and logistic troubles. The only “growth point” that exists in 
the region is significant reserves of coal. But full- scale development of a pro-
spective “coal project” is limited by the lack of necessary transport infrastruc-
ture, mainly of a railway that would connect Kyzyl, the capital of the republic, 
with the most important transport arteries. As a result, the few companies that 
are developing the coal project have to utilize the very expensive highway. This 
decreases the profitability of regional production.
 The fact that there is no railway in one of the remote border regions comes as 
a surprise. How is it possible that, even in the Soviet period, which was less 
sensitive to assessments of profitability, one of the border regions was not 
equipped with enough transport infrastructure?
 This is explained by Tyva’s geographical particularities, which hinder the 
implementation of such a project. The current plan for railway construction 
includes maintaining a line on the territory of permafrost and two mountain 
ranges. The project needs the creation of 180 bridges, and seven tunnels, one of 
which will be constructed at a depth of 200 meters. It is obvious that this project 
demands substantial financial resources and cannot be implemented without 
significant state support.
 Eight years later, the full- scale implementation of the project has yet to begin. 
The need to build this railway was questioned by federal officials (for instance, 
Andrey Makarov, the Chair of the State Duma’s Committee on Budget and 
Taxes said in 2015: “Who has heard the word ‘kyzyl’? Who has heard the word 
‘kuragino’? I do not believe that the Kyzyl—Kuragino railway is a project which 
will develop our economy” (Yakino, 2015)) and experts (Get’man, 2010) many 
times. The first consortium of the state and private business was ruined by the 
2008 economic crisis and corruption scandals. The second has suffered from a 
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lack of public financing. The only reason the project is still alive is tremendous 
support from Sergey Shoigu, one of the most authoritative ministers in all Russian 
governments since 1991, who was born in Tyva. His lobbyism ensures the pres-
ence of the project in governmental plans in spite of aforementioned criticism.
 In addition to the realization of obviously lobbyist projects, in the 2000s the 
Russian government launched a set of programs of regional development that 
had already proved their effectiveness in world practice. One of them was 
the project of establishing so- called “special economic zones” in some of the 
Russian regions. The government’s officials hoped that such zones would lay the 
foundations for new growth points that could accelerate the economic develop-
ment of both the region and the whole country. Over ten years the number of 
special economic zones increased from ten to 25. But in 2016, the government 
declared that all zones would be closed due to their extreme ineffectiveness.
 Overall, during the 2000s and 2010s, the government was unable to achieve 
visible progress in the field of regional policy. This chapter is devoted to the 
question of “Why?” How can we explain the failure of the federal government’s 
policy of regional development in Russia?
What does regional policy mean?
It is not that simple to define the content and limitations of a governmental 
policy. Numerous participants in the policy process are often not interested in 
the delimitation of boundaries between different policies. Such uncertainty 
allows them to increase financial support for their activities and decrease 
responsibility for the results of their work. This fact significantly hinders policy 
analysis by both practitioners who seek opportunities to improve a policy and 
scholars who would like to limit the subject of their studies. Regional develop-
ment is an example of a policy that a priori suffers from such ambiguity.
 Regional policy (also known as “regional development policy”) deals with 
the fact that in many countries there is a problem of disparity in the economic 
and social development of different regions.1 In particular, that problem was 
exacerbated during the economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s, which 
considerably developed industrial regions versus rural territories and regions 
without industrial growth points. In response, many states launched sets of 
policy measures aimed at leveling such differences (OECD, 2010). This goal is 
considered the basis for regional policy. At the instrumental level, the national 
governments have used subsidies and different forms of state aid for both 
lagging regions’ governments and firms in order to boost economic activity in 
such regions. Ideologically, this strategy is justified by the population’s demand 
for fairness: all citizens of a country have the right to equal living standards and 
economic opportunities; consequently, the state’s responsibility is to provide 
these, if the country meets with market failure.
 The policy of support for lagging regions continued up to the end of the 1980s 
and was ultimately admitted as a failure. Fabrizio Barca and his co- authors 
 formulate a diagnosis as follows:
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State aid and industrial intervention has wasted resources on declining 
industries, lame ducks, and big projects […]. In general, these policies have 
struggled to cope with the more heterogeneous economic reality emerging 
from globalization […], often ending as “strategies of waste.”
(Barca et al., 2012: 137)
 As a response, another—so- called “place- based”—approach began to develop 
in both theory and practice. Its content is based on the assumption that different 
places possess their own unique sources of development that should be con-
sidered by central governments when implementing economic policy measures. 
The objective of reducing interregional disparities was replaced by that of 
increasing regional economic competitiveness so as to underpin economic pros-
perity and social well- being in every region.
 The so- called “new paradigm” has not replaced the old one completely. The 
OECD report (2010) shows that, for developed countries’ governments, the three 
main problems in the field of regional development are interregional disparities 
(20 governments), decline of distressed areas (nine governments), and insufficient 
economic competitiveness (eight governments). At the same time, their regional 
policies’ objectives are regional economic competitiveness (25 governments), 
reducing interregional disparities (18 governments), and endogenous, balanced, 
and sustainable development (seven governments) (OECD, 2010: 15–16). This 
shows that the two paradigms are co- existing in the real policy process.
 In spite of those changes in strategies of regional policy, in the 2010s 
researchers demonstrated,
there is strong empirical evidence that during the 1990s and early 2000s even 
though income inequality between countries has declined somewhat in recent 
decades, it had at the same time increased quite markedly within countries, 
with poorer regions lagging further behind the highest income regions.
(Garretsen et al., 2013)
The disparities in regions’ development were not smoothed out but became 
deeper. At the same time, governments did not manage the task of noticeably 
improving economic and social conditions in the lagging regions.
 Taking these results into account, in the 2000s there appeared ideas of reject-
ing place- based policies. The most influential supporter of the spatially blind 
pattern of economic development became the World Bank, which expressed its 
position in its 2009 development report:
A generation of economic research confirms this: there is no good reason to 
expect economic growth to spread smoothly across space. The experience of 
successful developers shows that production becomes more concentrated 
spatially. The most successful nations also institute policies that make basic 
living standards more uniform across space.
(World Bank, 2009: 6)
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The report proposes thinking of spatial development in terms of three dimen-
sions—density, distance, and division. Density here is about how much is pro-
duced in a specific territory; distance refers to the remoteness of centers of 
production from markets, or inhabited spaces from territories with significant 
density; finally, division characterizes infrastructural, social, political barriers 
that hamper economic relations between residents in one or several territories.
 This approach stems from the belief that concentration is a normal form of 
economic development, and governments do not need to oppose this tendency 
by supporting lagging regions and restraining private companies and labor forces 
from seeking the most advantageous territories. Hence, the governments’ main 
objective is to stimulate and support the emergence of such points of concentra-
tion by using the three i’s—institutions, infrastructure, and interventions. The 
key aspect is that the governments should think of the whole country without 
special attention to the economic development of specific places. Indeed, the 
experts insist that social policy can be place based, while economic policy 
should be place blind. In fact, they propose rejecting regional policy as a specific 
direction of governmental actions.
 This idea has become extremely popular among practitioners in developing 
countries. It has produced conceptions of establishing agglomerations and 
special infrastructural projects aimed mainly at decreasing geographic barriers 
between territories. At the same time, this has not led to decreasing significance 
of regional policy. In any country, the economic reality is not separated from 
political processes. That is why in most of them we can observe the complex co- 
existence of all three approaches to regional development. However, under cir-
cumstances of limited financial and other types of resources, governments have 
to choose a strategy to dominate in their policies.
 Thus, regional policy can be defined in two ways. For those who support the 
“old paradigm,” regional policy is a set of governmental measures aimed at 
decreasing disparity in the economic and social development of regions in a 
country. However, taking into account the existence of the “new paradigm,” we 
can define regional policy as a set of governmental measures that seek to stimu-
late regions’ economic and social development.
 I agree with the authors of the World Bank development report who say that a 
government uses three types of instruments for achieving their objectives. The 
most famous group of instruments is interventions. This includes targeted budget 
spending to stimulate economic production in the regions. It can be allocated to 
lower levels’ budgets or private and public companies without the subnational 
government as an intermediary. The interventions are the main instrument of the 
old paradigm of regional policy. The new paradigm shifted the regional policy 
makers’ attention to another set of instruments—infrastructure. Transportation, 
communication, energy, and buildings—all are conditions that are able to attract 
economic participants to invest in launching new projects. Consequently, invest-
ment of public money in infrastructural projects makes sense in the long term. 
Finally, institutions are able to create legal norms to attract investors to develop 
a territory’s economy.
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 I will demonstrate below that most regional policy measures in Russia are 
realized within the framework of financial intergovernmental relations (in Russia 
they are called “interbudgetary relations”).
 The first component of intergovernmental finance is expenditure assignments, 
a list of specific functions and tasks that a given level’s government is obliged to 
accomplish. In spite of the growing belief in decentralization that has character-
ized the modern system of public administration since the middle of the twenti-
eth century, a discussion on how governmental responsibilities should be 
allocated among governmental levels has been developing in the theory and 
practice of public finance.
 There are two lines of argumentation in favor of significant decentralization. 
Richard Musgrave claims that any government realizes three major budget func-
tions—providing for the satisfaction of public wants; providing for adjustment 
in the distribution of income; and contributing to stabilization. While the latter 
two functions should be implemented by the central government, the first must 
be decentralized (Musgrave, 1956). In countries with a large territory and/or 
population, central governments experience difficulties with processing informa-
tion and providing truly successful policy- making. A more effective way is to 
establish additional levels of government, subordinated to the central one and 
taking on a significant volume of responsibilities. In support of this approach, in 
1972 Wallace E. Oates formulated the so- called “decentralization theorem” 
(Oates, 1972, 2008). It states that a decentralized form of decision- making is at 
least as effective as the centralized one, or even more so. This set of arguments 
can be called “top- down” justification for decentralization.
 The second line of argumentation—the “bottom- up” justification—stems 
from the so- called “Tiebout model” (Tiebout, 1956). In 1956, Charles M. 
Tiebout developed a hypothesis suggesting that competitiveness between muni-
cipalities for residents leads to a high level of performance. Later, the model’s 
followers applied the same reasoning to the competition of regions for residents 
and private investments.
 Both Musgrave and Tiebout identify decentralization as an important factor 
of effective public administration. The question is how such decentralization 
should be realized in terms of distribution of concrete responsibilities among dif-
ferent tiers. One response is the well- known principle of the subsidiary, which 
claims that upper tiers should implement functions that cannot be effectively 
realized by lower tiers. It allows the central agencies to unload their superfluous 
responsibilities on regional and municipal governments and to optimize the 
structure of governmental agencies to provide the most appropriate forms of 
public administration. At the same time, each government can apply the prin-
ciple while taking its specific circumstances into consideration.
 Anvar Shah, a World Bank expert, suggested his universal model of intergov-
ernmental finances for developing countries (Shah, 1994), based exclusively on 
the economic foundations of good governance. According to this approach, 
defence, foreign affairs, monetary policy, interregional commerce, immigration, 
etc. should be designed and implemented exclusively at the central level. There 
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are other directions of public policy that should be set by the central govern-
ment, but realized at the lower levels. These include natural resources, inter-
regional highway construction, and the like. Environment, education, health 
care, and social provision are complex policies that should be split between dif-
ferent levels at all stages of the policy cycle. Finally, there are public policies 
such as police, fire protection, and housing that Shah recommends to be concen-
trated at the lower level of government.
 Shah, Tiebout, and Musgrave discuss the issue of responsibilities in economic 
terms, without considering the political dimension. However, in real life, expendi-
ture assignment is a field of political struggle between central and regional govern-
ments, especially in federal states, where regional communities have a right to 
express their opinion on the distribution of power. Expenditure assignment is the 
financial incarnation of the constitutional principles of power distribution.
 In decentralized states, keeping political and administrative control over gov-
ernmental functions is a more important task for politicians than establishing the 
most effective system of management, and even the best technical proposals are 
limited by political constraints. Consider the example of school education policy 
in the United States. The US Constitution leaves school education to be the 
states’ responsibility. In his first term, President Obama declared a need to create 
national standards in order to improve the quality of education in the United 
States. But he faced resistance from the governors, who insisted that such inten-
tions from the federal government violated the constitution.
 The second element of intergovernmental financial relations is distribution of 
revenue assignments. This practice involves a significant difference in the pro-
portions of central, regional, and local budget revenues even in federal countries. 
Figure 2.1 contains data on funds received by the governments at different levels 
0
20
40
80
60
Australia
National
Austria Belgium Canada Germany Russian
Federation
Subnational Local
Figure 2.1  Distribution of incomes between different governmental levels in 2011 in 
several federations.
Source: The author’s calculations based on the data of the International Monetary Fund.
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from their own sources (taxes and fees that are legally assigned to be collected 
by the government of a given level).
 The existence of individual revenue sources is a politically significant element 
of intergovernmental finance. The lack of its own funds makes a regional or 
municipal government more dependent on the higher level, while having sources 
of such funds supports and strengthens regional or municipal autonomy. Tulia 
Falleti shows that national governments in Latin Amer ican countries often use 
financial mechanisms to control regional governments, which cannot fulfill their 
functions appropriately without financial support from the central governments 
(Falleti, 2010).
 Even the most thorough design of intergovernmental relations is all but incap-
able of ensuring a complete match between revenue and expenditure assign-
ments for all regions of a country. This is limited by the particularities of, first, 
the country’s economy; second, its long- term financial planning; and third, the 
policy makers’ political preferences. As a result, nearly every government faces 
the question of fiscal imbalance.
 The theory of the public sector distinguishes between vertical and horizontal 
fiscal imbalances. The first is a result of a fiscal system design that does not 
provide enough revenue assignments to cover all expenditure assignments. The 
second is a consequence of objective disparities in economic development 
between subnational units. Often, these two types of imbalance are closely inter-
twined. Bird et al. (2006: 88–89) show that realization of a vertical balance for 
the most developed regions invariably results in a vertical imbalance for the 
least- developed regions. The reason seems to be the structural disparity of 
regions, rather than the imperfection of intergovernmental financial relations.
 There are two main ways of achieving fiscal balance. The first is to provide 
lower levels’ governments with additional revenue sources. I have mentioned the 
presence of political constraints to using this alternative. Additionally, revenue 
sources are able to solve the problem of vertical, but not horizontal imbalance. 
The most widespread instrument for this is intergovernmental transfers—financial 
flows from the budget of one governmental level to the budget of another.
 The central government uses a wide range of intergovernmental transfers. 
Generally, they are divided into two groups—conditional (or tied) and uncondi-
tional (untied). It is obvious that the center seeks to increase the volume of con-
ditional grants to the regions, because it is thereby able to influence 
policy- making at the lower levels—“they link the amount received to a change 
in behavior, such as spending more on the relevant item” (Bird et al., 2006: 27). 
Consequently, the center’s control over these grants’ spending is comparatively 
simple and effective. Regional and municipal governments prefer to receive 
unconditional grants, so as to have the opportunity to spend money as they wish 
and thereby strengthen their autonomy in relations with the central government. 
The ratio between tied and untied transfers is one more result of the struggle 
between the center and the regions.
 Thus, a policy maker has many options when he or she formulates the coun-
try’s budgetary policy. The diversity of intergovernmental financial relations is 
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analytically grouped into two models. The first one is ubiquitously called fiscal 
federalism, and the other can be termed the unitary fiscal system. Table 2.1 con-
tains variations of the three elements of intergovernmental finances for each of 
the models.
 Fiscal federalism means a significantly decentralized system of public finance, 
where every level of government possesses its own financial resources. In such a 
system, the constitution or other laws contain a clear list of responsibilities for 
every governmental tier. Here, intergovernmental transfers perform a supporting 
role: the center allocates money to lower- level budgets to resolve the problem of 
horizontal fiscal imbalance.
 Within the framework of the unitary fiscal system, the lion’s share of all 
public revenues is concentrated in the central budget. Regional governments, if 
they exist, are designed so as to implement the central government’s policy to 
ameliorate the problem of information asymmetry. They can be responsible for 
certain expenditure assignments, which are financed by the central budget 
through the channels of intergovernmental transfer. It is obvious that in this case 
financial transfers are intended to manage the vertical imbalance.
 The design of intergovernmental finance is no less important an aspect of 
territorial governance than the classic distinction between federal and unitary 
states. At minimum, its influence on the ongoing processes of public adminis-
tration is comparable to building and supporting political relations between 
governmental tiers. That is why these processes are characterized by intensive 
political bargaining and the influence of political factors on the results of 
policy- making. Now let us model a process of policy- making by a govern-
ment that aims to implement a regional development policy. To do this, we 
must place the case of regional policy within the frameworks of the models 
of policy implementation—ideological and opportunistic, as previously 
discussed.
 When applied to the case of regional policy, the ideological model works as 
follows. Every policy- maker (whether a politician or a bureaucrat) has his or her 
own ideology concerning the most appropriate way of achieving regional devel-
opment. Analytically, every set of ideas can be related to the paradigms of 
regional development—the support for lagging regions, the place- based or place-
 blind policies. Supporters of these ideologies lobby for their approaches in the 
early stages of the policy cycle (Brewer, 1974). They build advocacy coalitions 
Table 2.1 Models of intergovernmental financial relations
Components Fiscal federalism Unitary fiscal system
Revenue assignments Decentralized government Centralized government
Expenditure assignments Principle of subsidiarity Concentrated mainly at the 
national level
Role of intergovernmental 
transfers
Supporting, regulating Dominate
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(Sabatier, 1988) or take advantage of favorable circumstances (Kingdon, 2003) 
to push their policy alternatives to the stage of implementation.
 The opportunistic model considers the need to be re- elected and hold the 
position as long as possible as a politician’s main goal. He or she implements a 
policy that will increase the chances of victory in the next elections (Nordhaus, 
1975; Kincaid, 2001). Hence, regional policy in the opportunistic model seeks to 
ensure that a region’s elite and population will be loyal toward the policy- maker 
and/or the center level in general.
 There are at least two political situations that force the government to use 
regional policy to gain loyalty. The first is the threat of a region’s or a territory’s 
secession. The second is a period of national elections when national rulers (the 
heads of states, or ruling parties) seek electoral support at the subnational level.
 There is a wealth of academic literature devoted to the central government’s 
use of intergovernmental finances to decrease the risk of disintegration in the 
country (Bulanin and Scherbak, 2005; Zakharov, 2003; Treisman, 2001). Studies 
show that national governments often provide special measures to economically 
and socially develop potentially secessionist regions. At first blush, this can be 
considered an attempt to buy the regions’ loyalty. Yet such a strategy can 
decrease the level of the regions’ autonomy due to the increase in the regional 
economies’ dependence on national financial interventions.
 During electoral campaigns, the center is able to redistribute the regional 
development policy’s funds to receive electoral support in targeted regions. The 
government takes into consideration the experience of previous elections and 
tends to divide all regions into “loyal” and “oppositional.” A politician interested 
in maximizing votes in the next elections should decide what sort of regions 
should be targets of the center’s additional support. He or she chooses between 
two strategies—political co- optation (aimed at appeasing the oppositional 
regions) and political cronyism (intended to encourage the friendly regions) 
(DeBardeleben, 2003). At first sight, political co- optation is a more advant-
ageous strategy. Its application is based on the assumption that, in postcommu-
nist regimes, a low level of electoral support results from the electorate’s 
discontent with its well- being. Hence, to increase its popularity, the national 
government should provide regional communities with additional resources to 
implement populist measures in social security, create new jobs, etc.
 The problem is that repeated use of this strategy leads to negative outcomes. 
The national government de facto rewards regional governments for unsatisfac-
tory governance and the population’s displeasure. In this way, the center creates 
counter- productive incentives for the regional elites, who are inclined to exploit 
this pattern to take advantage of the center’s strategy.
 Political cronyism involves establishing a system of rewarding the regional elites 
for providing loyalty to the center, and punishing oppositional regions. The regional 
governments have to focus their efforts on achieving the electoral results the center 
demands. Otherwise, they will suffer from a lack of central financial support.
 In the actual process of public administration, both the ideological and the 
opportunistic models are simultaneously in effect. Due to the limitations of 
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 financial resources, one model dominates over the other during any given period. 
Our goal is to understand how the Russian regional policy reflects the ideo-
logical and political preferences of the ruling group, and what factors contribute 
to these dynamics.
How does Russia do regional policy?
Over the last two- and-a- half decades, Russian regional policy has undergone 
significant changes. The so- called command system for planning economic 
development in the USSR was replaced by a set of complex mechanisms for the 
development of intergovernmental finances and regional economies. In this 
section, I will describe the basic phases of the regional policy’s development 
from the very beginning of the 1990s until the present time, and define the role 
of the political and other factors that influenced the observed dynamics of the 
federal government’s policy. It is not the task of this section to explain the 
causes of the policy’s success or failure, although at times I will demonstrate 
that some of the goals of the federal policy were successfully achieved while 
others were not. My intention is to show how and why the Russian government 
attempted to govern territorial diversity in the field of economic and social 
development. Therefore, success should be understood here in a narrow sense—
as adopting an alternative as a policy to be implemented, while a failure is when 
the alternative does not become a part of public policy.
 To limit the number of potential factors, I use John Kingdon’s approach 
(Kingdon, 2003), one of the most influential theoretical instruments for analyz-
ing the three initial phases of policy- making—invention, estimation, and selec-
tion. Kingdon’s model allows us to focus on changes in the ideas of regional 
policy proposed and implemented by the federal government, and is not intended 
to assess the particularities of the implementation of the resulting decisions.
 Following Kingdon, I concentrate my analysis on four basic groups of cir-
cumstances able to influence the results of policy changes. They are “particip-
ants” and three kinds of “processes” (or, as other authors prefer to say, “streams” 
(Zahariadis and Allen, 1995))—problems, politics, and policy.
 The participants are actors—the president, the legislature, other public offi-
cials, bureaucrats, political parties, and pressure groups—that can push through 
or hinder proposed policy alternatives. Usually, it is participants and their inter-
ests and strategies that are the focus of researchers’ attention, especially in polit-
ical science. But Kingdon insists that processes, i.e., sets of structural 
circumstances “by which agenda items and alternatives come into prominence” 
(Kingdon, 2003: 15), perform an even more important role. The stream of “prob-
lems” includes challenges that motivate a government to change the current 
pattern of policy and seek out possible alternatives. The stream of “politics” 
points to the influence of electoral politics, the mode of political struggle, and 
particularities of stable relationships between influential political actors. Finally, 
the “policy” stream is “a process of gradual accumulation of knowledge and per-
spectives among the specialists in a given policy area, and the generation of 
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policy proposals by such specialists” (Kingdon, 2003: 17). According to 
Kingdon, the influence of each process might be insufficient to realize an altern-
ative, but their combination is able to open a “policy window,” a unique oppor-
tunity “for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions or to push attention 
to their special problems” (Kingdon, 2003: 165). The concept of the policy 
window does not assume that one factor is more important than others. Within 
this model, the implemented policy alternative is a fortunate combination of all 
these different circumstances.
 Despite this fact, I “disintegrate” Kingdon’s model to identify more important 
conditions for the successful development of policy processes in the field of 
regional policy. The section concentrates on the individual effects of every 
stream.
 Following this interpretation of the model, four hypotheses can be formu-
lated. In the process of constructing theoretical expectations, I apply Kingdon’s 
elements to the Russian institutional context to overcome the problem that this 
model was developed for understanding policy- making in the United States, a 
democracy with a pluralist system of representation of interests.
 The first hypothesis is derived from Kingdon’s “problem stream.” His defini-
tion of a “problem” is quite strict. Not every difficulty in societal development 
can be called a problem. For instance, Kingdon distinguishes between a 
“problem” and a “condition.” While a problem is assessed by policy- makers as 
an obstacle to development that must be overcome, a condition is considered an 
inevitable difficult situation that must be taken into account when governing the 
country. The government’s opinion here is crucial. Often, a government assesses 
a situation as a condition even if a society considers it to be a real problem. In 
this case, non- governmental actors have to make an effort to force the govern-
ment to pay attention to the situation.
 Along with civil society’s and the expert community’s lobby actions, external 
and internal shocks can be the trigger that places a government’s attention on the 
situation and on policy alternatives capable of solving the problem. Kingdon iden-
tifies three sets of events that make the problem manifest to the government: indic-
ators (received by governmental and non- governmental actors as a result of 
monitoring the situation within a given policy subsystem), focusing events (“like a 
crisis or disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem” (Kingdon, 
2003: 94–95)), and feedback about the implementation and results of existing pro-
grams. All of these are important only if they shock policy- makers and force offi-
cials and politicians to change routine practices of administration within a 
subsystem. Paul Sabatier and his co- authors (Sabatier and Weible, 2007; Weible et 
al., 2009) distinguish between external and internal shocks. Applied to Russian 
regional policy, external shocks are events beyond the Russian regional policy 
subsystem that significantly change social and economic circumstances as well as 
officials’ views on governmental priorities; internal shocks are evidence of the 
ineffectiveness of governmental measures within a given policy subsystem.
 Hence, considering Kingdon’s suggestion that the existence of governmen-
tally admitted problems is important for opening a policy window and, as a 
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result, enacting a policy change, the following hypothesis can be formulated: dif-
ferent types of shocks—both external and internal—make the government change 
current patterns of regional development policy and find new forms of adminis-
tration in this field (H 2.1).
 The second set of circumstances identified by Kingdon concerns political 
possibilities and constraints to enacting a policy change. Kingdon clearly shows 
that the public mood and ideological preferences of parties that control the 
decision- making process are important factors in politicians’ readiness and 
ability to realize new policy measures. The significance of these parameters is 
expected to be lower under an authoritarian political regime. But transformation 
of authoritarian regimes into competitive and electoral types does not allow us to 
write off these conditions. Consequently, the second theoretical expectation is 
that significant changes in regional development policy are more likely if the 
government possesses support for its proposed measures from both the popula-
tion and a majority of the parliament. At the same time, the “political stream” 
can be interpreted more broadly—as the presence or absence of obstacles raised 
by deep- rooted political cleavages not only in the national parliament and the 
government but also beyond them. For instance, within the framework of the 
Russian regional policy subsystem, the structural conflict between the center and 
the regions is hypothesized to be crucially important. That is why the hypothesis 
can be formulated as follows: significant changes in regional development policy 
are more likely if the government possesses support for its proposed measures 
from the population, a majority in the parliament and/or other structurally signi-
ficant political actors (H 2.2).
 The third of Kingdon’s processes—the “policy stream”—concentrates on 
such characteristics of proposed policy alternatives as their technical feasibility 
and value acceptability, which support or hamper efforts to push the alternatives 
through the policy process. Indeed, Kingdon supposes that policy- makers always 
have many alternatives to implement, but the circumstances do not allow them 
to do so. Appropriate alternatives are characterized by their effectiveness on the 
one hand, and tolerably high transactional costs on the other.
 The research that Vladimir Gel’man and I conducted on policy changes in 
2000s Russia (2016) demonstrates that an important factor in the appropriate 
realization of a proposed policy alternative is the very “technical” characteristic 
of the time needed for its adoption and implementation. Many authors show that 
a reform that can be realized in a short- term timeframe has higher chances of 
being implemented than a reform that consists of several phases of realization 
and that must be implemented over several years. Additionally, the scale of the 
transaction costs that a policy- maker has to cover to realize his or her proposal 
can be a significant feature of a policy alternative.
 In the form of a hypothesis these ideas can be presented as follows: To realize 
his or her policy alternative, a policy maker should propose decisions with a low 
level of transaction costs, a short period of adoption and implementation, and 
the consensus of an expert community about effectiveness of the proposal 
(H 2.3).
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 Finally, the fourth element of Kingdon’s model is “participants.” The author 
insists that modern political science exaggerates the role of political actors in 
political and policy processes and unfairly understates the significance of struc-
tural and institutional characteristics. At the same time, the author offers a 
detailed description of the participants in the policy process in the United States 
and the resources they possess. This part of Kingdon’s book is the most USA 
centered: it describes the Amer ican presidential system, its democratic political 
regime, and its pluralist model of representation of interests.
 Russia is different in all three of these dimensions. It features a presidential–
parliamentary model of institutional design (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Gel’man 
and I (2016) identify the following effects of this design on the particularities of 
the policy process. First, due to the president’s complete control over the 
appointment of the prime minister, the Russian government’s role “is reduced to 
implementing the tasks posed by the president, and performing routine, daily 
administrative work in social and economic policy areas” (Gel’man and 
 Starodubtsev, 2016: 101).
 Second, the governmental ministers are under double subordination to both 
the prime minister and the president. Officially, this rule concerns only minis-
ters and the heads of agencies responsible for defense, security, foreign affairs, 
etc. In reality, the president controls the actions of the whole government and 
every governmental agency, bypassing the prime minister. This leads to a situ-
ation where the government is not a political team, but a technocratic organ-
ization with a complex structure. As a result, “policy- making under these 
conditions turns into a complex and often inefficient series of bargains and ad 
hoc agreements between several state agencies” (Gel’man and Starodubtsev, 
2016: 102).
 Finally, the parliament cannot effectively control the governmental officials 
and the policies they implement. The legislature’s two real possibilities for influ-
encing the government are the procedure of approving the candidate for the 
prime minister’s position and the rejection of governmental bills, including 
drafts of the federal budget. However, these opportunities are limited. The Duma 
cannot reject the candidate for prime minister more than twice—otherwise, after 
the third rejection, the president is obliged to dissolve the parliament. The rejec-
tion of governmental bills certainly hampers the government’s routine, but the 
Russian parliament has no effective instruments for punishing officials for the 
realization of a bad policy.
 Such an institutional design, combined with the Russian political regime, sig-
nificantly reduces the number of channels of interest representation. Con-
sequently, interest groups and expert communities influence the decision- making 
process only when the government or the parliament is ready to involve them in 
their actions. Under these circumstances, the strategic priority of given reforms 
for the political leadership becomes a crucial factor in their successful imple-
mentation. Decisions important to the president are more likely to be realized 
than reforms initiated and supported exclusively by governmental officials. In 
turn, a policy proposal designed and supported by parliamentarians or interest 
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group representatives is unlikely to be realized without the president’s or the 
government’s support.
 At the same time, considering the complex and competitive nature of rela-
tions within the government, another significant circumstance can be the concen-
tration and cooperation of agents of reforms during policy adoption and 
implementation. A high concentration of reformers in a single governmental 
agency, along with deep cooperation among them, supports the development of 
proposed policy changes. Conversely, the dispersion of responsibility for reali-
zation of a reform between several governmental agencies, and competitiveness 
between the different reform teams, lead to poor results. Thus, the fourth hypo-
thesis states that the president’s engagement in the realization of policy changes 
and the concentration and collaboration of reformers—both decision- makers 
and implementers—contribute to the success of the policy changes (H 2.4).
 Methodologically, the analysis is conducted in the tradition of the classic case 
study. This methodology is the best way to provide a description and analysis of 
long- term and complex political processes and attempt to identify all the pos-
sible factors that influence political outcomes.
 Thus, the result of the analysis includes a “thick description” of the Russian 
government’s policy toward regional development, identification of points of 
significant change in policy ideologies and instruments, and analysis of the influ-
ence of the factors discussed above on the relevant processes.
The 1990s: decentralization without development
The history of the development of regional policy in the Russian Federation can 
be roughly divided into three periods: the 1990s, the 2000s, and the 2010s. Of 
course, policy did not change every time a new decade came around. The first of 
these periods began in 1991 (when Russia was still part of the Soviet Union) or 
1992 (when the truly sovereign state faced the need to build a new fiscal system), 
and the period of the 2000s stemmed from the 1998 financial crisis, while it is 
not possible to determine a starting year for the third period. But overall, divid-
ing the timeline into decades correctly describes the dynamics of regional policy.
 Regional policy in Russia began at the moment of the Soviet Union’s col-
lapse. The government of the newly independent country had to deal with the 
legacy of the Soviet system of regional development.
 The Soviet Union had declared the principle of social justice to be the ideo-
logical basis of its public administration. The Soviet government actively parti-
cipated in the redistribution of regional incomes and sought to achieve effective 
placement of industrial objects. This effectiveness was understood in two senses. 
On the one hand, the decision on a manufacturing site’s placement took into 
account the existing distribution of resources (mainly natural resources) and of 
other enterprises. On the other hand, the state’s interest in social security often 
prevailed over economic needs. To develop a region, the government was ready 
to create additional jobs without consideration of the economic effectiveness of 
such measures.
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 Intergovernmental finance in the Soviet Union was an outstanding example of 
the unitary fiscal system. The principle of autonomous budgets at the levels of 
the Soviet republics and below did not exist. Subnational governments did not 
have the ability to regulate taxes and control budget revenues. If a regional gov-
ernment felt it was suffering from a lack of finances needed to implement its 
responsibilities, regional leaders requested additional resources at the union 
level. Consequently, intergovernmental transfers were crucially important for the 
Soviet budgetary system. Indeed, they were the main mechanism for decreasing 
imbalances in the Soviet Union (Trunin and Sinel’nikov, 2001: 5–6).
 When the economic situation in the USSR deteriorated, the lack of sub-
national governments’ responsibilities became an immediate problem for the 
Soviet system of public administration. The government found itself facing slug-
gishness and inertia from the regional governments, which hampered implemen-
tation of anti- crisis measures. As I observed in the previous chapter, economic 
problems, together with ethnic conflicts in autonomous oblasts and republics and 
certain Soviet republics’ threats to disintegrate the union, forced Gorbachev to 
delimit the responsibilities of the union, and of the Soviet and autonomous 
republics (thereby establishing those responsibilities) (Zakon, 1990a, 1990b). 
Although during that period no types of regions, with the exception of the Soviet 
and autonomous republics, were subnational units of the federal state, these 
measures significantly influenced both the development of federal relations and 
the construction of a new pattern of regional policy.
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional development was not a pri-
ority for the federal government. The catastrophic economic situation demanded 
that the executive should solve the immediate problems and use all available 
tools to support regions in need.
 The prime concern of the federal government was the lack of a system of 
formal institutions in the field of intergovernmental relations. Russia inherited 
the ambiguous system where all regions possessed many responsibilities, but 
only republics enjoyed the status of federal subnational units, including the right 
to make their own decisions. At the same time, not all republics had enough fin-
ancial resources to fulfill their responsibilities, while there were several non- 
ethnic regions that were ready to be more responsible and autonomous. The 
Russian government de facto lost its control over the republics. Two of them—
Tatarstan and Chechnya—were on the edge of final secession, and many others 
threatened to follow them. In their turn, economically strong non- ethnic regions 
declared their claims to equal status with the republics.
 In spite of the presence of all these difficulties, the national government was 
mainly interested in establishing well- functioning mechanisms for administra-
tion of regional economic processes and providing federal financial support for 
those regions that could not manage their economic problems without the cent-
er’s assistance. That is why the first governmental measures in this field were 
aimed at non- ethnic regions.
 First of all, the center tried to formalize the distribution of responsibilities and 
launched negotiations with the regions on conditions for a new federal agreement 
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that could establish common rules for intergovernmental relations in the new 
country. The agreement was signed in March 1992 (Federal Agreement, 1992). It 
was a concession by the federal center simultaneously to the republics and the non-
 republics, since the document both formally granted the status of “subnational 
units” to all subnational units and legalized asymmetry in their responsibilities.
 The signing of the Federal Agreement became an important measure that con-
tributed to the establishment of formal institutions for intergovernmental rela-
tions. However, that agreement was the last act of consensus between the two 
main actors of the federal center, the president and the Supreme Council: after 
that, a full- scale constitutional crisis broke out. During the subsequent struggle, 
both sides tried to enlist the support of regional elites. This promoted the prac-
tices of informal negotiations and bargaining between the regions and either of 
the opposing sides at the federal level.
 When President Yeltsin successfully gained control over the oppositional 
legislature in autumn 1993, he attempted to decrease the level of the republics’ 
autonomy. The 1993 Constitution established a symmetrical federation—all 
types of subnational units possessed an equal volume of responsibilities, and 
those parts of the Federal Agreement that contradicted the constitution were 
abolished.
 Yet, in reality, the federation remained asymmetrical until the end of the 
1990s. In 1994, the first bilateral agreements between the federal and regional 
governments were signed. Initially, this was the result of informal negotiations 
between the Kremlin and Tatarstan, which had not participated in the referen-
dum on the federal constitution and, consequently, remained outside the legal 
and political spaces of the federation. But later this practice extended to many 
other regions. By the middle of 1998, 38 agreements had been signed. They 
covered both the republics and the administrative subnational units.
 These agreements directly violated the federal constitution. Rabko et al. 
(2001) reviewed the entire set of documents and found that they all transferred a 
significant part of federal and shared responsibilities to the subnational govern-
ments. Indeed, every document set out a specific pattern of intergovernmental 
relations between the federation and a subnational unit. Its content completely 
depended on a region’s ability to lobby for its interests at the federal level.
 Since the very beginning of the 1990s, the center had been designing a suit-
able intergovernmental finance system. In October 1991, a new law was adopted 
on the foundations of the budgetary system in Russia (Zakon, 1991). It embod-
ied the principles of fiscal federalism: the law asserted the principle of the auto-
nomy of budgets at all governmental levels. Regional budgets should be based 
on the regions’ own revenue sources and the right to use financial resources at 
the regional and local governments’ discretion. However, it took three years to 
compose a list of all revenue sources and distribute them between the govern-
mental tiers as well as to establish common rules for the budgetary processes in 
the regions (Zakon, 1993).
 Even so, the system of federal financial support remained far from perfect. To 
assist the regions with managing their current public administration and iron out 
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differences in regional development, the federal government used a system of 
intergovernmental grants—subsidies and subventions (Zakon, 1992). The 
methods for distributing these grants were extremely politicized. They were 
known to be allocated individually after bargaining between regional lobbyists 
and the country’s leadership (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999; Kuznetsova, 2005). 
Additionally, some economically prosperous regions—Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, 
and Sakha—refused to transfer tax revenues collected in their territories to the 
federal budget. This significantly decreased the redistributive power of the 
federal government.
 In 1994, the government implemented a full- scale reform of intergovernmen-
tal finances. The reform aimed at two important goals: to establish an effective 
system able to reduce disparities in the regions’ development, and to speed up 
reforms in the fiscal sphere at all levels of government. The president, and the 
parliament elected after the autumn of 1993, which was therefore generally 
loyal, gave their support to the adoption of the following three measures 
(Biudzhetnyi, 2001: 9). First, the federal Fund for Financial Assistance to the 
Regions (FFPR, Fond Finansovoi Podderzhki Regionov) was established within 
the structure of the federal budget. It was to be the only channel for providing 
federal grants for all subnational units. The Ministry of Finance designed a 
special methodology that allowed it to calculate a region’s need for federal fin-
ancial support, factoring in its revenue possibilities and expenditure assignments. 
Second, the government distributed sources of tax revenues between the govern-
mental tiers. Many taxes were divided into federal, regional, and municipal parts. 
That is, specific proportions of those taxes were assigned to the budgets of the 
corresponding levels of government. Moreover, the center allowed the regions to 
set the size of the regional share of the profit taxes by themselves.
 But the new system suffered from many shortcomings (Kuznetsova, 2005). 
The methodology suggested by the government was far from perfect. It included 
indicators that demanded annual negotiations between the federal center and 
regional governments. Additionally, the methodology was obligatory only for 
Ministry of Finance officials, while the State Duma’s deputies could change the 
results of the bureaucrats’ calculations as they wished. Furthermore, the bilateral 
agreements interfered with the implementation of the described standards of tax 
revenue allocation, since the agreements included numerous exceptions to the 
rules and superseded federal laws.
 The finishing touch was added to this contradictory picture by the federal par-
liament’s practice of imposing unfunded mandates on the regional and local gov-
ernments. The cause was purely political. In 1995, the Communist Party won a 
majority in the State Duma and commenced a struggle against the federal gov-
ernment’s austerity measures. Since the Communists’ strategy mainly concerned 
social security, most of the Duma’s proposals generated additional expenditure 
assignments for the regional governments.
 Moreover, the federal government made an attempt to establish a new mech-
anism of regional development—“free economic zones”—in certain regions. 
Such zones had first emerged in the Soviet Union, but between 1990 and 1996 
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several dozen new zones were created. The residents of such zones enjoyed 
better customs duties and tax benefits and, as a result, it soon became very 
popular among Russian businessmen to register their companies within the ter-
ritory of the free economic zones.
 The problem was that the government had not determined criteria for select-
ing the territories most suitable for placement of these zones. As a result, the 
decisions on establishing them were made based on intergovernmental bargain-
ing. Additionally, the federal legislator had not defined requirements for resid-
ency. In fact, in most of the zones, new companies and jobs were not created. 
Businessmen registered their firms within the territory of a zone to receive a 
legal opportunity to reduce their tax burden. In exchange, regional officials con-
tented themselves with obtaining additional tax revenues and bribes. Con-
sequently, free economic zones did not lead to the resolution of existing 
problems of regional development. Moreover, their effect was negative for eco-
nomic development in Russia overall due to their broadening the grey area of 
economy and state- business relations. This was why in 1996 almost all these 
zones were closed. Furthermore, any proposals to establish new special zones 
faced fierce opposition from the federal government.
 Thus, since 1991, intergovernmental finance and regional policy were charac-
terized by the inconsistent behavior of the federal government. The Soviet 
Union’s collapse was accompanied by both the destruction of the institutional 
environment that regulated intergovernmental finance in the union and the urgent 
need to implement an equalizing policy. The lack of formal institutions gave rise 
to the domination of informal ones. The planned economy and established chan-
nels of regional representation were replaced by ad hoc bargaining, with the 
center’s objective being to put out political or economic fires in the Russian 
regions. All attempts by the government to formalize intergovernmental finance 
and regional policy were faced with the differences in the interests of the pres-
ident and the executive. While the latter tried to form unified “rules of the 
game,” the former demonstrated his readiness to bargain to ensure the stability 
of the political situation in Russia.
The 2000s: centralized development
The situation changed in 1998. To correct the main weaknesses of intergovern-
mental finance, the federal government adopted the Conception of Reforming 
Intergovernmental Finance in the Russian Federation in 1999–2001 (Postanovlenie, 
1998). The document was designed as part of a series of reform ideas proposed 
by the Russian government soon after Boris Yeltsin’s victory in 1996. The gov-
ernmental Economic Reforms Commission, headed by Anatoly Chubais, took 
advantage of Yeltsin’s victory to continue the neoliberal reforms, especially in 
the field of social security and economic development.
 The Conception formulated new objectives for intergovernmental finance. 
Along with the intention of erasing the existing disparities, the document 
included such new paradigmatic goals as “creating conditions for increasing 
Why has regional development failed?  79
effectiveness of social and economic development of the regions” and “estab-
lishing mechanisms of selective investment- based support of the regions.” The 
document stated that the Russian budget system should be based on the clear and 
unified distribution of expenditure assignment among the governmental tiers and 
suggested a draft version of such a distribution. Finally, together with FFPR, the 
Fund for Regional Development (FRD) and the Fund for Development of 
Regional Finances (FDRF ) were established. The first fund’s responsibility cor-
responded with the new paradigm’s ideology: it was aimed at creating “social 
infrastructure to provide guarantees established by the federal government.” The 
FDRF collected funds to assist subnational governments in reforming the budget 
policy and the fiscal system in the regions.
 Ideologically, the Conception demonstrated a shift in regional policy from an 
old paradigm to a new one. The center was ready to allocate its financial support 
to the subnational budgets to strengthen their potential for development, instead 
of the mechanically redistributing funds between the poorest regions in the 
country. At the same time, the government declared its readiness to extend the 
formalization of federal financial support instead of the established practices of 
informal negotiation.
 The implementation of such a strategy should have faced significant resist-
ance from the governments of both the politically influential and the economic-
ally poorest regions, as well as the Communist opposition in the State Duma, as 
had happened with many other reforms from that package (Dekalchuk, 2017; 
Grigoriev, 2017; Starodubtsev, 2017). However, in August 1998, Russia experi-
enced a dramatic financial crisis that emptied the Russian budget.
 Within this extremely unfavorable financial and economic situation, Yevgeny 
Primakov, a prime minister appointed by the president due to unprecedented 
pressure from the State Duma, launched the implementation of a centralized and 
tightened regional policy. He drastically cut the volume of budget debts the fed-
eration allowed subnational governments. Then, taking advantage of large- scale 
support in the Russian parliament, Primakov’s team was able to push a draft of 
the new budget, which was designed after the pattern of the 1998 Conception, 
through the State Duma: the parliament’s deputies refrained from changing the 
government’s proposal, and the cabinet could form a budget draft following the 
rationale of austerity.
 The 1998 financial crisis’ influence on the particularities of intergovernmental 
finance was profoundly significant. It opened the policy window for implemen-
tation of reforms in the field of intergovernmental finance. Unlike most of the 
reforms of the second half of the 1990s, which were blocked by the permanent 
political conflicts of the executive and the legislature as well as by resistance 
within the bureaucracy, these changes in budget policy and intergovernmental 
finance happened due to the scale and depth of the financial and economic prob-
lems at the very end of the 1990s. At the same time, the economic crisis trig-
gered a chain of governmental crises that led to the formation of Primakov’s 
government, completely supported by the Duma. The new prime minister 
attained consensus from all significant actors at the federal level.
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 In 1999, a new State Duma was elected. The pro- Putin Yedinstvo and its 
allies gained a majority in the State Duma in the 1999 parliamentary election. It 
must be said that this parliament was quite fragmented, and all left- wing factions 
became the opposition (Remington, 2006).
 In 2000, a new Budget Code was introduced. It significantly tightened the 
requirements for preparing, adopting, and implementing regional and local 
budgets and improved their transparency and effectiveness. The code declared 
the need for clear listing of expenditure assignments at every governmental 
level, so as to correctly determine every government’s resource needs and 
perfect the system of intergovernmental transfers. Additionally, the reformers 
proposed a transition from the so- called German system of tax allocation to the 
Amer ican system. This meant that, instead of splitting the income from each tax 
between different governmental levels’ budgets, the new system assigned each 
tax to one specific level. However, the measure seemed very radical to most of 
the participants in the budget process, and it was not realized.
 This reform became part of a program of radical policy changes initiated by 
Vladimir Putin soon after his ascension to the presidency. The financial reforms 
were achieved to a greater degree than any of the rest. The reasons for this success 
have been thoroughly scrutinized. First, the reformer team consisted of officials who 
were very close to the newly elected president. Consequently, they could enjoy his 
support at all stages of the reforms’ realization. Second, the new taxes as well as the 
new rules for the budget process were set by the sole efforts of the federal Ministry 
of Finance. Other parts of the reforms, which demanded that other agencies at dif-
ferent levels of government should be included in the process of implementation 
(for instance, the introduction of the performance- based budgeting institutions) 
ended up suffering numerous disruptions. It was impossible to coordinate the actions 
of a bureaucracy disintegrated both horizontally and vertically. Finally, a critically 
important factor was the federal center’s ability to reduce the scale of intergovern-
mental bargaining on financial issues. This did not mean that the government had 
achieved complete formalization of intergovernmental finances. Nevertheless, this 
reform was implemented without significant resistance from regional leaders.
 It is difficult to overstate the positive effect of the reform. The Budget Code 
for the first time created a solid and consistent system of intergovernmental 
finance, which limited all policy- makers through the frameworks of the formal 
institutions. At the same time, the new rules allowed the center to reduce 
regions’ revenues from the consolidated budget. In 1992–1999, the average 
share of the regional budget revenues was 50.9 percent (from 39.7 percent in 
1992 to 56 percent in 1998), but in 2003–2011 that indicator was only 37.9 
percent (Figure 2.2).
 The financial centralization was accompanied by unprecedented activity 
aimed at allocating the governmental agencies’ responsibilities across three 
levels (Kozak’s reform). After the 1992 Federal Agreement, this was the center’s 
first attempt to negotiate with the regions over the level of their administrative 
autonomy. The so- called “Kozak’s Commission” included both representatives 
of the federal government and of the subnational units.
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 In spite of this, both regional leaders and the deputies of the State Duma criti-
cized the results of the commission’s work. The main point of criticism was the 
commission’s intention of dividing the reform into two phases. In the first phase, 
the commission would revise all responsibilities so as to distribute them among 
the governmental tiers, and in the second phase it would find enough financial 
resources for each of the levels to cover its expenditure assignments. The gov-
ernors were concerned by the possibility of receiving additional responsibilities 
without gaining the appropriate financial resources. There were also many crit-
ical remarks about the assignment of particular responsibilities to federal, 
regional, or local governments. The governors were dissatisfied with the loss of 
responsibilities that had belonged to the regions during the 1990s, and the State 
Duma’s parliamentarians were worried about the significant decentralization of 
the social sphere of public administration.
 Although lively parliamentary debates took place, the law initiated by Kozak 
was adopted. In fact, the reformers proposed to integrate these norms into the 
law devoted to general principles of arrangement of regional executives and 
legis latures in Russia. The history of this law is very interesting: it was adopted 
only in 1999 as a successful attempt by the center to unify the governmental 
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Figure 2.2  Federal and regional shares of budgetary incomes in Russia in 1992–1999 and 
2003–2011.
Source: Rodin, 2006: 166: author’s calculations based on the data of the Federal Treasury (www.
roskozna.ru/).
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systems in the regions. Before that, the subnational units had established dif-
ferent constitutional models depending on the structures of their internal political 
processes (Kononenko, 2003).
 Of course, the regional elites actively defended their institutional choices. The 
center even had to appeal to the Constitutional Court to force certain regions to 
amend regional constitutions that included stipulations about appointing their 
governors by the legislature. This was an important symbolic act that meant that 
the distribution of responsibilities was a decision by the federal center that could 
be revised at the center’s discretion. Afterwards, the center frequently revised 
this part of the law. Moreover, the governors’ main fears were confirmed: the 
ongoing fiscal centralization led to the domination of federal transfers as the 
means of financing most of the new responsibilities.
 This combination of administrative decentralization and fiscal centralization 
achieved the absolute dependency of the regional governments on the central 
one. Given the gradual reduction of political autonomy the president had been 
implementing since 2000, by 2005 the center had established a de facto unitary 
state with a very decentralized system of top- down government. I will demon-
strate this model’s effects in detail in Chapter 3.
 The next key question is what motivation inspired Vladimir Putin and his col-
leagues in the process of this strategy’s realization. Many studies of Putin’s 
reforms at the beginning of his presidency—both academic and non- academic—
demonstrate that different kinds of reform were implemented by different teams 
of officials. All financial policy in the 2000s was controlled by Alexei Kudrin, a 
proponent of austerity measures. Administrative decentralization became the 
domain of Dmitry Kozak (the head of Kozak’s Commission, mentioned earlier). 
Finally, the political aspect of intergovernmental relations, including gubernato-
rial elections and their cancelation, was coordinated by Vladislav Surkov, the 
first deputy head of the Presidential Administration and the architect of com-
petitive authoritarianism in Russia. Thus, these three directions of intergovern-
mental relations developed separately and had their individual rationales. This 
situation became additional evidence that there was no unified ideology in 
Russian intergovernmental relations.
 Another important change in regional policy was the diversification of chan-
nels for supporting regional economies.
 First, in 2001, two new support funds were established for the regions: the 
Fund for Compensations and the Fund for Co- financing Social Expenditures. 
Both of them were aimed to offset the regional and local expenditures that were 
the result of federal decisions within the framework of social security policy. In 
ideal form, using funds with a narrow scope of functional responsibility instead 
of a common pool of financial transfers would facilitate a more transparent 
pattern of transfer distribution.
 Second, the federal government increased the number of federal programs aimed 
at social and economic development in the regions. Before 1998, two programs had 
existed. One of them, in place since 1993, supported the Kuril Islands in Sakhalin 
Oblast, and another, in place since 1995, provided assistance to the Republic of 
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Sakha (Yakutia). By comparison, in 1998, the federal budget financed 28 social and 
economic development programs for the regions. Some of these covered an entire 
region, while others concerned specific towns (for instance, in 1998–1999, the 
program of development of Ivangorod in Leningrad Oblast) or several regions 
simultaneously (for example, the South of Russia program in 2008–2013).
 But not all regions received this kind of federal support. There was no 
common ideology that could describe the role of the programs in the strategic 
development of territorial governance, nor is there even now. Lagging regions, 
prosperous and politically influential regions (the most prominent examples were 
the same as before—Tatarstan in 2001–2006 and Bashkortostan in 2003–2007), 
and regions important to the Kremlin from the perspective of national security 
(Kaliningrad and Sakhalin Oblasts and Chechnya) all benefited from special pro-
grams during the 2000s and 2010s.
 While in the 1990s the dozens of regionally oriented programs were sup-
ported by the center, in the 2000s and 2010s not more than ten programs have 
been financed (Figure 2.3). The improvement in the social and economic situ-
ation in the regions, along with the decrease in the governors’ political influence, 
led to the government’s gradual shift from supporting the regions to the develop-
ment of certain areas of public administration according to a spatially blind 
strategy. The regionally based programs continued to apply only in strategically 
important cases (for instance, the reconstruction of Sochi to hold the 2014 
Olympic Games, the programs for support of the Far East and Crimea, etc.).
 Third, in 2005, another mechanism was utilized to support the regions— 
special economic zones (OEZ, osobye ekonomicheckie zony) (Zakon, 2005). 
Supporters of this mechanism suggested bringing back the zones according to 
the practice of the federal government at the beginning of the 2000s, but the 
Ministry of Finance successfully cited the bad experiences of the 1990s to block 
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these initiatives. Now, German Gref, the minister for economic development and 
the main lobbyist for the introduction of the OEZ, was able to persuade Vladimir 
Putin and overcome the opponents’ resistance. The policy- makers took past 
experience into account: the new law included tough requirements for both the 
regional governments and the companies seeking to participate in the OEZ.
 Initially, the reformers intended to establish two types of zones—industrial 
and technology developmental zones. The new paradigm of regional policy was 
at the core of the OEZs. The industrial zones were to be placed in lagging 
regions, while the zones of technological development were designed to support 
existing technological centers, including Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Moscow 
(Fedotova, 2005). But in 2006, the government announced the creation of tourist 
and recreational zones, and, in 2007, port zones.
 Fourth, in 2006, the government established the Investment Fund of the 
Russian Federation, with the declared goal of co- financing large investment pro-
jects in the sphere of infrastructure development. Public money complemented 
the investments of private companies, which would invest at least 25 percent of 
the common project costs. Initially, the Investment Fund was designed as a spa-
tially blinded mechanism, but in 2007 Dmitry Kozak, at that point the minister 
for regional development, stated that these funds should be allocated to the 
development of regional projects.
 Thus, the 2000s featured the establishment and growth of numerous mecha-
nisms of development in addition to the mechanisms of financial support. Initi-
ated by the reform- driven Ministry of Economic Development and Trade headed 
by German Gref, the new measures were predominantly spatially blinded: the 
regions and municipalities had to compete for additional federal resources, and 
the federal government—at the ideological level—took the expected economic 
effects of these investments on the whole country into consideration, not merely 
those affecting specific territories. The rapid shift from the old paradigm of 
regional policy, which had been accompanied by extremely high politicization 
of decision- making, to the technocratic distribution of resources without special 
attention to territorial interests needs a good explanation.
 The 2000s, or at least their first half, are a good case for illustrating the possibil-
ities associated with policy windows. The long period of economic adversity in the 
1990s gave rise to a call for strong government from the population and for a new 
wave of reforms from the elites. The Communist opposition in the parliament was 
gradually losing its influence over the political and policy processes. The gov-
ernors had demonstrated their readiness to participate in policy- making within the 
limits established by the center. The president enjoyed unprecedented popular 
support. Under these conditions, any reform program declared by the president’s 
team would have high odds of implementation. This is why I believe that one must 
not underestimate the role of “participants” and their ideologies in seeking to 
understand why (and not only how) specific policy measures are realized.
 By 2005, the government implemented many centralist and spatially blinded 
measures in the economic and financial spheres. Political centralization and the 
elimination of effective channels for representation of regional interests provided 
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further opportunities to do so, or—more correctly—did not create high enough 
levels of resistance to hamper these policies.
 The Ministry of Regional Development had been established at the end of 
2004. This measure can be assessed from multiple perspectives. On the one 
hand, both the regions and the federal government needed to have a structure 
that would coordinate the policy actions of federal agencies with the interests of 
regional development. On the other hand, this decision symbolically meant that 
subnational units became objects of the center’s territorial governance, rather 
than partners of the federal government.
 The new ministry, headed by Vladimir Yakovlev, former governor of St Peters-
burg, had to delimit the sphere of its responsibilities relative to other governmental 
structures, including the powerful Ministries of Finance and Economic Develop-
ment, which had previously been jointly in charge of regional policy. The ministry 
developed a document titled The Conception of the Strategy for Socio- economic 
Development of the Regions in the Russian Federation, which declared a need to 
change the principles of the federal policy of regional development.
 Objecting to support for lagging regions and acknowledging the importance 
of regional development, the strategy called for investment in regions with the 
potential for economic development (tochki rosta, “focal points of growth”). The 
reformers divided the country into “clusters,” sets of regions that included 
“drivers of growth” (lokomotivy rosta), “basic” (opornye), and “depressed” or 
“lagging” (depressivnye, problemnye) regions. All were to contribute their 
resources to the development of the whole cluster. At the same time, the federal 
government would transform its tax and budget policies to decrease funding for 
lagging regions in favor of providing infrastructural investments and supporting 
interregional projects implemented by the driver and basic regions.
 Implementation of this strategy would mean the need to realize revolutionary 
changes in regional, economic, and financial policies. However, surprisingly, it 
did not provoke any public or expert discussion. The Conception was discussed 
within the government, but the Ministry of Regional Development did not have 
enough resources to commence its implementation.
 In 2007, Vladimir Yakovlev was replaced by Dmitry Kozak, a figure capable 
of pushing the reform through despite bureaucratic and political constraints. 
Kozak strengthened the ministry. He was able to gain the right to control the 
Investment Fund and the regionally oriented federal programs; additionally, 
housing policy became a responsibility of the ministry. Moreover, the new 
minister insisted that his team should participate in the distribution of intergov-
ernmental transfers.
 However, contrary to expectations, these changes in the status of the ministry 
did not lead to progress in the realization of the regional development policy 
reform. At the very beginning of his ministerial term, Kozak rejected the idea of 
radical reforms in this field and concentrated on development of investment pro-
grams, without radically revising the principles of the policy. A year later, Kozak 
became a deputy prime minister in charge of arranging the 2014 Olympic Games 
in Sochi. The next four ministers—Viktor Basargin (2008–2012), Vladimir 
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Tokarev (2012), Oleg Govorun (2012), and Igor Sliuniaev (2012–2014)—did 
not possess similar administrative and political resources.
 In 2007, still headed by Kozak, the ministry announced a project of devel-
opment of the urban agglomerations, i.e., collections of cities located relatively 
close to each other and united by common infrastructure as a single economic 
and social entity. Unlike the idea of territorial clusters, the project became very 
popular among the leaders of economically successful regions and among 
federal bureaucrats. After long negotiations within the government, which took 
almost seven years, the ministry was able to select the most promising candid-
ates to invest in for the purpose of developing the agglomerations, but in 2014 
it was suddenly dissolved, and its responsibilities and officials were distributed 
between other federal ministries and agencies—the Ministry of Economic 
Development, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Culture, etc. Now it is the Ministry of Economic Development that is realizing 
the agglomeration project, which continues to be at the preparatory stage of its 
implementation.
 The ministry’s proposal for territorial cluster reform appeared in 2005, during 
the period when the government was enjoying the most favorable economic and 
financial circumstances. The state budget had a huge surplus and ministers were 
ready to propose many projects to spend that money. The Ministry of Regional 
Development was an exception, because its team proposed changing the existing 
institutional pattern of regional policy instead of demanding that the government 
should increase its spending on regional programs. At the same time, there were no 
shocks that might force the government to urgently change the situation in the field. 
Due to the general economic situation, regional budget revenues were on the rise. 
The increasing gap in development between the strongest and weakest regions was 
considered a condition, but not a problem. In response, the government strength-
ened the interventionist element of regional policy, including increasing the volume 
of intergovernmental transfers aimed at achieving vertical fiscal balance.
 Another possible explanation is actor centered. I noted before that an important 
condition for a reform’s success was the support of Vladimir Putin. His political 
will—explicit or implicit—is able to push through a reform even in the face of 
political and bureaucratic resistance. The Ministry of Regional Development in 
2004–2007 did not have such support. Vladimir Yakovlev, the first minister of 
regional development, had once challenged Anatoly Sobchak, then governor of St 
Petersburg. At the time, Putin had been acting as vice- governor of St Petersburg 
and chief of Sobchak’s electoral campaign. Appointed to the federal government, 
Yakovlev did not become a member of the informal reform team consisting of 
German Gref, Alexei Kudrin, and other members of the government. The Ministry 
of Regional Development’s proposal sought to change the financial and economic 
foundations of regional development, thereby interfering with policies imple-
mented by more administratively strong governmental actors. Under those circum-
stances, most of the participants in the policy process understood that the reform 
project was an attempt by an administratively weak agency to attract the attention 
of the veto actor in order to gain additional resources.
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 Another case is the project of urban agglomerations that began its development 
under the supervision of Dmitry Kozak. Kozak is considered to be the govern-
mental official closest to the president, usually responsible for projects important to 
Vladimir Putin. He should have been able to coordinate all the bureaucratic inter-
ests and launch the project in a short space of time. Knowing this, everyone capable 
of being involved actively participated in the discussion of the proposed project.
 The project’s rapid realization was blocked by two circumstances. First, in 2008 
Kozak was transferred to a more important presidential project, the 2014 Olympic 
Games in Sochi. After that, the ministry suffered from a chain of new ministers 
who could not have the same level of lobbying potential as Kozak. Second, in 2008, 
the financial crisis broke out and drastically depleted the federal budget and most of 
the regional budgets. As a result, the government froze all long- term investment 
projects, except the most important ones such as the reconstruction of Sochi for the 
Olympic Games. As the economic situation began to stabilize, the Ministry of 
Regional Development and—after that institution was dissolved—the Ministry of 
Economic Development continued the step- by-step realization of the program.
 The 2000s, the time of the most intensive reforms in many spheres of public 
administration, became a period of absence of structural reforms in regional 
development policy. The explanation for this was the paradoxical lack of interest 
from the regional governments in forming a coherent and consistent system of 
regional development. The territorial dimension of the political and policy pro-
cesses was definitely an object of focus for the federal actors, but each one 
sought to satisfy the federal center’s interests in different spheres of public 
policy. At the same time, the regional actors were deprived of the ability to 
express and protect their territorial interests themselves. Under those circum-
stances, regional policy was doomed to be a policy of secondary importance that 
could not seize the opportunity even when all policy windows were open.
The 2010s: fake decentralization and territorially based 
development
The 2008 economic crisis deserves to be further analyzed from the perspective of 
its effects on regional policy. Due to the global scale of that crisis, the richest 
regions suffered the most, since they were integrated into the global financial and 
economic processes more than the others. It is known that banking and export- 
oriented oil and gas production, as well as metallurgy, were the main victims of 
the crisis (Starodubtsev, 2009). As a result, in the autumn of 2008, several regions 
where these industries dominated—the Vologda, Lipetsk, Chelyabinsk, and 
Tyumen oblasts, the Yamalo- Nenets autonomous district, the Republic of Komi, 
and even Moscow and St Petersburg—spoke of a need for federal financial 
support. In these regions, the global crisis led to decreasing regional tax revenues, 
an increasing unemployment rate, and a gradual decline of quality of life.
 The economically weakest regions felt the crisis less. While all developed 
regions saw a decline in industrial growth by the end of 2008 (Table 2.2), the 
Republic of Dagestan had this indicator at the +52.2% level and Kabardino- Balkar 
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Table 2.2 Decline in industrial production in the regions of Russia in 2008–2009
Region The decline in industrial 
production in November 
2008 (compared with 
November 2007, %)
Decline (−)/growth (+) of 
industrial production in 
July 2009 (compared with 
July 2008, %)
Vologda Oblast –43.8 –23.4
Oryol Oblast –37.3 –45.3
Chelyabinsk Oblast –34.9 –13.4
Republic of Tyva –32.7 –21.6
Ryazan’ Oblast –29.5 –11.1
Lipetsk Oblast –27.9 –17.3
Ul’yanovsk Oblast –27.8 –37.5
Kurgan Oblast –24.8 –24.9
Republic of Buryatia –24.7 –17.5
Kemerovo Oblast –22.8 –4.3
Republic of Altai –22.7 –12.0
Chuvash Republic –22.7 –37.8
Tambov Oblast –21.7 –5.0
Smolensk Oblast –20.9 –17.9
Kursk Oblast –20.4 –3.6
Tula Oblast –19.7 –13.4
Moscow –19.5 –29.3
Perm Krai –18.6 –8.0
Kostroma Oblast –18.5 –16.4
Kirov Oblast –18.3 –18.8 
Murmansk Oblast –18.3 –10.0
Yaroslavl’ Obalst –18.1 –25.3
Altai Krai –18.0 –10.3
Ivanovo Oblast –17.9 –24.1
Bryansk Oblast –16.3 –20.7
Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast –16.2 –21.7
Khabarovsk Oblast –15.9 –21.9
Republic of Mordovia –15.5 –19.6
Vladimir Oblast –14.6 –22.7
Volgograd Oblast –14.1 –17.0
Rostov Oblast –14.1 –23.8
Omsk Oblast –13.5 –10.8
Novgorod Oblast –12.9 –25.4
Chukotka Autonomous  
  District
–12.5 –17.0
Sakhalin Oblast –11.2 +53.9
Tver’ Oblast –11.0 –13.7
Stavropol’ Krai –10.4 +7.4
Belgorod Oblast –10.1 +3.9
Archangel’sk Oblast –9.9 +3.6
Orenburg Oblast –9.9 –4.1
Udmurt Republic –9.5 –5.4
Krasnodar Krai –9.3 –10.4
Republic of Ingushetia –9.1 –3.9
Magadan Oblast –8.8 +2.9
Irkutsk Oblast –8.5 –13.7
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Republic had it at +34.1%. The small sizes of the regional economies, their 
exclusion from world markets, and their dependence on federal finances ensured 
a normal economic situation in the lagging regions.
 The federal government used its resources, accumulated during the previous 
years of favorable economic conditions, to support this new group of regions in 
need. Financial assistance was allocated via two channels: distribution of inter-
governmental transfers and credit to the largest enterprises and companies 
through banks subordinated to the government. The latter was also aimed at sup-
porting the regional social sphere, since because of the low level of economic 
diversification in the regions, a decrease in such companies’ production led to 
significant social problems.
 A good illustration is Vologda oblast, which is a classic case of an economic-
ally successful subnational unit. However, its main problem during the crisis was 
Region The decline in industrial 
production in November 
2008 (compared with 
November 2007, %)
Decline (−)/growth (+) of 
industrial production in 
July 2009 (compared with 
July 2008, %)
Republic of Mari El –8.0 –0.5
Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Area
–7.1 –10.6
Chechen Republic –7.1 –20.9
Pskov Oblast –6.5 –5.6
Karachay-Cherkess  
  Republic
–6.3 +0.1
Tomsk Oblast –5.7 –2.2
Samara Oblast –5.6 –27.9
Zabaikal’sky Krai –5.4 +14.6
Moscow Oblast –4.5 –16.1
Republic of Adygeya –4.2 –2.8
Republic of Komi –4.0 –2.8
Voronezh Oblast –3.9 +3.9
Kaliningrad Oblast –3.5 –9.6
Saratov Oblast –3.1 –7.4
Republic of Karelia –2.6 –9.4
Republic of Bashkortostan –1.9 –6.9
Republic of Khakasia –1.8 +9.7
Tyumen’ Oblast –1.6 –2.3
Astrakhan’ Oblast –1.5 –32.1
Primorsky Krai –1.1 +21.2
Novosibirsk Oblast –1.0 –15.4
Republic of Tatarstan –0.9 –9.4
St Petersburg –0.7 –40.0
Sverdlovsk Oblast –0.7 –22.8
Krasnoyarsk Krai –0.3 –9.5
Penza Oblast 0 –12.0
Source: Federal Service of State Statistics (www.gks.ru).
Table 2.2 Continued
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that its social and economic prosperity had been based on the existence of the 
large metallurgic company Severstal, which provided 40 percent of tax revenues 
to the regional budget. The role of Severstal was not limited to tax flows and 
jobs. In accordance with Soviet traditions and Putin’s principle of “the social 
responsibility of the Russian businesses” (Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2003), 
Severstal supported (and continues to support) many social projects in the 
region.
 However, in October 2008, due to the fall of prices in the world steel market, 
its sales declined. Severstal was forced to cut its production plans by a quarter. 
The local media reported that by the end of 2008 employment services in Chere-
povets, the economic center of the region, had received notifications that the 
company was going to fire 7000 people, including 5600 metallurgists (Star-
odubtsev, 2009).
 The case of Cherepovets is important for understanding the situation that had 
arisen in most of the so- called monotowns. According to the Institute for 
Regional Policy’s assessment, more than 20 percent of the Russian population 
were living in monotowns during the late 2000s, and 40 percent of the Russian 
GDP was produced by enterprises in such towns. Before the crisis, local enter-
prises had been spending 10–15 percent of their profits on implementing social 
programs in towns and regions (Bel’chenko, 2009). However, as Cherepovets’s 
case demonstrates, during a crisis these companies could not even preserve a 
stable number of jobs. As a result, the federal government had to manage more 
than 500 potential social catastrophes in such territories.
 The crisis interrupted the attempts to design new approaches to regional 
development policy. As in the 1990s, the policy maintained an orientation 
toward managing current urgent problems and addressing the task of equalizing, 
but not of developing. Evidence of this reversion came in the form of the change 
of rules for the Investment Fund’s distribution. Initially, the fund had been estab-
lished for development of projects of national significance. But after 2009, some 
funding went to regional investment projects of less significance and scale than 
the national projects. At the same time, the previous periods’ achievements—
new mechanisms of regional development, formalization of the procedure for 
selecting the regions in greatest need, and federal political control over the 
regional leaders—allowed the federal government to avoid the problems of the 
1990s, including unrestrained politicization of the federal regional policy.
 The crisis strengthened financial dependence of the regional governments and 
regional economies on the federal government’s support. To compare, in 2000, 
the share of intergovernmental transfers in the federal budget’s expenditures was 
nearly 10 percent. This was less than the shares belonging to such spheres of the 
federal government’s work as national defense, managing the external national 
debt, and law enforcement and public security. In 2003, intergovernmental trans-
fers took first place in this rating of public expenditures. In 2009, more than 17 
percent of all federal spending was allocated to supporting the regions (Figure 
2.4). In further, the transfers included more than 100 subsidies, in addition to 
many subventions that were transferred to the regional budgets to compensate 
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regional governments for implementing federal responsibilities (Zubarevich, 
2011). In this way, the regions became enslaved by federal money and the gov-
ernment’s control over how it was spent.
 In spring 2011, Dmitry Medvedev, Russian President from 2008 to 2012, 
declared the need to decentralize the system of public administration (Medvedev, 
2011). This proposal was in line with Medvedev’s project of modernization in 
Russia. Throughout the whole period of his governance, Medvedev proclaimed 
that market- oriented policy changes needed to be realized in Russia (Malle, 
2013). Understood in the “narrow sense” (Gel’man, 2017), Medvedev’s modern-
ization was aimed at achieving stable economic growth and development by 
strengthening market mechanisms and diversifying the economy. Such moderni-
zation did not touch on questions of democratization that could have shaken the 
foundations of the current political system. This infected the design of 
Medvedev’s decentralization.
 To begin with, Medvedev established two working groups. The first, headed 
by Dmitry Kozak, was responsible for new revisions of federal and regional 
responsibilities. The second group, headed by Alexander Khloponin, former 
governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai, now the president’s plenipotentiary representa-
tive in the North Caucasian federal district and deputy prime minister of the 
Russian government, was to develop a plan for financial decentralization.
 This division of responsibilities initially came under question. Experts noted 
that real decentralization was possible only if administrative decentralization 
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Figure 2.4 Share of intergovernmental transfers in the federal budget’s expenditures.
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were to be accompanied with the fiscal kind. The first reform of the distribution 
of responsibilities between the center and subnational units, as well as the muni-
cipal reform designed by Kozak in the first half of the 2000s, had demonstrated 
that the ministries and agencies responsible for tax and budget policies were able 
to consistently block any initiatives aimed at transferring budgetary resources at 
the lower tiers. As a result, the aforementioned reforms (especially the municipal 
one) led to the establishment of governmental units possessed of significant 
responsibilities but deprived of sufficient financial resources. Consequently, 
these reforms strengthened centralization in Russia instead of developing an 
effective decentralized system of government.
 Medvedev’s decentralization was unable to avoid poor results. Toward the 
end of 2011, Kozak’s group proposed the delegation of many supervisory 
responsibilities to the regional level. As a result, up to 200,000 federal officials 
would have been moved to the regional level. But Khloponin’s group was unable 
to find an opportunity to increase regional tax revenues by more than 9 percent 
of the consolidated regional budgets (Zubarevich, 2011). This discrepancy pre-
vented any radical changes in intergovernmental relations.
 However, even that decision was not realized. The work of Khloponin’s 
group was stopped when Vladimir Putin returned to the presidential post in 
2012. Soon, the government announced that, instead of the 100 units of respons-
ibility Kozak’s Commission had proposed, regional governments would receive 
additional control in such spheres as ecology and environment, food quality, 
labor relations, forestry, and public transportation. At the same time, the poten-
tial reformers declared that control over regional governments would be 
strengthened, and that governors would be personally responsible for adequate 
implementation of the new functions.
 Along with the need to manage the consequences of the economic crisis, in the 
third phase, the federal government visibly subordinated its regional policy to the 
geopolitical interests of the federal center. The first signs of this approach had 
appeared in 2008–2009, soon after the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia 
and the Russian recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence. As 
a result, South Ossetia, a territory with an extremely poor population and a lack of 
an effective economy, informally became a Russian region. It received significant 
financial aid from the federal budget. In 2008–2011, the share of Russian grants in 
South Ossetia’s budget reached 97–98 percent, and in 2012–2014 it amounted to 
more than 80 percent of the republic’s total budget revenues (Golunov, 2014). It is 
noteworthy that it is the Ministry of Regional Development that was responsible 
for the development of South Ossetia’s economy.
 In 2012, the new Ministry of the Far East’s Development was established. Its 
responsibilities covered the coordination of the federal government’s actions 
aimed at developing the regions of the Far Eastern federal district, and control 
over the regional governments’ policy. In 2014 two other “territorial” ministries 
were formed. After the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the Ministry 
of Crimean Affairs appeared, and, two months later, the Ministry of North 
 Caucasus Affairs commenced operation.
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 In fact, since 2010, an extremely complicated system of territorial governance 
has developed within the government. Alexander Khloponin was appointed 
simultaneously as the president’s plenipotentiary representative in the North 
Caucasus federal district and as a deputy head of the Russian government. In 
2014, the president appointed a different representative, but Khloponin retained 
his responsibility for coordination of governmental actions in the North Cauca-
sus and the just- created Ministry of North Caucasus Affairs.
 The first minister of the Far East’s development was Viktor Ishayev, the pres-
ident’s representative in the Far East federal district. A year later, in 2013, he 
was replaced by Yury Trutnev as the president’s representative and by Aleksandr 
Galushka as minister. At the same time, the post of the president’s representative 
was combined with the position of a deputy head of the government.
 In that situation, the dissolution of the Ministry of Regional Development was 
a logical and justifiable measure. The president and the government demon-
strated their will to govern specific territories according to a special regime 
instead of developing a general strategy of territorial governance.
 The new Ministry of the Far East’s Development soon showed itself to be an 
effective lobbyist, since it could push the creation of a new mechanism of 
regional development—the territories of advanced development (TOR, territorii 
operezhauschego razvitiia)—through the government.2 Generally, the TOR are 
similar to the OEZ: they are special territories that provide their residents with 
special conditions for doing business. But, unlike the OEZ, the TOR received 
unprecedented rights. The ministry was able to defend the right not to divide the 
TOR into types and, consequently, attract different kinds of businesses, which-
ever were most profitable, into each new territory. Additionally, the TOR con-
ditions were more inviting. They included reduction of several tax rates (property 
tax, land tax, mining tax, and profit tax), a duty- free regime for foreign products, 
and the absence of limitations on the use of foreign labor by resident companies.
 The formation of the new organizational system of territorial governance in 
the government became evidence of new tendencies arising and dominating in 
regional development policy. During the 2000s, the key ministers had success-
fully resisted the influence of territorial interests on the policy process at the 
federal level. Their ideology presupposed that federal investments should be 
“regionally blind” in order to achieve the best results for the country’s develop-
ment. But by 2012, Alexei Kudrin, the leader of the governmental reformers at 
the end of the 2000s, had left the executive. New ministers of finance and eco-
nomic development, while being former members of Kudrin’s team, did not 
have a similar level of influence over the president. Rather than structural 
reforms, the need for governmental interventions became a popular idea in the 
government, resulting in the institutionalization of territorial lobbyism.
 Finally, the 2010s were a period that saw a chain of so- called mega- events. 
Most of these had been initiated in the 2000s, before the peak of the crisis, but 
their realization came in the third phase of the implementation of the regional 
development policy. The APEC Russia 2012 summit in Vladivostok, the 2013 
Summer Universiade in Kazan, the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, and the 2018 
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World Cup—all were taken up to increase Russia’s status in the international 
arena. But at the same time, they were considered by both governmental officials 
and regional leaders to be a way to provide significant public and private invest-
ment in the regions that had agreed to host those events.
 Thus, the 2010s were a period of ambiguity in Russian regional policy. The 
consequences of the 2008 economic crisis, as well as the staff changes in the 
government and the president’s team, led to the revision of the ideology behind 
governmental regional policy. The territorially blind strategy and support for the 
developed regions through provision of long- term public investments were 
replaced by regionally based support for lagging subnational units and federal 
districts. In addition to annual budgetary transfers, the federal center introduced 
long- term mechanisms for territorial development in order to provide financial 
and infrastructural support to amplify economic growth in depressed regions and 
towns. Systemic support of economically strong regions came to a halt. They 
now received additional federal finances predominantly as a result of their 
lobbying pressures within the framework of interregional competitions for 
federal programs or for the right to host a mega- event.
Agency matters: factors in the success and failure of changes 
in regional policy
The history of the development of regional policy allows me to draw certain 
important conclusions for understanding the particularities of this aspect of 
public administration in Russia.
 The 1990s, the 2000s, and the 2010s present three periods when the Russian 
government sought to achieve different goals and consequently implemented 
dissimilar policies in the sphere of regional development.
 In the 1990s, the government’s main goal was arranging a clear and effective 
system of intergovernmental finances, which would provide formal requirements 
for regional governments to receive federal support. Other mechanisms of 
regional policy were used unsystematically and inefficiently. Economically, the 
center aimed to provide financial support for the regions that were experiencing 
especially serious problems under the conditions of the current economic situ-
ation, and were unable to implement their basic responsibilities. This old- style 
equalizing policy was the only one possible under the conditions of an extremely 
poor federal budget and a high demand for federal assistance.
 However, at the same time, the federal government had to address the results 
of the intergovernmental politics of the end of the 1980s and the very beginning 
of the 1990s. The threat of Russia’s disintegration, the president’s electoral 
dependence on regional elites, and the absence of strong institutions of financial 
intergovernmental relations strengthened individual bargaining on all significant 
issues of intergovernmental finance.
 The 2000s can be described as the period of the “policy window.” Vladimir 
Putin achieved obedience from both the governors and the federal parliament. The 
economic conditions provided significant resources and allowed the government to 
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avoid the need for emergency action to rescue the regions from financial, eco-
nomic, and social catastrophes. As it had been in the early 1990s, the government 
was filled with reformers, and many reforms were launched. For regional policy, 
this became a period of gradual introduction of advanced mechanisms of develop-
ment, proposed and realized by the reformers. In the sphere of intergovernmental 
finances, the same people designed the policy of centralization. The government 
replaced a significant part of regional tax sources with intergovernmental transfers, 
increased the scope of regional responsibility, and tightened federal control over 
both budgetary spending and regional officials’ actions, thereby strengthening the 
dependence of regional governments on the federal level.
 Thus, this period displayed contradictory tendencies, with intensive interven-
tions and growing attention to infrastructure accompanied by institutional 
changes aimed at centralizing the system of government. In Chapter 4, I will 
show that this deepened the problem of informational asymmetry and interfered 
with the regional governments’ ability to concentrate on finding their own 
sources of regional development. In theory, decentralization promotes a process 
of interregional competition not only for federal funds and projects, but also for 
private investments and for the attention of current and prospective taxpayers 
within the regions. However, the simultaneous implementation of political and 
financial centralization led to complete integration of regional governments into 
a unified system of government in a country where officials at the lower tiers are 
obliged to achieve performance indicators set by the central government.
 The next period followed the 2008 world economic crisis. It was not a time of 
new initiatives in regional policy. The effects of the crisis and sanctions by the 
USA and the European Union forced the government to cut many strategic pro-
jects. The territorially blind mechanisms of development began to be used to 
develop territories strategically important for the federal center: additional 
federal support was allocated mainly to the republics of the North Caucasus and 
Crimea, and regions of the Far East.
 Thus, there was only a relatively short period—the 2000s—when it would 
have been possible to modernize regional policy significantly, as the policy 
window was open and the relevant ideas had come into existence. Below I will 
explain why this modernization did not take place.
 According to the first hypothesis formulated in this chapter, policy reforms 
can be initiated by shocks—both external and internal—that are able to make 
the government change current patterns of regional development policy and find 
new means of administration in this field. In the case of the Russian regional 
policy, this expectation is partially validated.
 The observed case does not demonstrate any influence on policy- making from 
internal shocks. Among external shocks, the most visible are the two world eco-
nomic crises. Their significance for policy- making is that they revealed problems 
that needed to be resolved in order to overcome the crisis and to accelerate Rus-
sia’s development. For instance, in 1998, the non- transparent system of inter-
governmental finance did not allow the government to make budget spending 
more effective and consequently to mobilize resources under the circumstances 
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of the financial crisis. In 2008, the crisis made immediate the problems of mono-
towns and territories suffering from depressed economies and dependence on a 
single economic sector. The armed conflict with Georgia, the annexation of 
Crimea, and many other shocks set new goals for the government.
 However, the shocks did not create a repertoire of policy measures. Rather, 
they contributed to a return to familiar practices of governance. In this instance, 
the crises strengthened the equalizing component of intergovernmental finance 
and the federal center’s control over the regional governments.
 The second hypothesis asserts that policy changes are more likely to happen 
if a government has the support of public opinion and a loyal parliament. This 
expectation of public opinion’s influence is derived from the “democratic” view 
that any public policy program is an object of public interest. Hence, to avoid 
society’s dissatisfaction, especially during electoral campaigns, governments 
prefer to realize measures mostly supported by public opinion and defer their 
implementation as long as possible.
 But there have been no public discussions of a strategy of regional policy in 
Russia. Due to the circumstances of the development of Russian federalism, dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, the issues of autonomy and decentralization have 
been absent from the public agenda. Neither national nor regional electoral cam-
paigns have raised the problem of intergovernmental relations as a cause of unsat-
isfactory economic development in both specific regions and Russia overall.
 At the same time, intergovernmental finance has been a significant policy 
issue for all political actors (but, again, not society at large). Policy changes in 
this sphere necessarily aroused the parliamentarians’ interest, and all significant 
policy changes—in 1994, 1998, and 2004—were realized during periods relat-
ively friendly to the executive.
 It is also noteworthy that the political stream in the sphere of regional policy 
is guided predominantly not by the parliament’s loyalty or the public mood, but 
by the particularities of intergovernmental relations in the political sphere. 
During the first period, the regions controlled the center’s actions in the field of 
intergovernmental relations; regional policy was decentralized and individual-
ized. The center’s empowerment during the second and third periods allowed it 
to establish new mechanisms of regional development that were mainly based on 
the economic calculations of the federal bureaucrats, rather than taking into 
account the political interests of federal or regional leaders.
 The third hypothesis underlines the importance of the content of proposed 
policy changes. The evidence presented is in line with the expectation that 
simpler proposals that would change a single area of intergovernmental relations 
are more successfully realized than complex reforms that simultaneously include 
several fields of regional development. In Russia’s case, specific government 
teams prefer to work with different subfields of regional policy. Intergovernmen-
tal finance is the Ministry of Finance’s sphere of responsibility. The Ministry of 
Economic Development is in charge of infrastructural projects and special pro-
grams of territorial development. The Ministry of Regional Development’s 
attempt to propose a full- scale reform program that would cover different fields 
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of government ended in complete failure. From this perspective, the project of 
development of agglomerations confirms this observation: it did not initiate 
radical changes in established intergovernmental relations, but was limited to a 
proposal to create suitable conditions for boosting economic processes in the rel-
evant territories.
 Finally, the fourth hypothesis highlights the significance of the interests and 
strategies of the participants in the policy process, as well as the institutional 
context of their relations. This factor is the most influential in the case of Russian 
regional policy. My analysis confirms that the institutional design of the Russian 
political system leads to extremely high significance of the individual makeup of 
the government on the one hand and the particularities of personal relations 
between individual members of the government and the president on the other. 
The ideological preferences of the government’s key ministers determine the 
governmental policy strategy, including in the sphere of regional policy, and the 
president’s support allows a reform to be protected from the interests of other 
politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups.
 Overall, by this point, the Russian center has yet to establish a unified and 
cohesive system of regional development that would cover all subnational units 
and propose both clear goals for their development and the tools to achieve 
them. Regional development has been a policy of secondary importance, one 
that has been subordinated to either the political interests of the Russian leader-
ship (as we observed in the 1990s and observe in the 2010s) or the interests of 
economic development in the whole country (as happened in the 2000s). This 
may have been caused by the particularities of the formation of the federal state 
in Russia and thus by the relations of citizens and governmental officials with 
the subnational level of government as an integrated part of a unified system of 
public administration.
Notes
1 I have to note here that throughout the book I will use the word “region” to define a 
subnational unit of a state that is located between the national (federal) and municipal 
tiers of government.
2 Supported by the president, the initiative was realized. Moreover, later, the president 
proposed to use the mechanism to support monotowns.
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3 Who, how, when, and how much?
Factors of the redistribution of 
intergovernmental transfers in Russia
In 2011, Alexei Navalny, one of the leaders of the opposition movement in 
Russia, actively supported the popular campaign “Enough of feeding the Cauca-
sus!” Prior to a meeting that took place in Moscow to assemble supporters of the 
campaign, the liberally oriented radio station Echo Moskvy asked their listeners 
if they considered the slogan appropriate. In total, 86 percent of those who parti-
cipated agreed with the statement and 14 percent did not. Later, on the radio sta-
tion’s website, the same slogan was supported by 61 percent of visitors 
(Razvorot Radio Show, 2011).
 In spite of the fact that the meeting brought together mainly representatives of 
nationalist movements, Navalny attempted to avoid purely nationalist debates 
and steered the discussion toward the rules for redistribution of federal financial 
support among subnational units. He raised questions concerning the status of 
the republics of the North Caucasus within the Russian federal system, the polit-
ical and economic situations in those regions, the problems of corruption, and 
many other issues. It was probably the first attempt to introduce the debates on 
financial intergovernmental relations into the public agenda.
 Navalny did not succeed in achieving that goal. Russian society did not 
express an interest in the discussion of difficult questions of intergovernmental 
finance, nor in the problems of Russian federalism at large. Further development 
of this line of argumentation merely brought Navalny closer to the nationalists 
and alienated the liberals and democrats. This is why Navalny soon abandoned 
that rhetoric.
 At the same time, revealing the factors that contribute to the particularities of 
intergovernmental finance in Russia is a very important task indeed for under-
standing how the contemporary territorial system functions. The process of dis-
tribution of money between the regions is influenced by many economic and 
non- economic factors, and the domination of some of them may characterize 
intergovernmental relations better than the existence of gubernatorial elections 
or the specifics of the national economic policy aimed at subnational units.
 This chapter is devoted to explicating the factors, other than the socio- 
economic ones, involved in the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in 
Russia in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. Using the results of statistical analysis 
conducted by different authors interested in intergovernmental transfers in 
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Russia, as well as my own statistical research, I will attempt to understand, first, 
when political factors had the most significance and, second, what circumstances 
contributed to their importance.
The academic discussion on political factors in the 
distribution of intergovernmental transfers in Russia
Studying the factors and the effects of the allocation of intergovernmental trans-
fers is a popular research field in economics and political science (see, for 
example, a review in Hagen, 2008). Academic discussions here concern mainly 
how politicians and bureaucrats manage two problems. The first is the “common-
 pool problem,” which, as applied to intergovernmental relations, deals with the 
fact “that residents in one region benefit from taxes paid by residents in other 
regions” (Hagen, 2008). Numerous studies demonstrate that this problem, 
exacerbated by the “soft budget constraints problem” (Qian and Roland, 1999), 
leads to systematic overspending by those regions that receive more bailouts. 
Another question derived from the common- pool problem is, who implements 
redistribution of finances in this common pool, and how and why? The motives 
of central governments are affected by different circumstances—both political 
(Nordhaus, 1975; Hibbs, 1977) and economic (Rodden et al., 2003).
 The second direction of the aforementioned studies focuses on the “principal–
agency problem,” which raises the question of how control mechanisms are 
arranged in this field of governance. Usually, scholars use the concept of principal–
agency relations to analyze the delegation of responsibilities either from voters 
to elected politicians (Tabellini, 2000) or from legislatures to executives 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins et al., 1989). The model is rarely 
used to explain the particularities of relations between governmental levels, 
especially in federal states, although the attempts that have been made have 
demonstrated interesting results (Sharafutdinova, 2010).
 I will pay special attention to the development of the principal–agency 
problem in understanding the particularities of Russian federalism in the next 
chapter. In this chapter, I would like to concentrate on the factors that force 
central governments to allocate financial assistance in particular ways.
 The Russian case is particularly interesting as an object of such studies. 
Russia possesses several features that amplify the effects of the common- pool 
problem. Among them are the large number of subnational units; the dramatic 
gap in economic and social development between the developed and the lagging 
regions; the existence of a plural society that increases the need to appease 
regional elites and communities; and the dependence of the federal politicians on 
the regional elites that even in the 2000s and 2010s control the electoral pro-
cesses in their territories.
 In the last 20 years, there have been many research projects devoted to factors 
in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Here, I provide an overview of 
the most significant. In each case, I am interested in understanding what kinds of 
political factors influence the distribution of intergovernmental transfers and 
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what model—political co- optation or political cronyism—the federal govern-
ment chooses in each specific period of Russia’s history.
 Daniel Treisman (1996, 1998, 2001) is the author of one of the most famous 
and rigorous analyses of intergovernmental transfers in Russia in the 1990s. Treis-
man does not consider intergovernmental transfers to be part of regional policy. 
He believes that the center used its financial resources mainly to stabilize the 
socio- economic situation in Russia instead of achieving the goals of territorial 
development. The materials in the previous chapter of this book support this posi-
tion. They demonstrate that the central government did not have any strategy of 
regional development in the 1990s, since it was allocating all available financial 
resources to resolving its immediate problems—political, economic, social, etc.
 Another relevant feature of Treisman’s analysis is his means of measuring 
intergovernmental transfers. In his research, Treisman uses, on the one hand, 
federal money transferred at the regional level and, on the other hand, taxes col-
lected in the regions and transferred by regional authorities to the federal budget. 
This method is justified by the practice of individual bargaining on the specifics 
of intergovernmental finance in the cases of the most influential Russian regions. 
Based on this, Treisman defines the dependent variable as “per capita transfers 
of financial resources to the regions net of tax payments to the centre” (Treis-
man, 1996: 308).
 According to Treisman’s results, in 1992–1996 the central government 
mainly realized a strategy of political co- optation. In 1992, autonomous repub-
lics that had declared their sovereignty, regions where long- term and mass 
strikes took place, and territories with a low level of electoral support for Pres-
ident Yeltsin received a larger share of transfers than regions more loyal to the 
center. In 1994, the growth of federal flows was increased by such factors as the 
low level of electoral support for Vybor Rossii in 1993 and regional elites’ 
opposition to the president’s actions in September–October 1993, as well as a 
larger number of representatives of certain regions in the State Duma. In 1995 
and 1996, the parliamentary and presidential campaigns affected the distribution 
of transfers. Perceiving these elections as crucially important for saving the 
political regime, the federal government used all available resources to appease 
the regional elites and electorates. In 1995, the government explicitly bought the 
support of regional leaders for the Nash Dom—Rossiya (NDR) party list: more 
transfers were allocated to the regions that had delegated their governors or 
deputy governors to the NDR. In 1996, the frequency of the president’s visits to 
the regions during his electoral campaign positively influenced federal financial 
support. Of course, the political factors were accompanied by economic ones. 
Overall, they were aimed at supporting the regions that had the deepest eco-
nomic problems in order to ensure acceptable living standards there.
 Treisman’s analysis ends with 1996. This does not allow for the assessment 
of possible changes in transfer politics under the conditions of the transforma-
tion of the political regime and the improvement of the economic situation. A 
research project by Vladimir Popov (Popov, 2004), which covers the period 
from 1992 to 2001, solves this problem.
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 Popov applies a different method for defining the dependent variable: he sug-
gests using “total net financial flows between the regions and the center,” which 
contains all revenues and outlays concerning intergovernmental relations. In 
addition, Popov introduces so- called “ideal transfers” into the analysis, 
which show
the difference between taxes that the region is able to collect, given the 
objective conditions in this particular region, the average Russian level of 
tax rates and tax compliance, and expenditure that the regional government 
should make in order to ensure the provision of the average Russian level of 
public services to local inhabitants.
(Popov, 2004: 519)
 As a result, Popov agrees that political factors played a significant role in the 
process of redistribution of federal financial support in the 1990s and at the 
beginning of the 2000s. But, ceteris paribus, autonomous republics, pro- 
presidential regions, and influential regions that did not have significant conflicts 
with the federal government had more transfers than oppositional regions, which 
were punished, i.e., the center implemented a strategy of political cronyism. The 
only exception was the period 1992–1993, when the analysis did not identify 
any “political” bias in the patterns of transfer allocation. Thus, the political and 
economic changes on the cusp of the 1990s and the 2000s did not transform the 
federal government’s strategy concerning transfer politics.
 Israel Marques, Eugenia Nazrullaeva, and Andrei Yakovlev (2016) contest 
the idea that the center implements a unified strategy with regard to all regions. 
They analyze the allocation of federal transfers in 2000–2008 (measured as total 
federal transfers per capita to the regions) to answer the question, “how do polit-
ical leaders allocate government largess to voters?” (Marques et al., 2016: 23) 
Based on the literature, which discusses two models—the core voter (allocation 
of transfers in favor of loyal voters) and swing voter (distribution of finances to 
get new supporters) models—the authors show that how politicians choose 
between them depends on the dynamics of the region’s economic growth. Given 
low levels of growth, the center supports the regions that are usually loyal to the 
federal ruling politicians. When it comes to regions with high levels of economic 
growth, the center attempts to co- opt usually oppositional regions. Hence, the 
center is able to realize both strategies simultaneously. The federal government 
relies on the dynamics of regional economic factors rather than national political 
determinants.
 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova and Rostislav Turovsky (2016) turn their attention to 
the fact that almost all authors analyze the intergovernmental transfers from the 
perspective of the central government’s strategies and actions. Sharafutdinova 
and Turovsky’s observation is that regional lobbyism matters in Russian inter-
governmental relations even given a tendency toward centralization. Often, the 
regional elites initiate projects for special programs of federal support, as in 
the case of the 2013 Universiade in Kazan or the federal program for developing 
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the Republic of Karelia. Therefore, this new research focuses on examining 
regions’ potential to influence the existing allocation of transfers.
 The authors use a novel way of measuring the dependent variable. They 
attempt to capture “politically sensitive” transfers, measured as “the share of 
transfers that excludes the equalization grants and subventions calculated using 
relatively objective criteria” (Sharafutdinova and Turovsky, 2016: 6–7). As a 
result, they find that gubernatorial lobbying capacity (measured as top federal 
officials’ visits to regions) and regional administrative capacity (measured as 
voter turnout in the federal elections) to a significant extent explain the federal 
government’s decisions on distribution of funds between regions in 2002–2012.
 This is a very important conclusion that illustrates the opportunities available 
to the regional leaders during the period of Putin’s centralization. Under the con-
ditions of gradual formalization of budgetary institutions aimed at equalizing the 
vertical fiscal imbalance, the distribution of an increasing volume of other types 
of transfer continued to depend on non- economic factors. Sharafutdinova and 
Turovsky’s research demonstrates that regional leaders have continued to use all 
their informal options in order to receive additional financial support from the 
federal center.
 Overall, this overview of recent studies in the field of revealing the political 
factors in intergovernmental transfers allows us to conclude that politics matters. 
However, it is difficult to understand the strategy being implemented by the 
center, since the studies produce different results depending on the calculation of 
dependent variables.
(De)politicization of intergovernmental transfers during 
1998–2015
This book’s basic thesis is that the transformation of intergovernmental relations 
in Russia should be analyzed through the lens of changes in the political regime, 
as well as the growth of Vladimir Putin’s political power. From this perspective, 
the redistribution of intergovernmental transfers can be seen as an effective 
instrument in the hands of the federal government, since it is able to both reward 
obedient regional elites and punish potential or actual challengers. However, due 
to insufficient financial resources, the center tends to restrict the spending of 
transfers on political goals and has room to realize the socio- economic goals of 
redistributive policy.
 When does the center employ the strategy of politicization of financial trans-
fers? My suggestion is that it makes use of it when the level of political uncer-
tainty is highest. Taking care to protect their governing positions, federal 
officials use financial resources as an additional instrument for pressuring the 
regions and their elites and electorates. It is obvious that elections are a key 
event in any political process, one that produces said level of uncertainty and 
which is deeply sensitive to the territorial dimension of politics. In modern 
authoritarian regimes, elections provide the opposition with a unique opportunity 
to participate in political competition. Even if the opposition candidates possess 
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no real chance to win, they are able to seriously undermine the rulers’ popular-
ity. That is why it is no less important for the incumbents to obtain a high level 
of support from the population to serve as evidence of strong legitimacy of both 
the rulers and the regimes they have built.
 The idea of the political business cycle, developed by William H. Nordhaus 
(Nordhaus, 1975), provides an understanding of how electoral processes impact on 
governmental policy outcomes. In his article, Nordhaus proved that the classic 
choice of the trade- off between the level of inflation and the level of unemploy-
ment is politically determined: “there is a predictable pattern of policy, starting 
with relative austerity in early years [of an electoral regime] and ending with the 
potlatch right before elections” (Nordhaus, 1975: 187). This model can be refor-
mulated in terms of uncertainty: the years with the highest levels of political uncer-
tainty precede federal elections and lead to a significant increase in the influence of 
political factors. In turn, the periods following elections involve increasing signifi-
cance of socio- economic determinants of distribution of transfers.
 However, an alternative hypothesis can be suggested. Transfer policy may be 
influenced by political factors permanently, regardless of how soon the next 
elections are to be held. Unlike stable democracies, in authoritarian regimes, as 
Schedler notes, rulers’ hold on power is never secure (Schedler, 2013). Con-
sequently, one can expect that autocrats will always politicize a policy process 
because they will never have absolute assurance of keeping their positions.
 To test these theories, I began by analyzing the distribution of annual trans-
fers in the period from 1998 to 2015. The linear regression analysis included 
results of intergovernmental transfers’ annual distribution in 73–78 subnational 
units.1
 To identify the level of socio- economic well- being of a region, three indic-
ators were used:
1 average personal income in a region (rubles per capita per year);
2 gross regional product per capita (million rubles per 10,000 people per 
year);
3 percentage change in gross regional product (from the previous year).
These three indicators allow for assessment of different aspects of the economic 
and social situations in the Russian regions. The average personal income 
demonstrates the population’s level of well- being. The level of the gross regional 
product shows the extent of economic development in a region, while the change 
in the gross regional product evaluates the tendencies of economic development 
in a region. The regression analysis I will present includes the socio- economic 
indicators for the year preceding the one during which federal funds were alloc-
ated. To satisfy the assumptions of linear regression analysis, the indicator of the 
gross regional product has been transformed into its logarithm.
 The federal center’s political motivation was captured by two possible fac-
tors—levels of loyalty and of opposition of a region’s electorate in the national 
elections. I used the results of both presidential and parliamentary campaigns 
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because both the president and the State Duma participate in the process of 
design and adoption of annual budgets. Therefore, the analysis included the 
results of popular voting for Boris Yeltsin and Gennady Zyuganov in the pres-
idential elections of 1996 (the second round), for Vladimir Putin and Gennady 
Zyuganov in 2000, for Vladimir Putin and Nikolay Kharitonov in 2004, and for 
Dmitry Medvedev and Gennady Zyuganov in 2008. The percentages of votes for 
Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev were taken to represent the level of regional 
loyalty, while Zyuganov and Kharitonov’s results were interpreted as the level 
of regional opposition.
 In parliamentary elections, regional loyalty was assessed using the electoral 
results of the party Nash Dom—Rossiya (NDR, Our Home is Russia) in 1995, 
Yedinstvo in 1999, and United Russia in 2003 and 2007. The level of regional 
opposition is demonstrated through the electoral results of the Communist Party 
of the Russian Federation in all four electoral campaigns. All “political” vari-
ables have been presented in the regression in logit- transformed equivalents.
 Finally, a dummy variable that indicates whether a region has the status of 
“republic” was inserted into the analysis to control for the influence of this 
important characteristic of the Russian regions.
 The dependent variable of the analysis is the volume of annual budget trans-
fers from the federal budget to regional budgets. To take into account the sizes 
of regional populations and economies I calculated a sum of transfers (in thou-
sands of rubles) per 10 000 regional residents. Additionally, the variable was 
subject to a square root transformation to satisfy the assumptions of the linear 
regression model.
 The most significant models from the analysis are presented in Appendix 2. 
What have we discovered about the impact of electoral factors from these 
models? The electoral results had the greatest significance in two periods—from 
1998 to 2003 and from 2008 to 2015, while in the period from 2004 to 2007 
their influence was insignificant. This fact contradicts both the suggestion that 
the impact of electoral factors depends on the phase of the electoral business 
cycle and the hypothesis of the permanent politicization of the policy process. 
Instead, the results show that there were two multi- year periods of politicized 
transfers and only one period of their depoliticization.
 In addition, the models allow me to highlight political cronyism as the pre-
dominant strategy of politicization. The regions that voted for Unity in 1999 and 
United Russia in 2011 had a larger volume of transfers in their regional budgets. 
The exceptions were the 1998–1999 period of political co- optation (a larger 
volume of transfers was allocated to the most oppositional regions) and the 
period of 2008–2011 when political cronyism was implemented as a punishment 
for regions that voted for the opposition.
 However, the analysis of the annual distribution of financial transfers has an 
important shortcoming—it contains only a small number of observations (78 
regions). To overcome this problem, as well as to test the significance of polit-
ical factors during the specific periods indicated by the previous analysis, in the 
second phase the regressions were built on the basis of data that grouped annual 
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transfers into five periods: 1998–1999, 2000–2003, 2004–2007, 2008–2011, and 
2012–2015. Two models were tested for each of these periods. The first one did 
not include the volume of transfers received by a region in the previous year, and 
the second did. It was impossible to apply the same procedure for 1998–1999 
because of the absence of data on transfers for 1997.
 The results of the new tests (see Appendix 3) show the impact of electoral 
factors in all identified periods, including 2004–2007. Introducing the variable of 
transfers received by the regions in the previous year decreased their significance 
in 1998–1999, 2000–2003, and 2011–2014, while 2004–2007 and 2008–2011 
demonstrate the ongoing influence of electoral factors. Again, in 1998–1999 a 
larger volume of transfers was received by the regions that demonstrated less 
support for the pro- governmental party in the 1995 elections. However, after that 
the strategy changed from political co- optation to political cronyism.
 Finally, the third phase of the analysis regrouped the annual data to form three 
periods, 1998–1999, 2000–2008, and 2009–2015, which reflected the changes in 
regional development policy described in the previous chapter.
 This test confirms the conclusions drawn previously. At the end of the 1990s, 
the strategy of political co- optation dominated: oppositional regions and repub-
lics received a larger volume of transfers. In the 2000s and 2010s, the strategy 
changed: during the period of 2000–2008, the government rewarded loyal 
regions, and in 2009–2015 it punished the oppositional regions.
 Overall, these results allow me to draw the following conclusions. First, elect-
oral factors have been important determinants during the whole period scruti-
nized. This fact supports the hypothesis that federal government is at all times 
attentive to ensuring the political loyalty of the regional elites and electorates. A 
study of Russia’s case alone cannot provide a strong theoretical basis for why 
this is so, but I can suggest that such politicization of transfer policy is a result of 
the institutional uncertainty that becomes especially serious in electoral periods, 
but remains significant during the periods between elections.
 These results confirm Andreas Schedler’s way of thinking about the particu-
larities of political uncertainty in authoritarian regimes. In such regimes, elec-
tions are certainly an important political event, but they do not reduce the list of 
possible threats to the rulers. As a result, governments have to constantly take 
political risks into account and include them as a significant factor in redistribu-
tive decision- making. This, in turn, must make us acknowledge that the federal 
government continued to perceive regional communities as a potential threat 
even after the regional political elites had come under control.
 Second, the dummy variable that indicates the republican status of the subna-
tional units demonstrates extremely high significance. To show that the republics 
receive more transfers than all other types of subnational unit, I compared mean 
transfers allocated to republics and non- republics in 1998–2015, as well as the 
mean gross regional product in the same regions and the same period (see 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2). The results show statistically significant differences in 
transfers received by republics and non- republics even where the economic posi-
tions of both groups are not so different.
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Figure 3.1   Average value of transfers from the federal budget to subnational budgets in 
republics (1.00) and other types of subnational units (0.00).
2000
1500
1000
M
e
a
n
 
gr
p_
10
00
0
500
Error bars: 95% Cl
Rep0.00 1.00
0
Figure 3.2   Average value of gross regional product per 10 000 residents in republics 
(1.00) and other types of subnational units.
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 This fact can be explained in different ways. On the one hand, republics per-
sistently demonstrate a higher level of electoral support for Vladimir Putin and 
United Russia. The only exception was the 1999 parliamentary election, when 
some republican leaders entered the Fatherland—All Russia regional bloc. On 
the other hand, this support could be determined by the special attention paid by 
the federal government to the republics, which included additional transfers and 
investments. This is why it is difficult to reveal which of the two sides—transfers 
and political support from the republics’ communities—is cause and which is 
consequence.
 Finally, the statistical results demonstrate that most of the transfers have been 
distributed in favor of the poorest and lagging regions. This is not a surprising 
outcome. On the one hand, Russian regional policy is clearly oriented at equaliz-
ing the budget capacities of economically lagging subnational units with the rest 
of the country. On the other hand, such regions have become the main sources of 
both Vladimir Putin and United Russia’s popularity (Zubarevich, 2011, 2016).
 Thus, transfer policy in the Russia of the 2000s and 2010s was no less politi-
cized than in the 1990s. It did not assert the federal government’s complete 
control over the regional elites, nor were the Ministry of Finance’s consequent 
efforts to make redistribution of financial support more objectively able to over-
come the political dependence of the federal center on the regional communities’ 
electoral support. This is why year after year electoral factors continue to influ-
ence intergovernmental financial relations.
The draining lake: the disempowerment of instruments of 
territorial development in Russia
In 2007, the Russian government made the decision to create an OEZ in the 
Republic of Altai, named the Altai Valley. The project involved creating a lake, 
with several islands hosting hotels and other tourist infrastructure. The lake’s 
construction took three years, from 2009 to the end of 2011. In January 2012, 
builders started to fill the lake with water, but soon discovered that the water was 
draining from the lake due to serious errors in its engineering. After several 
attempts to fix the problem, in 2016 the government decided to close the project. 
By that time, more than four billion rubles had been spent from the federal 
budget to develop the zone (Chernyshov, 2013).
 This case is not unique. In 2016, the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federa-
tion declared the results of an inspection of several special economic zones 
(including the Altai Valley) and drew the conclusion that they were completely 
ineffective. One of the auditors claimed:
The process of the special economic zones’ creation and management is char-
acterized by formalism, irresponsibility, and impunity, and by the lack of 
executive discipline and responsibility for decisions and their consequences. 
No real economic effect of the special economic zones was achieved.
(Audit, 2016)
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 As a result, the Audit Chamber proposed revision of the government’s 
approach to creation, management, and assessment of the economic zones, as 
well as of other tools of regional development that had been actively established 
in the 2000s and 2010s.
 This section attempts to explain the poor results of such mechanisms of 
regional development. My argument stems from the assumption of rent- seeking 
behavior by bureaucrats, who tend to use all new policy instruments to increase 
their own resources and fulfill current tasks of regional development, instead of 
achieving strategic goals for the development of Russia as a whole. I will 
demonstrate how federal and regional bureaucrats transform initially narrowly 
targeted instruments of territorial development into regular tools of regional 
policy, thereby weakening their essence and decreasing their effectiveness.
 It is important to make a distinction between annually distributed financial 
flows and special funds aimed at supporting long- term developmental regional 
projects. While annual budgets are influenced by a combination of political and 
economic factors, long- term projects allow rulers’ attention to be paid to stra-
tegic issues of the country’s development.
 Before 2005, only one instrument of long- term territorial support existed in 
Russia, namely federal programs (federal’nye tselevye programmy). In addition, 
special economic zones had existed since the 1990s in two regions (the Kalinin-
grad and Magadan oblasts). But the economic growth of the 2000s and the 
reformist intentions of Vladimir Putin’s government allowed the federal policy- 
makers to create a system of financial and legal instruments aimed at accelerat-
ing economic and social development in the regions.
 Those governmental actions had been directly connected with the rationale of 
centralization since the beginning of the 2000s, which deprived the regions of 
the ability to propose and realize effective instruments for their own economic 
growth. First of all, they did not have enough financial resources to plan multi- 
year economic projects. Furthermore, after the cancellation of direct gubernato-
rial elections, the regional governments lost the motivation to contribute to 
prospective economic development, while the federal center introduced electoral 
results as a key performance indicator for reappointment of governors. Finally, 
due to the reinforcement of the federation’s control over regional authorities’ 
actions, regional bureaucrats tended to avoid realizing projects of uncertain pre-
dicted effectiveness since they were afraid of being accused of misappropriation 
of funds. Under these circumstances, the federal government became a priori 
responsible for territorial development. A key agency that was put in charge of 
designing and implementing mechanisms for intensive regional economic devel-
opment in the country was the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade 
(MERT) headed by German Gref, one of the core reform- driven figures in the 
president’s team.
 The MERT created two mechanisms of territorial development—the new 
model of special economic zones and the Investment Fund of the Russian Feder-
ation. German Gref declared strict principles for the distribution of financial and 
other types of resources within the frameworks of the new mechanisms. Both 
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mechanisms implied obligatory competition between regional governments, 
which were expected to suggest thoroughly thought- out projects with clear 
potential for the attraction of private investments and significant contributions to 
the country’s economic well- being.
 Both instruments were devised as specifically targeted measures to ensure 
suitable conditions in different territories for economic breakthroughs significant 
for the economic development of the country as a whole. Ideologically, the 
MERT embodied a spatially blind approach to territorial development—the offi-
cials’ attention was focused not on regions and their needs, but on projects and 
their potential success. Consequently, the regional leaders were to present them-
selves not as representatives of regional communities, but as managers respons-
ible for the development of specific territories. In addition, while the allocation 
of annual financial flows aimed at equalization of regional budgets was becom-
ing more and more transparent (although it continued to suffer from the influ-
ence of federal politicians’ political interests), distribution of financial support 
within the frameworks of the new mechanisms for regional development was 
characterized by opaqueness. Moreover, the new mechanisms established in the 
2010s after German Gref left the government—governmental programs and ter-
ritories of advanced development—are often described as initiatives that dupli-
cate existing ones.
Federal and governmental programs
The federal programs emerged within the structure of the federal budget in 1995. 
They were intended to transition from the principle of annual formation of the 
federal budget, which was influenced by immediate problems and goals, to a 
system of long- term budget priorities and financial planning of their implemen-
tation that would not be dependent on annual political and economic conditions.
 This objective certainly demands an attentive approach to the selection of 
projects. According to the legislation (Poryadok, 1995), the procedure of 
decision- making in the sphere of the design and implementation of federal pro-
grams primarily operates at the level of the federal government. A project of the 
federal government can be proposed exclusively by a federal ministry. To 
become a program, the project must be approved by the ministry responsible for 
the field of public policy the program would contribute to, as well as the Minis-
try of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development. After that, the 
Russian Government needs to discuss and approve the program overall.
 Thus, regional governments do not participate in any stage of decision- 
making on federal programs. Their officials have to persuade the federal govern-
ment to design a program concerning their region or merely wait for such a 
program to be created one day. Such a system prevents politically and adminis-
tratively weak players from participating in the policy process. If regional gov-
ernments and other potential beneficiaries (for example, commercial companies 
that would be interested in government investment in the regional economy) do 
not have enough resources to push their initiatives through all the stages of 
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decision- making, they are deprived of the chance to effectively take part in the 
competition for this segment of federal funds.
 In the 1990s, such programs became an instrument of additional financial 
support for the socio- economic development of regions that could demonstrate 
their significance to the federal government. During the financial crisis at the end 
of the 1990s, numerous programs of support for regions and cities were stopped. 
In 2000, only one program of territorial development remained in effect (see 
Figure 3.3). But by 2003 the number of such programs reached eight, and by 
2006, 10. Then the new economic crisis decreased the number of programs to 
eight, and in 2014 the government financed only five of them. Appendix 4 
assembles all programs implemented in the 2000s and 2010s.
 The federal programs have not become a dominant mechanism for budget 
spending in Russia. By 2010, only 8 percent of all federal budget expenditures 
were allocated through them. The federal government applied the federal pro-
grams as a financial tool that allowed it to plan (but not guarantee) the distribu-
tion of money to realize a project that lasts over several years. However, 
consistent implementation of such a plan contradicted the dominant ideology of 
the federal budget’s formation in the 1990s and the 2000s, which was based on 
annual planning of income and expenses and did not demand accurate imple-
mentation of either mid- term or long- term plans and strategies. Thus, federal 
programs have been considered a financial instrument of project management, 
but not a framework for strategic planning of governmental action in a long- term 
perspective. To overcome this tendency, in 2010, the government established a 
mechanism for governmental programs (gosudarstvennye programmy) in the 
form of official documents that contained the main goals of the government’s 
activity and tasks intended to reach these goals. Since then, the government has 
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Figure 3.3 The number of federal programs in the 2000s and 2010s.
Source: Russia’s federal programs (http://fcp.economy.gov.ru).
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implemented 45 governmental programs, grouped into five program blocks: 
“New Quality of Life,” “Innovative Development and Modernization of 
Economy,” “Securing National Defense,” “Balanced Regional Development,” 
and “Effective Government.” Together the programs cover around 70 percent of 
the federal budget’s expenditures and include all federal programs that received 
the status of subprograms of the governmental programs. Appendix 4 contains 
lists of the governmental programs and subprograms included in the Balanced 
Regional Development set.
 All of the programs designed and implemented since the beginning of the 
2000s can be divided into four groups.
 The first one assembles programs intended to provide financial support for the 
nationally significant regions. Two of these federal programs are meant to 
allocate federal funds to the economy of the Chechen Republic, and others to 
Kaliningrad Oblast, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the Republic of Ingushetia, Sakha-
lin Oblast, and Crimea.
 The programs devoted to the Chechen Republic, Kaliningrad Oblast, Ingush-
etia, the Kuril Islands, and Crimea have been motivated by both socio- economic 
and political—even geopolitical—factors. All these regions perform crucial 
political roles: the Chechen Republic and Ingushetia are genuine sources of ter-
rorist threats, Kaliningrad Oblast is the Russian exclave within the European 
Union, the Kuril Islands’ territory is claimed by Japan, and Crimea received its 
own federal program after Russia annexed its territory in 2014.
 The first program of support for the Chechen Republic was an atypical 
example amidst such a group of programs. Its title—“Recovery of the Economic 
and Social Spheres in the Republic of Chechnya (2002 and thereafter)”— 
contradicted the rules for composing federal programs since it did not indicate a 
time limit for federal financing. It could be implemented for as long as the 
federal government wanted. At the same time, at the point when the program 
launched, no one knew the potential scale of the total sum of federal finances. 
Every year, the amount of funding was agreed through a process of intergovern-
mental negotiations. Overall, around 53 billion rubles were spent from the 
federal budget through this program (Tokareva and Silin, 2016).
 The program ended in 2007, but in 2008 a new one was launched. It covered 
the period from 2008 to 2012 and allocated 98 billion rubles to the republic’s 
economy (Tokareva and Silin, 2016). In 2013, the federal government stopped 
financing Chechen developmental projects through the federal program. This 
fact was presented by Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic since 
2007, as evidence of his government’s economic success. However, specific 
forms of financing of the republic from the federal budget continued. For 
example, at the beginning of 2016, Chechnya achieved 14 percent growth in 
federal transfers in spite of the fact that the rest of the regions suffered a 12 
percent decrease (Malysheva, 2016). At the end of 2016, Kadyrov fiercely 
claimed that it was unacceptable to cut federal financial aid for the republic as it 
attempted to recover after the war (Bondarenko, 2016). As a result, Chechnya, 
along with Crimea and Sevastopol, is to receive significant additional subsidies 
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in 2017 (Bocharova, 2016). Finally, the federal program “Russia’s South” and 
the governmental program for development of the North Caucasus continue to 
be in force. Within the framework of these instruments, Chechnya retains first 
place among the beneficiaries of federal financial aid.
 The federal programs aimed at social and economic development of Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan illustrate how changes in regions’ political status impact on 
the additional federal transfers they receive. It is undoubted that at the beginning 
of the 2000s these two regions were among Russia’s economic leaders. At the 
same time, during the five years of the programs’ implementation, Tatarstan 
received over 61.5 billion rubles, while Bashkortostan received over 34 billion 
rubles during the three years when its respective federal program was in effect.
 The specific pattern of intergovernmental relations between the federal center 
and these two republics is rooted in the political process of the 1990s, when the 
latter acted as leaders of regional movements seeking the highest level of 
regional autonomy. The federal government had no options for controlling the 
regional elites and was forced to buy their political loyalty. At that time, Tatar-
stan and Bashkortostan received the unique right not to transfer taxes collected 
within their territories to the federal budget. This practice continued until the end 
of the 1990s, when Yevgeny Primakov’s and Vladimir Putin’s governments 
imposed stricter tax and budget policies.
 But federal programs became a new form of financial support of the repub-
lics’ loyalty. The descriptions of both programs stated that the volumes of 
federal investments allocated to the programs’ frameworks should be corrected 
annually in accordance with the volumes of taxes that the republics transferred 
to the federal budget. That is, the programs were considered to be compensa-
tion for the republics’ participation in standard financial intergovernmental 
relations.
 In 2001–2003, when these programs appeared, the process of centralization 
of intergovernmental relations was in its earliest stages, and the regional leaders 
met it with hostility. The federal government sought to enlist Mintimer 
Shaimiev’s and Murtaza Rakhimov’s support. Both programs were terminated in 
2006, soon after gubernatorial elections were eliminated: the campaign for 
administrative centralization established a system of complete subordination of 
regional governments to the federal center, and consequently the center was able 
to control the regional elites.
 However, the fact of the political dependence of regions on the federal center 
did not put an end to the standard process of lobbying that was (and continues to 
be) a feature of any political system. An illustrative case here is the emergence 
of the federal program “Development of the Republic of Karelia during the 
period until 2020,” which granted that region financial support alongside such 
border regions as Kaliningrad Oblast, the Republic of Ingushetia, Sakhalin 
Oblast, and Crimea.
 Unlike these geopolitically significant regions, Karelia did not possess any 
particularities that would force the center to support it in line with the others. 
The program was a result of individual negotiations between the representatives 
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of the republican and federal elites. In 2020, Karelia will celebrate its 
 anniversary—100 years since the republic was established. The special commis-
sion responsible for preparing for this date is headed by Nikolai Patrushev, a 
former director of the Federal Security Service and current Secretary of the 
Security Council, who worked in Karelia in the early 1990s. As a result, the 
republic was able to build a sufficiently strong coalition to persuade the federal 
government to create a new federal program. But the process of its implementation 
in 2016 and 2017 demonstrates the weakness of seeking federal financial support 
without being able to provide serious arguments to force the central government to 
implement it. Despite the fact that the republic is to receive three billion rubles 
between 2016 and 2020, in 2016 only 200 million rubles were transferred from the 
federal budget, and 170 million are to be allocated in 2017 (Glava, 2016).
 The second group of programs is devoted not to whole regions but to their 
specific territories. By contrast to the 1990s, when a number of federal programs 
were devoted to the development of cities and parts of regions, in the 2000s and 
the 2010s only two such programs have been implemented—in Sochi and in the 
Kuril Islands.
 The federal program “Development of Sochi as a Mountain and Climate 
Resort (2006–2014)” followed a proposal by Alexander Tkachev, then governor 
of Krasnodar Krai, to establish a world- class resort zone in the krai. The idea of 
competing for the right to hold the 2014 Winter Olympics was part of the 
regional government’s strategy, and the program became the main instrument for 
financing the Olympic project. In the period from 2006 to 2014, 185 billion 
rubles were to be spent from the federal budget. But in 2007, the Audit Chamber 
identified many serious violations in how the investments were being spent, as 
well as extremely poor performance at achieving the program’s goals. As a 
result, the federal government terminated the program, and further financing of 
the Olympic Games in Sochi was implemented through other mechanisms with 
the direct participation of federal agencies.
 Meanwhile, the program of support for the Kuril Islands is similar to the 
program for Kaliningrad Oblast. The islands are a territory with low levels of 
economic development and poor living conditions. At the same time, they are 
the object of a territorial dispute between Russia and Japan. As such, because it 
contains this politically sensitive area, the Sakhalin Oblast is a recipient of 
federal financial support.
 The third group of programs includes projects that cover several regions simul-
taneously. The programs for the development of the Far East and the North Cauca-
sian regions, as well as the program aimed at increasing the effectiveness of 
regional and local finances, are examples of such instruments. The establishment 
of these programs can be interpreted as a trick aimed at introducing as many 
regions as possible to the process of receiving this segment of funds even as the 
total number of “territorial” programs was reduced at the beginning of the 2000s. 
At the same time, it is obvious that the selection of regions eligible for these funds 
is politically based as well. The program devoted to the Far East—the only one to 
have been preserved since the 1990s—targets a sparsely populated area located far 
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from the center of Russia. Meanwhile, in accordance with the “Russia’s South” 
program, the federal government invests significant financial resources in the eco-
nomic development of the North Caucasus.
 Finally, the fourth group of programs does not directly concern regional or 
even territorial development. It includes the projects to replace the Black Sea 
Fleet (a program in effect before 2014, when Crimea was annexed by Russia), to 
resettle “Russia’s compatriots,” and to support the Russian Nenets people.
 Overall, the analysis of all programs allows us to draw the following important 
conclusions on the specifics of federal decision- making in the sphere of the realiza-
tion of federal and governmental programs. The reduction in the total number of 
territorially oriented programs in favor of programs devoted to the development of 
specific industrial sectors or solving country- level problems demonstrates the gov-
ernment’s transition to a spatially blind approach. However, at the beginning of the 
2000s, the federal center could not ignore the political dimension of intergovern-
mental relations. Therefore, the remaining regionally based programs aim to 
achieve political (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya) and geopolitical (the border 
regions, the Far East, and the North Caucasus) goals. Due to the policy of centrali-
zation and the need to ensure the center’s political control over regional elites, polit-
ical motivations gave way to geopolitical ones, which rose in significance during 
the 2010s. The introduction of governmental programs maintained this tendency.
Special economic zones
The special economic zones laid the foundations for forming new points of 
growth that could accelerate the economic development of both a given region 
and the whole country. Initially, the reformers intended to establish two types of 
such zones—industrial and innovation. The industrial zones were to be located 
in Russia’s biggest industrial centers, which had significant potential for devel-
opment and were experiencing a lack of resources, while the innovation zones 
were designed to support existing technological centers, including Novosibirsk, 
Tomsk, and Moscow (Fedotova, 2005).
 Yet in the process of discussion of the law on special economic zones in 
2005, regional governments, members of the State Duma, and representatives of 
other federal ministries expressed their dissent against the Ministry of Economic 
Development’s approach (Granik, 2005). Regional lobbyists insisted on making 
the system of establishment and management of the zones more decentralized 
and attractive for different types of investors, even those prepared to contribute 
comparatively insignificant funds to developmental projects. In turn, representa-
tives of different federal ministries argued against the stipulation that only the 
mentioned type of zones could be created. For example, the Ministry of Com-
munications demanded the creation of a specific type of zone that would be 
appropriate for the telecommunication industry.
 Minister Gref ’s administrative capacity in 2005 was enough to insulate this 
decision from the influence of interest groups and to push the law, including its 
initial strict principles for the mechanism’s functioning, through the government 
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and the parliament. But as early as 2006, the government declared the creation 
of tourist and recreational zones, and, in 2007, port zones. These decisions were 
the result of pressure from a coalition of parliamentarians and “sectoral” minis-
tries. The ideology of the new zones’ creators was significantly different from 
Gref ’s initial idea. Instead of development of points of growth for the country’s 
economy, the new zones were intended to solve current problems in two sectors—
tourism and transportation.
 It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and 
the special governmental agency responsible for the management of the zones 
firmly supported the new initiatives, although the Ministry of Finance continued 
to demand compliance with the original principle of highly selective funding. 
But that demand failed. As a result, by 2013, 31 new zones (in addition to the 
two “old” ones) had been established—six industrial, five innovation, three port, 
and 17 tourist. The industrial and innovation zones were placed in regions char-
acterized by a relatively high level of socio- economic development: the Moscow 
Oblast, Lipetsk and Tomsk oblasts, the Republic of Tatarstan, and St Petersburg. 
The tourist zones were located in the less prosperous regions: the Stavropol and 
Altai Krais, the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Buryatia, and several repub-
lics of the North Caucasus. In 2016, the federal government assessed the effec-
tiveness of the zones and found out that some of them did not have serious 
investors to demonstrate the needed economic results. As such, six tourist zones 
and two port zones were closed.
 Meanwhile, another federal agency, the Ministry for the Development of the 
Russian Far East, proposed a new mechanism of territorial development—terri-
tories of advanced development (TORs, territorii operezhauschego razvitiia). In 
general, TORs are similar to the special economic zones: they are territories that 
provide their residents with special conditions for doing business. But unlike the 
zones, the TORs received unprecedented rights. The ministry was able to defend 
the right not to divide the TORs into types and, consequently, to attract different 
kinds of businesses, including the most profitable for each new territory. Addi-
tionally, the TORs’ conditions were more attractive to investors. They included 
the reduction of several tax rates (property tax, land tax, mining tax, and profit 
tax), a duty- free regime for foreign products, and the absence of limitations on 
use of foreign labor by resident companies.
 Initially, the TORs were designed exclusively as a mechanism for the devel-
opment of the regions in the Russian Far East, which suffered from a lack of 
investment and labor. But quite soon the president made the decision to extend 
the mechanism to the Russian monotowns that had been suffering from some of 
the gravest problems of social well- being since the 2008 economic crisis. As a 
result, in 2015 nine TORs appeared in Khabarovsk, Primorsky and Kamchatka 
krais, the Republic of Sakha, the Chukotka Autonomous District, and Amur 
Oblast, and in 2016, 16 more TORs were created in various parts of Russia.
 While special economic zones and territories of advanced development are 
the most significant examples, in recent years the government has created many 
instruments aimed at accelerated development of the territorial economy, including 
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innovation- focused territorial clusters, industrial parks, agricultural parks, technolo-
gical parks, high- tech industrial parks, tourist parks, zones of territorial develop-
ment, and special economic zones established by regional governments. Their 
emergence and growing quantity are an effect of the strategy employed by the bur-
eaucracy at all levels of government, intended to raise additional budgetary funds. 
Most have enjoyed the financial support of the federal or regional budgets, but have 
not demonstrated significant results. During its discussion of special economic 
zones, the Audit Chamber claimed that the number of such policy tools is excessive 
and provides little benefit for either the nation or the regions (Audit, 2016).
The Investment Fund of the Russian Federation
A similar story can be told about the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation, 
another idea from the reform- driven team headed by German Gref. The govern-
ment established the fund in 2006 with the declared goal of co- financing large 
investment projects that would contribute to the development of the country as a 
whole within the sphere of infrastructure development. Public money was to 
complement the investments of private companies, which would amount to at 
least 25 percent of the common project costs.
 Initially, the Investment Fund, like the special economic zones, was designed as 
a spatially blind mechanism. But as early as 2007, when German Gref left his posi-
tion in the government, the fund was placed under the authority of the Ministry of 
Regional Development. Dmitry Kozak, then minister of regional development, 
stated that financial support would be allocated to regional developmental projects. 
Consequently, in addition to nation- wide investment projects (those with a 
minimal investment of five billion rubles per project), opportunities for funding 
would also be given to regional projects (with a minimal investment of 500 million 
rubles). According to the new rules, every region could seek to receive financing 
within the limits of annually redistributed quotas, calculated with a special formula 
designed by the ministry. This money was targeted at regions that lacked resources 
but could offer promising developmental ideas.
 A particularity of the system of distribution of the funds was the complete 
control of the federal government over decision- making. Until 2006, the MERT 
was the dominant actor in this area, but since 2007 it has been replaced by the 
Ministry of Regional Development.
 It is noteworthy that the two commissions that made the decisions—the Min-
istry of Regional Development’s Investment Commission, responsible for pre-
liminary estimates of projects, and the Government Commission that made the 
final decision—included neither experts in territorial development nor represent-
atives of the regions. As a result, the system of fund allocation was insufficiently 
transparent, although, according to the documents, it was very technocratic.
 Thus, a tool designed to support and accelerate development beyond the 
boundaries of the capitals, and to provide potential points of growth with unpre-
cedented public and private investments, was transformed into a mechanism of 
support for regional projects once more. To identify the differences between the 
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initial and subsequent approaches to spending the Investment Fund’s resources, 
one need only look at the projects supported by the government. The list of 
national projects includes 11 programs aimed at the development of transporta-
tion infrastructure in different parts of the country (a sea port in St Petersburg, 
development of the Volga–Baltic Waterway, construction of railways in territ-
ories that are difficult to access, etc.). Meanwhile, the list of 39 regional projects 
includes an industrial park in Tatarstan, wastewater treatment plants in Bashkor-
tostan and Karelia, a plant for the production of glass containers in Tula Oblast, 
a logistics complex in Voronezh Oblast, and many others. Thus, the Investment 
Fund, an instrument of support for national economic projects, was transformed 
into a means of assistance for regional economies.
 The three cases presented above demonstrate the federal government’s limita-
tions in introducing spatially blind mechanisms for territorial development. The 
reasons for this outcome lie in the dominance of bureaucratic interests, combined 
with the prevalent influence of the federal center’s political and geopolitical 
interests.
 The instruments’ initial ideology contradicted the interests of the govern-
mental bureaucracy at both federal and regional levels. Federal officials sought 
to diversify the channels for spending of budgetary funds so as to achieve the 
goals of their ministries. The case of the Ministry of Communications’ request to 
create special economic zones for telecommunication companies, and the sub-
sequent creation of the port and tourist zones, as well as the Ministry for the 
Development of the Russian Far East’s successful initiative of establishing territ-
ories of advanced development, are good examples of the strategic behavior of 
federal bureaucrats with the aim of increasing their own resource capacities 
through controlling the tools of territorial development.
 In its turn, the regional bureaucracy does not agree with the federal govern-
ment ignoring the interests of regional development, and actively works to 
change the instruments’ ideology from spatially blind to regionally based. As a 
result, by enlisting the support of the Ministry of Regional Development, 
regional governments have gained access to financial support for regional pro-
jects from the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation.
 These results come as no surprise to those who understand the revolutionary 
nature of German Gref ’s policy measures, as the proposals ignored the funda-
mental interests of both the “sectoral” federal ministers and the governors. But 
such radical policy changes can be made only with the support of dominant 
political actors. In the 2000s and 2010s, Vladimir Putin has been such an actor, 
and has been able to achieve several reforms while protecting the reformers and 
their initiatives (Gel’man and Starodubtsev, 2016). However, the economic 
dimension of territorial development has never been on the shortlist for the pres-
idential agenda. Hence, federal and regional bureaucrats use all available oppor-
tunities to redirect budgetary funds to achieving their current bureaucratic tasks 
instead of allocating them to long- term projects with delayed effects.
 Another result of this research indicates a change in the non- economic moti-
vations of the distribution of long- term budgetary funds. While in the 2000s the 
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federal government had to take into account the need for the political loyalty of 
the regional elites and electorates to the incumbents at the federal level, in the 
2010s those motives have been replaced by the geopolitical significance of par-
ticular territories.
Note
1 The number of subnational units in Russia has been changing in the 2000s and 2010s. 
Before 2005, the country consisted of 89 regions, since 2005 of 88, since 2007 of 85, 
and since 2008 of 83. After the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and incorporation 
of this territory into Russia the number of subnational units became 85. The Chechen 
Republic and all autonomous districts were excluded from the sample.
References
Audit (2016) Za 10 let OEZ Tak I Ne Stali Deystvennym Instrumentom Podderzhki 
Ekonomiki (Over 10 Years the OEZ Has Not Become an Effective Tool for Supporting 
the Economy), Audit.gov.ru. Available at: http://audit.gov.ru/press_center/news/26369 
(accessed: February 14, 2017).
Bocharova, S. (2016) Pravitel’stvo Opredelilo Ob’em Dotatsii Chechne I Krymu Na 2017 
God (The Government Has Determined the Volume of Subsidies to Chechnya and 
Crimea for 2017), RBC.ru. Available at: www.rbc.ru/economics/05/12/2016/5844a242
9a79470dbb30cd1f (accessed: January 4, 2017).
Bondarenko, M. (2016) Kadyrov Vystupil Protiv Planov Minfina Urezat’ Byudzhet 
Chechni (Kadyrov Has Spoken Against the Ministry of Finance’s Plans to Cut Chechn-
ya’s Budget), RBC.ru. Available at: www.rbc.ru/economics/01/11/2016/5817b6ce9a79
4719a7473be8 (accessed: January 4, 2017).
Chernyshov, S. (2013) “Proshche Dostroit’, Сhem Zakopat” (It is easier to finish than dig 
in), Expert Online. Available at: http://expert.ru/siberia/2013/42/prosche- dostroit-
chem- zakopat/ (accessed: February 14, 2017).
Fedotova, I. (2005) “Osobye Ekonomicheskie Zony Ne Stanut ‘Vnutrennimi Offshorami’ 
(Special Economic Zones Will Not Become “Internal Offshores”), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
July 27. Available at: https://rg.ru/2005/07/27/ekonom- zony.html (accessed: July 13, 2016).
Gel’man, V., and Starodubtsev, A. (2016) “Opportunities and constraints of authoritarian 
modernisation: Russian policy reforms in the 2000s,” Europe- Asia Studies, 68(1), 
pp. 97–117.
Glava (2016). Glava Karelii Oboznachil Osnovnyye Uspekhi I Trudnosti Realizatsii 
Federal’noi Tselevoy Programmy Razvitiya Karelii (The Head of Karelia Has Outlined 
the Main Successes and Difficulties in Implementing the Federal Program for the 
Development of Karelia), Kareliya Ofitsial’naya (Official Karelia). Available at: www.
gov.karelia.ru/gov/News/2016/11/1129_43.html (accessed: January 5, 2017).
Granik, I. (2005) “MERT i Minsvyazi Stolknulis’ Na Zone” (The MERT and the Minis-
try of Communications collided in the Zone), Kommersant, 5, p. 15. Available at: 
http://kommersant.ru/doc/580108 (accessed: February 15, 2017).
Hagen, J. von (2008) “Political economy of fiscal institutions,” in Weingast, B. R., and 
Wittman, D. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 464–478.
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) “Political parties and macroeconomic policy,” Amer ican Political 
Science Review, 71(4), pp. 1467–1487.
Who, how, when, and how much?  123
Malysheva, E. (2016) Krym i Chechnya Vyzhivayut Na Dotatsiyakh (Crimea and Chech-
nya are Surviving on Subsidies), Gazeta.ru. Available at: www.gazeta.ru/business/ 
2016/10/12/10247693.shtml (accessed: January 4, 2017).
Marques, I. I., Nazrullaeva, E., and Yakovlev, A. (2016) “Substituting distribution for 
growth: the political logic of intergovernmental transfers in the Russian federation,” 
Economics & Politics, 28(1), pp. 23–54.
McCubbins, M. D., and Schwartz, T. (1984) “Congressional oversight overlooked: police 
patrols versus fire alarms,” Amer ican Journal of Political Science, 28(1), pp. 165–179.
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., and Weingast, B. R. (1989) “Structure and process, pol-
itics and policy: administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies,” 
Virginia Law Review, 75, pp. 431–482.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975) “The Political Business Cycle,” Review of Economic Studies, 
42(2), pp. 169–190.
Popov, V. (2004) “Fiscal federalism in Russia: rules versus electoral politics,” Com-
parative Economic Studies, 46(4), pp. 515–541.
Poryadok (1995) Poryadok Razrabotki I Realizatsii Federal’nykh Tselevykh Pro-
gramm I Mezhgosudarstvennykh Tselevykh Programm, V Osushchestvlenii Koto-
rykh Uchastvuyet Rossiyskaya Federatsiya (The Procedure for the Development 
and Implementation of Federal Programs and Interstate Programs in Which the 
Russian Federation Participates), Consultant.ru. Available at: www.consultant.ru/
document/cons_doc_LAW_7120/0afbd40f2155403cfd3c4df4668b5c74a2d9c6c4/ 
(accessed: June 19, 2017).
Qian, Y., and Roland, G. (1998) “Federalism and the soft budget constraint,” The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 88(5), pp. 1143–1162.
Razvorot Radio Show (2011) Echo MSK Online. Available at: http://echo.msk.ru/ 
programs/razvorot- morning/822833-echo/ (accessed: August 9, 2016).
Rodden, J., Eskeland, G. S., and Litvack, J. I. (2003) Fiscal Decentralization and the 
Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, MIT Press. Available at: www.google.com/
books?hl=ru&lr=&id=h6DWIXi3CdYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=fiscal+decentralization+ 
and+the+challenge+of+hard+budget+constraints&ots=RfTXeyMoXL&sig=tPmkQgw
uRViykhRZEsUU8WI1aXk (accessed: August 14, 2016).
Schedler, A. (2013) The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral 
Authoritarianism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sharafutdinova, G. (2010) “Subnational governance in Russia: how Putin changed the 
contract with his agents and the problems it created for Medvedev,” Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism, 40(4), pp. 672–696. doi: 10.1093/publius/pjp036.
Sharafutdinova, G., and Turovsky, R. (2016) “The politics of federal transfers in Putin’s 
Russia: regional competition, lobbying, and federal priorities,” Post- Soviet Affairs, 
33(2), pp. 1–15.
Tabellini, G. (2000) Constitutional Determinants of Government Spending, CESifo 
Working Paper No. 265. Available at: http://econpapers.repec.org/scripts/redir.
pf?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cesifo- group.de%2Fportal%2Fpage%2Fportal%2FDocBas
e_Content%2FWP%2FWP-CESifo_Working_Papers%2Fwp-cesifo- 2000%2Fwp-
cesifo- 2000-03%2Fcesifo_wp265.pdf;h=repec:ces:ceswps:_265 (accessed September 29, 
2017).
Tokareva, V., and Silin, N. (2016) Ramzan Sberezhet. Pochemu Finansirovaniye Chechni 
Prodolzhit Rasti (Ramzan Will Save. Why Financing of Chechnya Will Continue to 
Grow), Lenta.ru. Available at: https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/12/08/priemlemo/ (accessed: 
January 2, 2017).
124  Who, how, when, and how much?
Treisman, D. (1996) “The politics of intergovernmental transfers in post- Soviet Russia,” 
British Journal of Political Science, 26(3), pp. 299–335.
Treisman, D. (1998) “Fiscal redistribution in a fragile federation: Moscow and the regions 
in 1994,” British Journal of Political Science, 28(1), pp. 185–222.
Treisman, D. (2001) After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in 
Russia. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Zubarevich, N. (2011) “Chetyre Rossii” (Four Russias), Vedomosti.ru, December 30. 
Available at: www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2011/12/30/chetyre_rossii (accessed: 
June 14, 2017).
Zubarevich, N. (2016) Chetyre Rossii i Novaya Politicheskaya Real’nost’ (Four Russias 
and New Political Reality), Polit.ru. Available at: http://polit.ru/article/2016/01/17/
four_russians/ (accessed: June 14, 2017).
4 Decentralize but not federalize
Coordination, subordination, and 
control in Russian territorial 
governance
In 2012, the Russian Ministry of Healthcare changed the model for procurement 
of medicines for HIV/AIDS patients. Before, the ministry had arranged a single 
tender for buying all needed medicines and then redistributed them among the 
Russian regions. During 2012, the process of procurement was decentralized. 
Every regional government received federal funds and organized its own tender 
to provide medicines for the regional inhabitants.
 This decision was made due to strong pressure from regional authorities, who 
insisted that centralized procurements led to errors in the distribution of medica-
tions—regions received the wrong medicines, or fewer sets than they needed. 
But the decentralization created other problems. A range of tenders set different 
prices for the same medications in various regions. As a result, some regional 
governments had to buy more expensive medications and consequently again 
faced a lack of money and medicines.
 The media reported that thousands of HIV- positive people across the country 
could not receive their pills. Moreover, the lack of finances led to a practice 
where HIV/AIDS centers refused to serve people who had temporary residence 
in a region even though they were Russian citizens. Finally, the decentralization 
revealed the fact that many regional authorities did not have well- qualified spe-
cialists to administrate tenders in accordance with Russian legislation. Con-
sequently, all formal procedures in these regions were implemented half a year 
late, depriving patients of essential drugs.
 As of 2017, the ministry has implemented another reform—it has centralized 
the procurement of drugs for HIV/AIDS patients and created a unified register of 
HIV- positive citizens of Russia. These measures are to lead to significant savings 
in public funds and to solving the problem of people who cannot obtain therapy 
due to living outside the region of their official registration. But the transition 
period revealed new problems. Because of the lateness of the centralized 
procurement, the medicines reached the regions only in April 2017, whereas 
several regions experienced an acute deficit of the drugs in January–March 
(Pereboi, 2017).
 This story is an example of how the system of intergovernmental relations in 
Russia functions at the level of current public administration. It demonstrates 
how the federal center attempted to find the best level for the realization of a 
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function; it also reveals problems in public administration that appeared during 
the processes of centralization and decentralization, or as their effects. It chal-
lenges the effectiveness of control mechanisms in a government system that is 
called upon to warn of all kinds of negative outcomes in advance.
 This chapter is devoted to the current state of the power vertical, i.e., the part 
of the system of public administration responsible for relations between the 
federal and regional tiers of government. The chapter will describe its form, and 
explain the causes of its formation and its effects in different spheres of public 
policy.
The Russian Constitution and false decentralizations
In 2001, after removing acting regional political leaders from the Council of the 
Federation and strengthening presidential control over the regional authorities, 
Vladimir Putin sought to put in place a distribution of competences and respons-
ibilities among all levels of government. To do this, a special commission was 
established, which has now existed for more than ten years. During this period, 
its name changed repeatedly—from “on the distribution of responsibilities” to 
“on the regulation of federal relations,” and “on the development of federal rela-
tions.” However, to the mass media and observers, from the very beginning, it 
has been “Kozak’s Commission,” named after Dmitry Kozak, its permanent 
chair and one of Vladimir Putin’s confidants.1
 Mintimer Shaimiev, former president of the Republic of Tatarstan, described 
the results of the commission’s activity in the following way:
In the past, we had been very seriously involved in delimiting responsibil-
ities. In 2002, the Commission […] prepared a package of legislative pro-
posals. But unfortunately, nearly ten years later, these rules have turned out 
to be blurred. This is because federal ministries have not wanted to give 
their responsibilities away, even though we agreed to do it while working on 
the Commission. Instead of a real delegation of sets of responsibilities, 
many federal agencies have appeared in the regions, and now they have 
become a real headache for the center.
(Shaimiev, 2011)
By 2017, the system of public administration had become even more centralized 
and clumsy. At least two waves of distribution of responsibilities, known as 
decentralizations, led by “Kozak’s Commission” in the 2000s and 2010s para-
doxically reduced the level of autonomy of the subnational units in Russia. Even 
when gubernatorial elections were restored in the majority of regions, the situ-
ation did not change significantly.
 In this section, my core argument is that the causes of this situation are not 
limited to the tactical behavior of federal elites interested in preserving central-
ized control over their regional counterparts. In addition to this important 
factor, I would like to stress that the causes must be found in the system of 
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intergovernmental relations that was written into the Russian Constitution in 
1993 and has been in effect until the present time.
 The theoretic basis for my analysis was developed by Tulia Falleti in her 
comprehensive investigation of the processes of decentralization in Latin Amer-
ican countries (Falleti, 2005, 2010). She proved that decentralization did not 
necessarily lead to increasing subnational authorities’ autonomy.
 According to Falleti, decentralization is “a process,” “the set of policies, 
electoral reforms, or constitutional reforms that transfer responsibilities, 
resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of government” (Falleti, 
2010: 34). Depending on what is being transferred, decentralization may include 
administrative aspects of intergovernmental relations (when responsibilities are 
delegated), fiscal aspects (where the regional level receives additional sources of 
subnational revenue), or political ones (the devolution of “political authority to 
subnational actors” and opening up “new spaces for the representation of subna-
tional polities” (Falleti, 2010: 38)).
 Each of these leads to different effects on the level of subnational autonomy: 
if political decentralization increases autonomy, then the effects of the other two 
types may vary. This conclusion is based on the consideration that delegation of 
responsibilities (administrative decentralization) without reliable sources of their 
financing (fiscal decentralization) makes regional actors very dependent on the 
central authorities, which control the volume of financial support and, con-
sequently, the effectiveness of the regional governments’ activity. Strengthening 
the fiscal power of the subnational level without political decentralization 
increases regions’ autonomy insignificantly: the subnational authorities have 
more resources with which to realize their preferred policies, but only if those 
correspond with the national government’s will.
 Falleti distinguishes between decentralization initiated by the center (I will 
call this “top- down decentralization”) and decentralization with the initial domi-
nation of the subnational level (“bottom- up decentralization”). It is clear that, 
within the framework of top- down decentralization, national policy- makers will 
seek to implement the delegation of administrative responsibilities and not go 
further down the path of decentralization, while bottom- up decentralization will 
begin with devolution of political power.
 At the same time, decentralization is not a specific policy measure that is real-
ized by one of two actors, the center or the regions; it is a process where delega-
tion of responsibilities or authority is able to provoke a reaction from the other 
party in intergovernmental relations. Falleti highlights two possible types of such 
feedback—self- reinforcement by an active actor, and the reaction of an actor 
unsatisfied with the pattern followed by the process. In light of this, Table 4.1 
demonstrates the paths and effects of decentralization scrutinized by Falleti.
 Thus, there are several important starting points that can be useful in ana-
lyzing the causes of intergovernmental relations’ outcomes. The specifics of 
the intergovernmental balance of power are a result of initial conditions modi-
fied by the reactions of both sides in intergovernmental relations during the 
process of reform. At the same time, I will include in this model the institutional 
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frameworks that I believe also contribute to the results of this intergovernmental 
interplay.
 At the beginning of the 2000s, such institutional frameworks were established 
by the Russian Constitution, which initially formed an extremely centralized ter-
ritorial system.
 There are three articles in the constitution that stipulate the two levels of gov-
ernmental responsibility. Article 71 describes the Russian Federation’s spheres of 
competence, i.e., the responsibilities of the federal authorities (see Appendix 5). 
This list includes issues of defense and security, foreign policy and administration 
of justice, as well as some other strategically important policies—nuclear energy, 
transport infrastructure, space activity, etc. At the same time, paragraph “e” (“f ” in 
the English version) states that the federal center is allowed to establish “founda-
tions of federal policy and federal programs in the spheres of state, economic, 
environmental, social, cultural and ethnic development of the Russian Federation.” 
It is obvious that this list covers most of the categories of public administration. So 
what issues can be left in the hands of subnational governments?
 Article 72 involves so- called spheres of shared responsibilities of the federal 
center and subnational units. Within the Russian legal context, “shared respons-
ibilities” mean that the federal center is able to establish legal frameworks within 
which the regional governments then make their own decisions (Lazareva, 
2009). If the center does not regulate a sphere, the subnational level is allowed 
free rein within it in accordance with each region’s laws. But as soon as the fed-
eration establishes its own norms within that sphere, the regions are obliged to 
bring their legislation in line with the federal. Thus the federal center de facto 
maintains a significant degree of control over these spheres of public 
administration.
 Finally, Article 73 is devoted to the spheres of exclusive responsibility of the 
subnational units. It stipulates:
Beyond the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the responsibilities of 
the Russian Federation within the frameworks of spheres of shared respons-
ibility of the Russian Federation and the subnational units of the Russian 
Federation, the subnational units of the Russian Federation possess full gov-
ernmental power.
(Constitution, 1993)
 Such a pattern of distribution of responsibilities within a federal state is not 
unique, although it is not encountered in classic federal states. For example, in the 
USA, the states implement a governmental responsibility if it is not included in 
the list of Congress’s responsibilities. A similar institutional model can be found in 
the constitutions of Argentina, Australia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Canada’s 
constitutional acts present two lists—the exclusive legislative competences of the 
 federation and the exclusive legislative competences of the provinces. Finally, the 
Belgian Constitution lists the responsibilities of subnational units, while the federal 
government controls all other spheres of public administration. It is clear that, in 
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these examples of federal constitutions, the subnational level has either a fixed list 
of responsibilities guaranteed by the law or a short list of functions that may not be 
implemented by the regional governments—and all other functions belong 
to them.
 At the same time, there exist models closer to the Russian principle of distri-
bution of powers. The most similar example is Germany. Its basic law includes 
11 spheres of federal responsibility and 23 spheres of so- called competitive 
responsibility. The Constitution of Austria has three lists of responsibilities—
those implemented by the federation; those which are regulated by the federa-
tion, but implemented at the subnational level; and those regulated by the 
federation, but where the regional governments are able to specify the applica-
tion of federal laws to regional particularities. By default, all other responsibil-
ities remain at the subnational and local levels. In a similar fashion, the Brazilian 
Constitution delimits the responsibilities of the union, the shared responsibilities 
of the union and regional governments, and the spheres where the union is 
allowed to establish common legal frameworks and the units are able to specify 
their application in light of particular territorial features.
 All three countries mentioned are known as centralized federations. Austria is 
often analyzed as a country with a unitary society but a federal style of govern-
ment, “a federation without federalism” (Erk, 2004). The authors of the Brazilian 
Constitution dealt with many years of struggle between the union and strong 
regional elites (Zakharov, 2016). The German Constitution asserted a system of 
centralized policy- making and decentralized policy implementation (Benz, 1999).
 The Russian case perfectly demonstrates how such a model of intergovern-
mental relations works. On the one hand, despite the many spheres of responsib-
ility controlled by the central government, the regional authorities have found 
areas where they can express their power. Administration of subnational units’ 
property, formation of regional budgets, management of the budget process 
(including distribution of their own budgetary funds), establishing rules for 
holding regional referendums, the ability to establish official governmental posi-
tions in addition to the existing federal list of bureaucratic positions, and the 
ability to change the name of a subnational unit—all these and certain other 
functions are performed by the subnational authorities.
 In the 1990s, due to the particularities of the political process described in 
Chapter 1, the federal center did not challenge the list of subnational compe-
tences, and even expanded it at the cost of federal responsibilities. But the 
experience of the 2000s demonstrates that even Article 73 does not enable 
the regional governments to realize their responsibilities independently from the 
federal center. At the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, the 
Russian Constitutional Court considered a set of cases initiated by the regional 
governments and assemblies regarding the interference of the federal center in 
public administration at the regional level, and the inclusion of governmental 
functions in regional or shared responsibilities. For instance, in 1998, the court 
confirmed the regional authorities’ right to regulate the process of holding local 
referendums. But in the same statement, the court added:
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This does not mean that the regional and local authorities’ discretion cannot 
be limited by the federal legislator in the interest of protecting the rights of 
the citizens in the sphere of local government and the basic principles of its 
organization in the Russian Federation.
(Postanovlenie, 1998)
Similarly, in 2004, the Constitutional Court agreed with the St Petersburg and 
Krasnoyarsk Krai authorities that subnational units have the right to manage 
their property and administer their budget processes autonomously. But, the 
court noted, the constitutional principle of unity of economic space demanded 
that the federal center should implement financial regulation that included budget 
issues (Postanovlenie, 2004).
 In the 1990s, Article 72 was also interpreted in favor of the subnational level of 
government. In the bilateral agreements that were the main institution for regulating 
intergovernmental relations in that period, most spheres of public administration 
were delegated to the subnational units. The center de facto voluntarily surrendered 
its ability to restrict the subnational units’ discretion in these spheres. But the center 
nevertheless possessed all the legal instruments necessary for controlling the 
responsibilities listed in Article 72, as was confirmed by the campaign to align the 
regional legislation with the federal in the beginning of the 2000s, when over two 
years the federal center radically changed legislation at the regional level.
 Thus, when the list of the federal center’s own regional responsibilities 
became extremely short and it was able to ensure its control over federal 
responsibilities, Article 72, the list of the shared responsibilities, became a space 
for changes in intergovernmental relations in the sphere of public administration. 
Vladimir Lysenko, deputy head of the State Committee on Issues of Federation 
and Nationalities (1992–1993) and member of the State Duma (1993–2003), 
remembered how the institution of shared responsibilities appeared in the 
Russian Constitution:
I remember that when we discussed the Federal Agreement in the Supreme 
Council, I acted categorically against Article 72 and said: “Let’s work for 
another week, but we will not leave 40 spheres of shared responsibility.” 
But people were in a hurry to sign it in the St George Hall in the Kremlin. 
That is why they unfortunately did not agree. And this “bomb” has been 
hanging over us for these last 10 years. Normally, we would have broken up 
Article 72, changed the Constitution, and there would be no problem.
(Stenogrammy, 2003)
There was no Article 72 in the Federal Agreement—Lysenko was referring to 
the articles on shared responsibilities, which had initially appeared in the agree-
ment and were inherited by the constitution. But the important point is that, even 
at the beginning of the 1990s, some of the participants in constitution- building 
had noted that the institution of shared competences created a high level of 
uncertainty in the system of intergovernmental relations.
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 Kozak’s Commission aimed to reduce the level of that uncertainty, to ensure 
a situation where every tier of government was responsible for the implementa-
tion of a clear list of functions. That task was part of the comprehensive admin-
istrative reform that involved the revision of the governmental agencies’ 
responsibilities and their reassignment so as to pursue the best implementation 
of every function. At the same time, Kozak’s proposals would have a significant 
political role—to overcome the effects of the uncontrolled decentralization of 
the 1990s.
 As a result of intensive discussion, in 2003, the commission proposed a 
package of amendments for the federal law “On the General Principles of the 
Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of the State 
Power of the Russian Federation’s Subnational Units” (Federal’nyi, 1999). This 
law was adopted in 1999 and became a symbol of the increasing power of the 
federal government, which could formulate rules for institution- building at the 
regional level and push them through the parliament. All subsequent changes in 
the political and administrative autonomy of the subnational units were realized 
through amendments to this law.
 The fact that the bill that specified the constitutional norms was proposed as 
an addition to the general federal law demonstrated that the president’s adminis-
tration considered the distribution of competences and responsibilities to be 
regulation of the functional obligations of authorities at different levels, part of 
the current administrative reform. In this respect, they did not see the distribu-
tion of responsibilities as having constitutional, state- building significance.
 The discussion of the bill in the State Duma was not a simple one for the 
Kremlin. Indeed, it was the first example of public debate on the principles of 
intergovernmental relations in Russia.
 The supporters of strong federalism focused on Kozak’s Commission’s sug-
gestion of empowering the federal government to introduce so- called external 
financial management where a regional government admitted to exceeding the 
regional debt threshold by over 30 percent of its own budget revenues. Vladimir 
Lysenko referred to the experience of the majority of federal states to demon-
strate that this norm did not correspond with the principles of the federal model. 
Dmitry Kozak replied that the institution of “external control” should be used if 
“the mechanism of the regional governments’ political responsibility for the 
implementation of budget policy does not work” (Stenogrammy, 2003).
 In turn, the supporters of strong central power opposed delegating many func-
tions to the regional level. The responsibilities fiercely discussed in the State Duma 
were the regions’ right to set the level of debt; social protection of families with 
children, orphans, and homeless children; targeted subsidies to the poor to cover 
communal bills; benefits for veterans; support of vocational schools; support for 
folk art and crafts; establishing norms of financing educational organizations in the 
regions; financial support for primary and secondary schools; financial support for 
agricultural production and housing utilities; and others.
 Finally, one of the main points of disagreement between Kozak’s Commis-
sion and the parliamentary opposition arose from the sequence of discussions of 
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responsibilities and financial resources. According to the opposition, a proper 
implementation of the delegated responsibilities would be possible only if the 
regions were given appropriate financial funds, yet the commission was not pro-
posing the necessary amendments to the Budget Code and the Tax Code. Dmitry 
Kozak insisted that changes to the principles of fiscal federalism should come 
after the distribution of responsibilities.
 In any case, the State Duma adopted the law, but the distribution of votes 
confirmed the existing split over the general vision of intergovernmental rela-
tions in Russia. The State Duma’s Committee on the Issues of the Federation 
and Regional Policy supported the bill by nine votes to eight. In the State Duma, 
the bill was supported by the following factions and groups: Unity, Fatherland—
All Russia, LDPR, People’s Deputy, and Russia’s Regions. The Communists, 
the Agroindustrial Deputy Group, Yabloko, and most of the members of the 
Union of Right Forces voted against the proposal.
 Consideration of the bill by the Federation Council followed the same pattern. 
The Council’s Committee on Regional Policy supported the proposals. At least 
two senators—Vyacheslav Novikov, representative of the Legislative Council of 
the Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Viktor Shudegov, representative of the government of 
the Republic of Udmurtia—stressed that this law was an attempt to change the 
constitution by amending federal law: “Radical reform of government, cardinal 
revision of the regions’ responsibilities—there is no need to remind you that 
these should be realized by changing the Constitution” (Nagornykh, 2003). 
Dmitry Kozak reacted in an unexpected way: “The Constitution is how the legis-
lator interprets it and how the court interprets it. The legislator interprets it in 
this way” (Nagornykh, 2003). Only nine members of the Federation Council 
voted against the law; seven senators abstained.
 Thus, the Kremlin pushed the law through the parliament without much diffi-
culty. In the lower chamber, it was supported by the pro- presidential majority 
that had formed by the end of that convocation (Remington, 2006), and which 
had already voted for Putin’s first federal reform three years earlier. The support 
of the higher chamber came as a result of expelling the real political regional 
leaders from the Federation Council.
 Kozak’s Commission proposed the needed amendments to the Budget Code and 
the Tax Code before launching the new approach to intergovernmental relations, 
but their content and subsequent effects confirmed the opposition’s fears. During 
the discussion of the law “On General Principles” in the State Duma, the Commu-
nist Party representative declared: “Regions will be delegated competences which 
cannot be realized without subsequent financial support. All the responsibility will 
be imposed on them. They will have to reproduce conditions of poverty, while the 
policy will be commanded by the center” (Stenogrammy, 2003).
 The amendments proposed in 2004 are considered inconsistent. On the one 
hand, the federal governments addressed the problem of unfunded obligations 
that had flourished in the second half of the 1990s. During that period, the 
federal parliament had created new social obligations that were to be imple-
mented at the subnational level without guaranteed financing from the federal 
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budget. Now, every obligation and responsibility was provided with a source of 
financing at one of the three levels of government. In addition, the new model of 
distribution of tax income was fixed by the Budget Code and the Tax Code, 
instead of a law on the budget for the next financial year. This led to the stabili-
zation of the rules of the game in the financial aspect of intergovernmental rela-
tions (De Silva et al., 2009).
 On the other hand, the new norms led to a situation where the volume of 
transfers from the federal budget to the regional and local ones increased while 
the volume of its own regional revenues dramatically decreased (Figure 4.1). In 
the following years, this ratio would never return to what it had been at the end 
of the 1990s.
 Finally, all these changes had one more unexpected effect. As early as 2005 
Vladimir Putin retold the numerous complaints of the governors in the 
following way:
I consider the position of many governors to be correct. It states that the 
number of the federal agencies in the regions is increasing constantly and 
unswervingly, but the quality of the job is not improving […]. There is a 
mixing of functions and parallel activity, but when somebody needs to take 
responsibility, there is, on the contrary, a dropping and transferring of 
responsibility from one agency to another.
(Kolesnikov, 2005)
Year
Federal share Regional share
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
98
19
99
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Figure 4.1  Ratio of federal and subnational budget revenues in the Russian Federation in 
1992–2011.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Russian Federation’s Federal Treasury (www.
roskozna.ru).
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The official statistics on the number of federal and regional bureaucrats at the 
subnational level confirmed Putin’s words (Figure 4.2). The period 2003–2005 
saw a rapid increase in the number of federal officials at the regional level, and 
that increase paused only in 2010. In the next section I will analyze the role of 
those bureaucrats in the governmental system.
 During the following years the federal center repeatedly changed indi-
vidual parts of the system for assigning administrative responsibilities. Since 
2003, the law “On General Principles” has been amended more than 100 
times. But the established principles of intergovernmental relations have not 
changed.
 In June 2011, Dmitry Medvedev, then the Russian President, declared a call 
for a new wave of decentralization:
It is impossible to govern a country from a single center in the modern 
world, especially if we are talking about a country such as Russia. More-
over, if everything starts working and moving based on signals from the 
Kremlin—and we have been there, I know this from my experience—
that means that the system is non- viable, that it has to be arranged 
around a specific person. This is bad; it means that the system must be 
changed.
(Medvedev, 2011)
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Figure 4.2  Number of officials at the national and subnational governmental levels in 
2000–2013 (in thousands of people).
Source: Federal state statistics service (www.gks.ru).
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To realize this political intent, two commissions were engaged. Kozak’s Com-
mission launched another revision of administrative responsibilities, while reas-
signment of sources of budget revenues was assigned to the so- called 
Khloponin’s Commission.2
 The results of this wave of decentralization were similar to those of its prede-
cessor. The center delegated to the regional level a set of control responsibilities 
within the spheres of animal health and protection of plants, environmental pro-
tection, land management, meteorological and geodetic control, fire safety, and 
many other issues. The federal government sought to thereby decrease the 
number of federal officials in the regions, transferring them to the level of 
regional government. But the activity of Khloponin’s Commission was de facto 
blocked by Vladimir Putin’s team, and the regions could not receive additional 
resources to significantly increase their budget revenues.
 Although Falleti’s sequential theory of decentralization in its complete form 
cannot be applied to Russia (if only because Russia has not yet undergone all 
three phases of decentralization), her analysis is useful for understanding the 
nature of the Russian decentralization processes in the 2000s and 2010s.
 The regional leaders were divided and disoriented as a result of losing the 
1999 parliamentary election and of the growing popularity of Vladimir Putin’s 
actions aimed at integrating the country. The federal center possessed all neces-
sary means to promote its interests while it formed the new system of intergov-
ernmental relations. Compared with the system that had appeared spontaneously 
in the 1990s, Kozak’s program was seen as a process of governmental centrali-
zation (Petrov, 2000). However, that process should be interpreted more care-
fully. Taking into consideration that the constitution stipulated a centralized 
model of federalism and that the intergovernmental relations of the 1990s had 
significantly deviated from the constitutional model, Kozak’s reform was the 
first case of administrative decentralization realized in accordance with the con-
stitutional norms.
 Falleti’s idea presupposes that every new phase of decentralization is motiv-
ated by strong causes that force the actors of intergovernmental relations to 
move forward. In Russia’s case, there was no real need to continue decentraliza-
tion. Genuine fiscal decentralization had been replaced by fiscal centralization, 
the most profitable option for the central government, and by the simultaneous 
growth in intergovernmental transfers redistributed among the subnational 
budgets. The return of gubernatorial elections in 2012 did not become an oppor-
tunity to increase the regional communities’ political autonomy. Due to the polit-
ical regime that had formed by that time and had effectively established a system 
of political control over the regional governments, the federal center’s influence 
on intraregional political and policy processes remained.
 The process of reallocation of administrative responsibilities among the dif-
ferent governmental levels has continued until the present time. The federal gov-
ernment has held onto the position of the veto actor and technocratically amends 
laws to adjust the system of intergovernmental relations as appropriate. At this 
time, the governors act as obedient implementers of the federation’s will; they 
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do not have agendas of their own, and do not initiate any great debates on the 
future of Russian federalism. As a result, Vladimir Putin continues to maximize 
his gains in the political field.
Anatomy of (de)centralization: evidence from the education 
system
In his historic speech at the special meeting of the Russian government, which 
took place after the Beslan tragedy, Vladimir Putin formulated his vision of the 
relationship between the federal and regional levels of government:
First of all, I believe that the most important factor in strengthening the state 
is the unity of the system of the executive in the country—the unity that 
derives from the meaning and the letter of Article 77 of the Constitution. 
Indeed, we are talking about the fact that within the framework of the 
Russian Federation’s responsibilities and the sphere of shared responsibil-
ities, the executive in the center and the executives in the subnational units 
form a single system of power and, accordingly, have to work as a holistic, 
coordinated, united body.
(Putin, 2004)
The model of intergovernmental relations established during that period corres-
ponded to the political interests of the ruling group. But the construction of the 
power vertical involved not only ensuring political control over the regional 
elites, but also improving collaboration between federal and regional authorities.
 In order to assess the impact of the federal government’s regional policy on 
the particularities of governance, there is a need to analyze specific areas of 
public policy. These are located within the sphere of shared responsibilities of 
the federal center and the subnational units, which became a space for realloca-
tion of powers during the Kozak reform. Among the many policy fields regu-
lated by the Kozak reform the analysis should be devoted to those that involve 
significant financial and human resources, as that is where the effects of the 
changes in intergovernmental relations will be most visible to the observer.
 All these requirements are best satisfied by education and healthcare—two 
policy fields that, due to the social orientation of the Russian state, have 
remained important objects of governmental attention (Table 4.2).
 Tulia Falleti selected the education sector to measure administrative decen-
tralization (Falleti, 2010). In addition to the fact that educational reforms are 
noticeable because they mobilize significant fiscal and human resources (and 
consequently, can lead to long- term and unexpected policy feedback for both 
other policy areas and the process of political struggle), she took into account 
that in Latin America education has often been the first decentralized policy 
field, and that this policy field involves influential trade unions that actively 
participate in bargaining concerning the redistribution of responsibilities and 
resources.
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 In Russia, education was not the first policy field to be decentralized. In addi-
tion, there were no significant trade unions of teachers or university professors 
that would have been able to protect the interests of education sector employees. 
At the same time, it is fair to say that any policy change in the Russian education 
sphere affects a tremendous number of people and significant volumes of money. 
By 2015, 14.5 million people were studying at pre- school organizations as well 
as primary and secondary schools, and nearly 700 000 at universities;3 almost 1.5 
million people were working in educational organizations (Regiony, 2016). 
From the financial perspective, education is also the biggest area of social 
expenditure in Russia (Table 4.2). During the 2000s and 2010s, the federal gov-
ernment made an effort to greatly reform the education system. It is considered 
that, among all the reforms in the social sphere launched by Putin’s government 
at the beginning of the 2000s, reforms of education policy were the most suc-
cessful (Belanovskii et al., 2016). Finally, allocation of responsibilities in the 
educational sector became a real battleground during the discussion of Kozak’s 
reform in the State Duma. This section will be devoted to the question of how 
education governance changed due to the transformation of intergovernmental 
relations.
 Since the 1980s, there has been an active decentralization of the educational 
sector around the world, and this trend has covered not only federal but also 
unitary states. Noel McGinn and Susan Street highlighted three so- called “norm-
ative” goals of decentralization in education: (1) to improve the efficiency of 
administration, (2) to increase the effectiveness of the system, and (3) to increase 
local participation (McGinn and Street, 1986).
 The first two goals are technocratic: they are aimed at building up the most 
effective models of public administration in a country. In the last 30 years, due 
to the development of new public management principles in the world, ones sup-
ported by different developmental institutes, decentralization of public adminis-
tration has become a leading measure for increasing the performance of 
implementation of public policies. Because of the large number of educational 
institutions and their entrenchment in the social processes of cities and regions, 
educational systems were among the first to experience the process of redistribu-
tion of responsibility between levels of power, especially in the field of school 
education.
Table 4.2  Social expenditures of the Russian consolidated budget in 2005, 2010, and 
2015 (in billion rubles)
Category 2005 2010 2015
All expenditures 2941.2 6636.9 9479.8
Education 628.6 (21.4%) 1450.9 (21.9%) 2472.5 (26.1%)
Health care 463.8 (15.8%) 796.8 (12%) 1355.8 (14.3%)
Social policy 336.0 (11.4%) 1167.3 (17.6%) 1497.1 (15.8%)
Source: Rosstat, 2016.
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 In their article, McGinn and Street observe: “Less clear is why the govern-
ment – if it is distinct from (and somehow antithetical to) individual citizens – 
should want to increase citizen participation” (McGinn and Street, 1986: 473). It 
is reasonable that central governments are not inclined to delegate authority to 
regional and local communities without serious need. This is why the main 
motive for increasing local participation in the educational policy field is con-
nected with the central government’s need to avoid political conflict between the 
center and strong and disobedient regions.
 It is not surprising that the federal system, where education is understood as a 
part of regional identity closely connected with a regional community’s culture 
and language, is characterized by the decentralization of education and the pro-
vision of regional communities with special rights to influence decision- making 
in educational governance.
 The simplest way to illustrate this point is to observe the numerous examples 
of ethnofederal states that were formed in accordance with the holding- together 
model. In Belgium, the decentralization of language, culture, and education 
became the first step toward complete federalization. Now the Belgian educa-
tional sector is mainly governed by the individual communities. The federal 
level controls only standards for such practices as establishing training periods, 
setting minimal requirements for diplomas, and providing pension insurance for 
retired teachers. Similar patterns can be found in Spain and India.
 Equally, education is also decentralized in federal states that were not based 
on ethnic distinctions. In the United States, the states’ governments and school 
districts regulate pre- school, school, and vocational education, while universities 
enjoy a significant level of autonomy.4 In Germany, the federal government’s 
sphere of responsibility is limited to the ability to establish general frameworks 
in the field of university education, and all other responsibilities are assigned to 
the Länder. Even in Austria, one of the most centralized federal systems in the 
democratic world, education is strongly influenced by from municipal and 
regional governments.
 There are noticeable differences between “technocratic” decentralization and 
decentralization aimed at strengthening regional participation. The first is often 
interpreted as a “top- down” process. The central governments are inclined to test 
different options for the assignment of responsibilities, and configure the system as 
they receive new information on its function and effects. Such an approach can be 
found particularly often in unitary systems, where the regional and local authori-
ties are merely territorial departments of the central government, and the center’s 
experiments do not face any resistance from regional communities or elites.
 Decentralization aimed at ensuring the participation of the regional and local 
communities in creating education policy, on the other hand, is initiated as a 
“bottom- up” process. As a result of insistent demands from the subnational com-
munities, and careful intergovernmental bargaining, this system tends to be 
stable and robust for a long period of time.
 Thus, examining the process of redistribution of powers in a particular policy 
area allows us to understand much about the nature of intergovernmental 
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 relations in a country. The following analysis of changes in the education system 
in Russia is useful in order to assess both the features of intergovernmental rela-
tions in Russia in the 2000s and 2010s, and the influence of the resulting model 
of territorial governance on public administration.
 Designing intergovernmental relations in the education sphere involves ques-
tions about the allocation of responsibilities in respect to a variety of issues such 
as selecting the knowledge to be studied in schools, colleges, and universities, 
planning the number of educational organizations in a specific administrative 
unit, or providing financial support for schools in order to satisfy their utility and 
other needs. These tasks, among others, can be resolved at different levels of 
government or even left to the educational organizations themselves. Given this, 
there is a need to choose a few indicators that will suffice to characterize the 
level of decentralization of the whole system.
 I follow Falleti’s approach in selecting six indicators of policy- making 
authority that comprise (1) authority over the curriculum, (2) responsibility for 
training teachers, (3) responsibility for evaluation of the educational system, (4) 
management of schools, (5) authority over hiring, firing, and relocating teachers, 
and (6) authority over salaries. In addition, I will discuss one more responsib-
ility: financing the needs of educational organizations at a given time.
 An important feature of Russian educational governance has been its signi-
ficant centralization. Since the Soviet period, it is the central government that 
has been establishing the standards that describe not only curricula at all levels 
of education, but also detailed technical requirements for licensing educational 
institutions.
 The Russian Constitution assigns “general issues” of education to the sphere 
of shared competences of federal and regional governments. To understand what 
this means for the practice of public administration, I analyze three federal laws 
devoted to the assignment of responsibilities in the educational sector. The 
first—“On the General Principles of the Organization of Legislative (Represent-
ative) and Executive Bodies of the State Power of the Russian Federation’s Sub-
national Units” (Federal’nyi, 1999)—has already been commented on in the 
previous section. In addition, special attention should be paid to laws that regu-
late the educational system. Since the beginning of the 1990s, there have been 
two such laws. The law “On Education” was adopted in 1992, revised twice in 
1996 and 1997, and amended 80 times in the period from 2000 to 2012 (Zakon, 
1992). In 2012, it was replaced by the new federal law “On Education in the 
Russian Federation” (Federal’nyi, 2012). To trace significant changes in the 
model of intergovernmental relations, I analyzed Chapter III of the 1992 law and 
Articles 6–9 of the 2012 law, the sections devoted to the distribution of respons-
ibilities of federal, regional, and local agencies in the education sector.
 The analysis of the changes to the 1992 law allows us to see how education 
governance is affected by the dynamics of federal relations. In 1992, a time of 
uncontrolled growth for the republics’ influence, the national government pro-
vided them with the right to “create and implement policy in the field of educa-
tion.” There was certainly a note that the policy should not contradict federal 
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legislation, but the norms of federal regulation in that period were not very strict. 
In 1996, a period of increasing influence for other types of subnational units, this 
right was spread to all regions. But in 2006, soon after gubernatorial elections 
were eliminated, the federation deprived all subnational units of the ability to 
establish policy; instead, they became implementers of federal policy.
 The same tendency has been reproduced in federal authority over the curric-
ulum. At present, the federal government sets federal educational standards for 
almost all types of educational organizations, from pre- school to postgraduate 
levels. But in the 1990s, the law allowed regional governments to allocate 10 
percent of study time to disciplines established by subnational units. After 2007, the 
so- called “regional component” was abolished: the federal government took control 
of all standards. In 2009, this abolition was mitigated: the subnational units obtained 
permission to “participate in developing sample educational programs so as to take 
into account regional, ethnic and cultural particularities of the territories.”
 The federal government’s role in the field of education content is crucial. It 
controls the process for selecting textbooks authorized to be used as official 
study materials in educational institutions and establishes the official list of pub-
lishing houses allowed to produce these textbooks. The regions’ role is restricted 
to the ability, which was granted in 2011, to participate in the process of select-
ing textbooks devoted to native languages and native literature.
 Complete control over the content of education is ensured not only by setting 
the standards, but also by retaining influence over the training of teachers. This 
indicator of decentralization has not changed during the whole period: since 
1992, the federal government has been responsible for creating and managing 
the teacher training system and providing means for university professors to 
improve their qualifications. The subnational units are responsible for implemen-
tation of the procedures set by the center.
 The centralized system of curriculum creation complements a decentralized 
model of the management of educational institutions. There is a general prin-
ciple in Russia whereby the federal government manages universities while 
regional governments are responsible for colleges, and municipalities for schools 
and pre- school institutions. At the same time, there are exceptions. For instance, 
the colleges that implement educational programs in the sphere of security and 
defense are subordinated to the federal Ministry of Education. The regions and 
even some types of municipalities are allowed to establish universities and sub-
sequently manage them. But, on the whole, the system of correspondence of 
levels of educational institutions to levels of territorial governance was founded 
in the early 1990s and has been in effect since.
 Consequently, this is also true for the distribution of authority over hiring, 
firing, and relocation of teachers and professors. The federal legislation estab-
lishes the general requirements for appropriate qualifications of educational 
institution employees, but their implementation is delegated to the level respons-
ible for the institution’s management.
 The four indicators discussed above show the increased strength of the federal 
center in preserving the status quo in intergovernmental relations in the 2000s 
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compared with the 1990s. The next two indicators—allocation of financial 
responsibilities and the function of mechanisms of control and evaluation—will 
demonstrate the changes made by Kozak’s reform.
 Before 2004, public funding of education conformed to the principle of co- 
financing: the expenses of educational institutions at any given level of education 
were reimbursed from multiple budgets. For instance, at the level of general school 
education, municipalities were responsible for financing schoolteachers’ salaries, 
teaching materials, and schools’ communal needs. The federal government was 
responsible for providing library funds, repairing buildings, purchasing equipment, 
etc. Most of the financing of vocational colleges came from regional budgets, 
while universities were financed mainly from the federal budget (Abankina et al., 
2005). At the same time, the fact that all educational institutions in Russia were 
co- financed from the federal budget, together with the influence of the federal 
center on the standards of labor remuneration and other expenses, preserved the 
significant role of the federal center within the educational system.
 Kozak’s reform tremendously increased the significance of the subnational 
units. It delegated the responsibility for financing all educational institutions 
except federal ones to the regional budgets and deprived municipal authorities of 
those competences.5 This also affected the rules for setting salaries for teachers. 
Now, the federation only established standards for teachers’ remuneration for 
federal educational organizations.
 The declared refusal by the federal center to participate in financing the 
majority of educational institutions provoked serious discussion in the profes-
sional community, which demanded the establishment of federal standards for 
financing education across the whole country. The purpose of such a standard 
would be to ensure equality in providing educational services in all Russian 
regions.
 During discussion of Kozak’s reform in the State Duma, a group of deputies 
headed by Oleg Smolin suggested amending the bill and introducing the notion 
of federal standards of financing:
The right to education is guaranteed for all Russian citizens, regardless of 
where they live. The right to education is guaranteed by the Constitution, 
among other things, by the Presidential Address of 2001, and by the estab-
lishment of the federal state standard. If we set the standard for education 
and guarantee the right to education for people, how can this be done 
without money? How are you imagining it? And there will be twenty times 
more in Moscow […]. Well, not twenty, of course, but fifteen times more 
than in Mountain Altai. We are not demanding a reduction in [financing] in 
Moscow, we are asking that the whole country’s educational funding does 
not fall below a certain level, otherwise there is no federation.
(Stenogrammy, 2003)
Dmitry Kozak objected to this suggestion because “it contradicts the federative 
nature of our state, and it does not allow for the construction of transparent 
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 interbudgetary relations between the subnational units and the federal center.” In 
this and many other debates on the necessary level of centralization, the federal 
government acted as the main supporter and defender of federalism. Meanwhile, 
it was clear that this understanding of federalism was reduced to issues of the 
implementation of policy measures by the regional governments, and not to the 
actual devolution of educational policy- making to the regions. The center’s 
approach was technocratic: in 2010, the federal standards called for by the 
opposition in 2003 were introduced as a part of federal control over the imple-
mentation of educational policy when the previous model showed such negative 
results as disparity in the provision of educational services in the Russian 
regions.
 Another important point of confrontation between the Presidential Adminis-
tration and the parliamentary opposition during the debates over Kozak’s reform 
came from a lack of understanding of how the subnational governments would 
manage their new financial responsibilities. The State Duma’s deputies explicitly 
questioned the federal government’s plans to strengthen the fiscal power of the 
regions. Kozak’s laws could lead to the implementation of a strategy of unfunded 
redistribution of responsibilities, where the delegation of new governmental 
functions would not be accompanied by transfer of new sources of replenish-
ment to regional budgets. One often encounters such situations: the central 
authorities seek to rid themselves of the obligation to finance a sphere of public 
administration, or implement a policy of cuts and austerity via the hands of the 
regional governments (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Falleti, 2010).
 Figure 4.1 shows that there was no significant increase in the revenues of the 
regional authorities in the 2000s: a major fall that began in 2000 was replaced by 
minor growth in 2006 and 2007, and then a more promising increase in 2009 and 
2010, but the revenues never returned to the level of the 1990s. In turn, the 
expenditures in the field of education in the 2000s and 2010s have likewise 
demonstrated no significant increase in the financial role of regional govern-
ments compared with the federal center (Figure 4.3).
 However, the redistribution of powers did not become an example of 
unfunded decentralization. The regional governments received the resources 
they needed from two sources. The first was the local governments that had been 
deprived of the majority of responsibilities in the sphere of financing the educa-
tion system. Figure 4.4 demonstrates the massive redistribution of educational 
expenditures from local authorities to regional ones, with an appropriate redis-
tribution of a number of financial sources. The second source was the intergov-
ernmental transfers that became a key element of regional development policy in 
the 2000s.
 Having delegated the right to manage most educational organizations to the 
regional level, the federal government increased pressure on regional authorities 
to force them to realize measures aimed at the reduction of expenditures, includ-
ing social ones. The reform that involved restructuring the secondary school 
network is an indicative example (Starodubtsev, 2017). The federal Ministry of 
Education initiated it as an extension of implementing the per capita financing 
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Figure 4.3 Dynamics of allocation of expenses in the field of education in 2000–2015.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Russian Federation’s Federal Treasury (www.
roskazna.ru/).
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Figure 4.4  Dynamics of change in expenses for education in three Russian republics in 
2001 and 2015.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Russian Federation’s Federal Treasury (www.
roskazna.ru/).
principle, which tied the amount of financial resources received by a school to the 
number of students. Now the federal government agreed to integrate schools with 
a small number of students with schools located in neighboring settlements. But 
the implementation of that reform was delegated to the regional governments, 
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which had to select means and methods for increasing the effectiveness of the 
educational sphere in their regions.
 Thе model of educational governance in Russia is close to those of con-
temporary unitary systems. It includes the omnipotent national government that 
has the position of veto actor in the policy- making area, and political and finan-
cial resources to control the implementation of its policy decisions. In this 
model, regional governments play an important role as territorial departments of 
the central government. They have been delegated a large number of functions, 
and from the perspective of the system’s effective operation, the regional gov-
ernments are key actors making the most important administrative decisions. 
However, their discretion is substantially restricted by the scope set by the 
federal legislator, which is based on its own ideas of the desired and most 
effective degree of autonomy of the implementers in a policy field. The role of 
local governments in such a system is minimized. They have no administrative 
autonomy, and their main task is the fulfillment of the requirements of the 
federal and regional governments.
 A system that combines centralized policy- making with decentralized policy 
implementation raises an important question—how can the national govern-
ment’s control over implementers be ensured so as to achieve the most positive 
outcomes for public administration? A large and decentralized bureaucracy a 
priori generates a risk of losing the loyalty and obedience of lower- level offi-
cials. A vast territory, many subnational units, the existence of ethnic, religious, 
and even societal conflicts—all these features of the Russian state and society 
create a risk of the center losing control over the regional authorities 
(Prud’homme, 1995; Treisman, 2007).
 Thus, the model of territorial governance established by Vladimir Putin’s 
team aggravates the principal–agency problem. The principal–agency model is 
used to analyze relationships between assemblies and executives (Weingast and 
Moran, 1983; Weingast, 1984; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins et 
al., 1989; Miller, 2005), but several authors (for instance, De Groot, 1988; 
Dehousse, 2008; Ferris, 1992; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 2007; Sharafutdi-
nova, 2010; Busygina and Filippov, 2012) find it useful for discussion of the 
problems faced by national governments when they implement a policy of gov-
ernmental decentralization. The question is, how can the center delegate signi-
ficant responsibilities without losing control over the results of the subnational 
governments’ activity?
 The content of principal–agency theory is well known (if not, see a most 
interesting explanation presented in the introduction to Shapiro, 2005), but there 
is still a need to relate the possibility of principal–agency problems to the rela-
tionship between the central and lower levels of government, especially with 
respect to federal states. The principal, unable to cope with the management of a 
complex system, decides to delegate some of its authority to an agent, who must 
normatively follow the principal’s will and ensure for it the best results of its 
activities. However, there are two obstacles that can disrupt this ideal model of 
relations. The first is that the agents have much more information about their 
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abilities, the activities that they produce, and the true quality of the results of 
their labor, than the principal. The second obstacle arises when the interests and 
preferences of the agents diverge from the interests and preferences of the prin-
cipal. Together, these obstacles provide all the conditions for so- called agency 
loss, when the agent fails to perform the functions that were delegated in order 
to achieve the goals set by the principal.
 Decentralization is one case of such delegation of functions that causes an 
agency problem. Here, subnational governments are responsible for realizing 
functions that are important to the central politicians (for example, social policy, 
social security, education, etc.). A national government delegates these compe-
tences to the subnational level because it suffers from information asymmetry, 
since it cannot control the situation in the regions completely. At the same time, 
the center seeks to control subnational actions, but cannot do so successfully 
because of the high costs of such a control system. It dominates in relations with 
subnational governments, and offers and formulates a contract between it and 
them. But there is a dramatic asymmetry in the center’s and the regional govern-
ments’ preferences. At the ideological level, while the former is concerned with 
the socio- economic development of the whole country, the latter are responsible 
for specific regions. In opportunistic terms, central and regional officials as 
opportunistic actors have rent- seeking strategies that concern different territorial 
interests and often conflict with each other. That is why the central government 
accepts the autonomy of the subnational governments’ preferences and the need 
to provide subnational officials with incentives and control mechanisms to guar-
antee the agents’ credible commitment.
 At first glance, federal relations do not seem to be a good example of the 
 principal–agency problem. In its classical understanding, federalism presupposes 
elections of regional authorities autonomously from the federal center, and the 
existence of their own responsibilities independent of the center. However, even 
without discussing the arguments for the use of agency theory in the analysis of 
federal relations, one can agree that the Russian case fully matches the “canoni-
cal” assumptions of that theory, since it presents a delegation of functions initi-
ated by the federal center and controlled by it.
 In addition, since the point when its canonical version was codified, agency 
theory has undergone a serious transformation. First, many studies have demon-
strated that it is not rare in political processes for a single agent to have to 
interact with several principals simultaneously (Moe, 1984, 1987; Spiller, 1990). 
From this perspective, governors and regional executives seem to be excellent 
examples of agents that have to be subordinated to two principals (the federal 
president and the regional community) at once.
 The need to ensure control over agents is a key element of agency theory. The 
bulk of literature devoted to the principal–agency problem’s implications for 
relations between legislators and executives proposes two models for providing 
control mechanisms. According to the first (“police patrol”), the principal creates 
a centralized system that involves special organizations responsible for observ-
ing the agents’ behavior. This model implies strict regulation of the agents’ 
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activity and their being rewarded for successful achievement of the principal’s 
goals. The second (“fire alarm”) transfers responsibility for control of the agents’ 
activities to target groups that possess all the information about the results of the 
agents’ performance. This requires institutions that allow the target group to 
keep the principal informed of the efficiency of the agents’ activities. Such a 
system is characterized by decentralization, and in its most radical version it 
allows the target groups to select the agents independently from the principal.
 The realization of the “police patrol” strategy leads to a paradoxical situation: 
the establishment of additional supervisory agencies reinforces the agency 
problem instead of solving it. The “controllers” become new agents; for the prin-
cipal, it is no easier to establish control over both them and the original agents. 
In addition, it is very expensive to form a system with several levels of control. 
This is why the “police patrol” is a pernicious strategy that leads to a low level 
of effectiveness of the entire administration apparatus. The “fire alarm,” on the 
contrary, works as a self- regulating model; it includes mechanisms for repres-
entation of interests and allows recipients of public services to influence the 
process of public policy.
 Within the system of territorial governance, the “police patrol” strategy means 
creating special territorially based “watchdogs” subordinated directly to the 
central government. Here, complete control is possible only in the presence of 
strict regulations. The realization of such a model in its radical form means the 
creation of a politically unitary state, where the central government is forced to 
decentralize the governmental system, and consequently this decentralization is 
implemented as a transfer of rights to implement decisions from the higher level 
to the lower.
 The “fire alarm” strategy involves the transfer of control of regional govern-
ments to the regional community, which can be named the target group for the 
regional authorities’ work. In this case, either the personnel decisions of the center 
should be based on the opinions of the regional community, or citizens should 
have the right to independently determine the leadership of regional authorities. 
Either way, it means the formation of political autonomy for the respective regions. 
Such a system of intergovernmental relations would be characterized at least by a 
high degree of political decentralization, and in its ultimate version by federalism, 
i.e., transferring the right to make final decisions in a policy field to the subnational 
level. Thus, the “fire alarm” is not only a less costly strategy, but, from a long- term 
perspective, more flexible in responding to crises.
 The Russian model of intergovernmental relations is a case of the “police 
patrol” strategy. In education, the federal government seeks to control all opera-
tional processes: licensing and accreditation of all educational organizations in 
the country, final exams in secondary schools and vocational colleges, admission 
processes in colleges and universities, certification of teachers and professors of 
public educational organizations, and many other processes in the educational 
sector.
 Before Kozak’s reform, the federal government was responsible for supervis-
ing all educational institutions, but in 2005–2006 all control and supervision 
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responsibilities concerning educational organizations and programs implemented 
in the territories of subnational units were delegated to the regional ministries of 
education.6 The federal center reserved exclusive control only over federal 
universities, foreign educational organizations, and military educational programs.
 This decentralization of control responsibilities demanded control mecha-
nisms that would oversee the regional governments’ activity in this sphere. The 
“fire alarm” strategy was eliminated as an option at the same time as Kozak’s 
reform was being implemented. The president rejected direct gubernatorial elec-
tions and began actively developing authoritarian practices of government, 
thereby abandoning reliance on institutions of accountability. Under those cir-
cumstances, the only option for the federal center was the formation of a “police 
patrol” system that led to the creation of numerous “watchdogs” in the educa-
tional sector.
 The main governmental bodies responsible for education policy at the federal 
level in Russia are the Ministry of Education and the Federal Service for Super-
vision in Education and Science (Rosobrnadzor). The ministry is responsible for 
creating frameworks for educational policy while Rosobrnadzor ensures the 
implementation of federal norms in universities and other educational organiza-
tions subordinated directly to the federal government, and controls the actions of 
regional governments in the sphere of education.
 It is significant that the federal center did not surrender its right to control 
education in favor of regional governments. Instead, it has included control func-
tions in the group of “responsibilities of the Russian Federation in the sphere of 
education whose implementation is delegated to the subnational units’ executive 
agencies” (Federal’nyi, 2012). At the regional level, a structure similar to the 
federal one has been reproduced. In addition to the regional ministry of educa-
tion, there is a special supervisory department in every region. In spite of the fact 
that this department is part of the regional ministry, it is financed by the federal 
budget and its chair is appointed in coordination with the federal authorities. The 
regional supervisory agency is responsible for monitoring the educational organ-
izations subordinated to the regional government, and for the activities of muni-
cipal authorities in the field of education.
 It is noteworthy that similar control functions have also been realized by the 
Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation and its territorial units, by 
the Federal Service for Financial and Budgetary Supervision of the Russian Fed-
eration (which existed from 2004 to 2016) and its territorial subdivisions, by the 
Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, and even by the Control Office of 
the President of the Russian Federation.
 The system of top- down control operates only under conditions of strict regu-
lation of the activities of educational organizations. As a result, it takes the form 
of the production of many reports, both at each level of government and directly 
by the educational institutions themselves. In 2015, Vyacheslav Nikonov, the 
Chairperson of the State Duma’s Committee on Education and Science, 
described how many reports had to be submitted by teachers and administrators 
of educational organizations (Nikonov, n.d.). According to him, secondary 
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schools prepare up to 300 reports per year, which include 15,000 indicators. Ped-
agogical staff members write 80 percent of them. Such reports include data on 
the midterm results of academic performance, many kinds of teaching plans, 
reports on the introduction of new technologies in the educational process, etc. A 
large number of reports are related to the achievement of targets set by the 
decrees of the Russian President, and fulfillment of the terms under which the 
Federal Government grants subsidies to the subnational governments. Even after 
the implementation of federal programs aimed at the development of the educa-
tion system, the modernization of Russian schools, and the development of the 
pre- school education system, school administrators as well as municipal and 
regional educational authorities have to submit reports to higher governmental 
levels.
 The large number of mechanisms and channels of federal control over the 
activities of regional and municipal authorities has not provided the center with 
sufficient information on how effectively regional governments work. In this 
regard, soon after the cancellation of gubernatorial elections (in 2007), the Pres-
idential Administration decided to create a special methodology for measuring 
the performance of regional governments, which has been in place ever since. In 
the system of territorial governance that has now developed, socio- economic sta-
tistics, along with public opinion polls and electoral results, have become an 
important instrument for monitoring and evaluation (and this is not limited to the 
education system).
 The history of changes in the federal center’s approaches to measuring 
regional governments’ performance demonstrates the problems the center faces 
when it attempts to control the outcomes of regional governments’ activity. The 
first version of the methodology included 43 indicators that measured the level 
of regional development in many sectors (economy, demographics, healthcare, 
education, housing, ethnic relations, etc.) In fact, there were more than 43 indic-
ators because each of them was split into several subcategories (for instance, the 
mortality rate was to be calculated for children from one to four years, from five 
to nine years, from ten to 14 years, and so on).
 The proposed methodology for assessment came under serious criticism from 
experts and regional officials. Such a large number of closely related indicators 
did not allow the federal government to assess the importance of each of them to 
generate a final assessment of the performance of regional authorities. Another 
problem was organizational: the regional units of the federal statistical agency 
have been closely related to the regional governments, and, consequently, the 
quality of statistics was called into question.
 In 2012, all these problems made the Presidential Administration change the 
composition of the indicators, reducing them to 12 obligatory indicators (Appen-
dix 6). At the same time, to assess the individual development of each region, 
the federal government could choose two indicators from an additional list of 44 
indicators that covered all mentioned policy fields as well as others.
 The introduction of the first version of the assessment methodology became a 
cruel joke when it came to Roskomnadzor’s work to control the institutions of 
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secondary education. As one indicator, the methodology presented the average 
result of the Unified State Examination in the previous year in a given region. 
The introduction of the Unified State Exam was aimed at ensuring the unity of 
the educational space in Russia and a decrease in the school teachers’ and 
administrators’ discretion in the process of final examinations (Starodubtsev, 
2017). The need to account for the results of the exam led to unjustifiably high 
results in several regions. The regional governments demonstrated the ability to 
influence the reported statistics at their discretion. As soon as this indicator was 
removed from the methodology, the level of the results of the Unified State 
Examination in the subnational units evened out. At the same time, several years 
in a row, variants of the examination tasks appeared on the Internet shortly 
before the examination, and the media reported on mass violations in how the 
examinations were conducted.
 Another example of the ineffectiveness of the established control system, 
even with issues of fundamental importance to the federal center, is the ban on 
schoolchildren wearing hijabs. In 2015, the Supreme Court of the Russian Fed-
eration recognized as legal the ban on wearing hijabs in schools in certain 
regions of the Russian Federation (for example, in the Republic of Mordovia). In 
spite of this, in some Muslim regions of Russia, wearing hijabs is either allowed 
(for example, in the Republic of Tatarstan) or obligatory (the Republic of Chech-
nya). Thus, some regions demonstrate their ability to ignore federal norms even 
under conditions where they are not able to influence the decision- making 
process at the federal level.
 The analysis of the intergovernmental dimension of Russian educational gov-
ernance shows how the dynamics of intergovernmental relations described in the 
previous chapters led to the creation of a monstrous system of formation and 
implementation of public policy in the 2000s. The model of centralized decision-
 making with decentralized policy implementation that exists in some federal and 
many unitary countries has, in the Russian context, resulted in significant growth 
of the central governmental apparatus. This has created a large number of super-
visory agencies and channels, and their subsequent poor performance, as they 
have to be managed by the government and are buried under an avalanche of 
paperwork and fear of superiors and supervisors. The system as it is now strug-
gles with the principal–agent problem and at the same time paradoxically repro-
duces it at a more advanced level. However, it is reasonable to argue that a 
reform of the system is a task that can hardly be accomplished by a new round of 
changes in administrative rules, because its formation was a logical result of a 
combination of institutional features of intergovernmental relations laid down in 
the early 1990s and the federal government’s strategic behavior aimed at redu-
cing the influence and power of regional elites.
 First, the current governance system is based on the constitutional norm on 
the existence of shared responsibilities of federal and regional authorities. This 
is the main institution that provides regional governments with the possibility of 
administrative autonomy, although the federal government is at all times able to 
intervene in the decision- making process. The model of federalism stipulated by 
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the constitution is characterized by a strong central authority that is able to 
control the boundaries of the subnational units’ autonomy.
 Second, the system has been the product of a particular reform developed and 
promoted by Dmitry Kozak, Vladimir Putin’s authorized representative. This 
reform for the first time clearly assigned the responsibilities of federal, regional, 
and local governments in the field of shared competences, while preserving the 
federal government’s influence in a number of areas of public policy. At the 
same time, the federal government has consistently implemented measures to 
promote financial and political centralization.
 Third, the formation of the system took place in the context of the develop-
ment of an authoritarian regime that persistently destroyed institutions of social 
control and, as a result, made it impossible to implement at least some of the ele-
ments of the “fire alarm” strategy.
Notes
1 Dmitry Kozak was deputy head (2000–2003) and first deputy head (2003–2004) of the 
Russian President’s administration, head of staff of the Russian government (2004), 
plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President in the South Federal District 
(2004–2007), and minister for regional development (2007–2008). Since 2008, he has 
been deputy head of the Russian government.
2 The commission was named in honour of Alexander Khloponin, deputy head of the 
Russian government (since 2010) and plenipotentiary representative of the Russian 
President in the North- Caucasian federal district (2010–2014) who was in charge of the 
activity of that commission.
3 Hereafter I use the term “schools” for all educational organizations that provide 
primary and secondary education, “colleges” for those institutions that offer primary 
and secondary vocational programs, and “universities” for organizations that provide 
undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate education.
4 The United States government has made several attempts to establish federal control 
over school education so as to equalize the quality of educational services in different 
corners of the country. But with few exceptions, these attempts have always faced 
fierce resistance from the subnational elites.
5 A partial rollback took place in 2012: municipalities were forced to provide the financ-
ing for pre- school education.
6 In various regions of Russia, executive authorities responsible for educational policy 
can have different names—ministries, committees, etc. Hereinafter, I will use the term 
“regional ministry,” meaning any agency that is part of the regional government.
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Conclusion
Traditionally, in political science a national government’s policy toward subnational 
units (“territorial governance”) is analyzed through the lens of models of vertical 
distribution of power. There, researchers juxtapose federal states with unitary ones. 
They focus their attention either on legal issues of redistribution of competences and 
responsibilities among different governmental tiers or on political struggles between 
national and subnational governments for control over decision- making. At the 
same time, the issues of subnational units’ social and economic development, and 
national public policy aimed at regional development, have stayed beyond the scope 
of analysis by political science or been treated as factors that contribute to under-
standing “political” processes (i.e., ones concerning struggles for political positions). 
But a national government’s territorial governance combines both politics and 
policy in its relations with lower governmental levels. The political interests of both 
sides’ actors undoubtedly influence their policy decisions, while said decisions are 
able to constrain or influence strategic moves in the political sphere.
 Fortunately, in the last half- century, political science has been demonstrating 
a shift toward studying public administration and public policy. New theoretical 
tools, together with classic political science methodology, have allowed political 
scientists to describe and explain governmental actions aimed at achieving policy 
goals. In this way, national governments’ actions in the sphere of public man-
agement have been successfully integrated into political analysis.
 It is very useful to analyze intergovernmental relations as a number of policies 
instead of thinking about them from the position of normative models of vertical 
distribution of power. Today, when an increasing number of states are decentraliz-
ing their systems of government, the distinction between unitary and federal states 
is disappearing, and its analytical utility is declining. Federal and unitary models 
have become ideal types that describe tendencies in the development of intergov-
ernmental relations, but they do not explain how such states function.
 In my book, I have defined intergovernmental relations more broadly than 
Dail S. Wright (1978) does. Wright insists that intergovernmental relations 
concern only federal systems, since federalism empowers their lower tiers. I 
believe that the modern model of government, where a level of decentralization 
is an integral characteristic of a policy system, allows us to apply the term “inter-
governmental relations” to unitary states as well. A way to operationalize this term 
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is to assess the level of all types of decentralization in a state—administrative, 
political, and fiscal. A wealth of literature shows that these types can develop in 
contrary directions. Thus, a state’s model of intergovernmental relations is a 
complex of institutions that constitute relations within each of these spheres.
 My central thesis is that Russian intergovernmental relations have been 
affected by the phenomenon of political uncertainty as it is produced in authorit-
arian states. Under the conditions of consolidated electoral authoritarianism, 
Russian political leaders suffer from three types of uncertainty—uncertainty of 
outcomes as well as institutional and informational types of uncertainty.
 The territorial dimension of Russian politics has had tremendous significance 
for the functioning of the political regime. For Vladimir Putin, regional political 
elites have always been a source of potential threat. They have been able to 
increase all types of uncertainty, as they demonstrated in the 1990s. During that 
period, the federal center’s economic and political weakness led to a situation 
where the Kremlin was held hostage by politically strong regional leaders, who 
successfully used authoritarian practices to control their populations, especially 
during electoral campaigns. The well- known bargain of “the regional leaders’ 
loyalty in exchange for their significant autonomy” could not work for long. It 
was a forced agreement that was able to continue as long as neither side had 
enough resources to revise the terms. The regional leaders openly challenged the 
Kremlin in the 1999 parliamentary elections. Suddenly, the old political struggle 
between the liberal government and the communist opposition made way for 
electoral competition between the federal center and the regional leaders.
 Since the conflict between the federal center and the regional governments is 
a distributive one, it is impossible to resolve it permanently. The governors are 
always a threat to the federal politicians, who have to use all possible means to 
neutralize the potential danger. Thus, it is not surprising that the centralization of 
intergovernmental relations became the first political goal that Vladimir Putin 
decided to achieve upon his election as the Russian President.
 His politics acted in three fields, which corresponded to three types of decen-
tralization—administrative, political, and financial (fiscal).
 In the field of political decentralization, the Kremlin has demonstrated itself 
as a strategic institution- maker, one able to build an institutional environment 
favorable for decreasing the potential for challenges from regional leaders.
 Initially, the president achieved a reduction of the governors’ influence on 
decision- making at the federal level. In the 1990s, regional leaders had success-
fully used formal and informal channels of subnational unit representation to 
protect regional interests at the federal level. The formal channels became the 
first victims of the new policy. The changes in the recruitment of the members of 
the Federation Council, the rejection of single- member districts in the State 
Duma’s deputy elections, and the rejection of bilateral agreements with subna-
tional units—all these measures allowed Vladimir Putin to weaken the regional 
leaders’ political influence at the federal level.
 The second step was the Kremlin’s control over political processes at the 
regional level. In the early 2000s, the center’s political power was based on 
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Vladimir Putin’s unprecedented popularity, which allowed the Kremlin to ignore 
the governors as a source of electoral votes. But the situation could change, and 
the federal center did not want to return to a state of dependence on regional 
leaders. Furthermore, the governors demonstrated their ability to take advantage 
of institutions to preserve their control over regional assemblies in a situation 
where all leading parties were centralized. With its legislative initiatives, the 
Kremlin established the United Russia party’s control over the regional assem-
blies. As a result, the subnational units’ executives were faced with a potential 
alternative regional actor that could complicate a governor’s control over a 
region. Finally, the regional leaders’ autonomy was eliminated by the measure 
that transferred the right to appoint them to the president.
 Simultaneously, the center used the mechanisms of administrative decentrali-
zation to demonstrate a will to support federalism in Russia (especially after the 
rejection of popular gubernatorial elections) on the one hand, and to strengthen 
control over public administration at the regional level on the other. The process 
of delimitation of responsibilities revealed the astonishing fact that the Russian 
Constitution had established a very centralized federation. In the 1990s, bilateral 
agreements had violated constitutional norms and delegated federal responsibil-
ities to the regional governments. In the 2000s, the institution of shared respons-
ibilities of the federal and regional governments provided the federal center with 
the opportunity to distribute competences without reference to subnational units’ 
interests and their capability to implement such competences in the most 
appropriate way.
 The key element of this redistribution became the so- called “federal respons-
ibilities delegated to the regional governments,” which allowed the center to 
establish direct control over the regional governments’ daily activity. As I 
demonstrate, this practice became a way to enslave the regional agencies, turning 
them into regional departments of the federal government.
 Another form this control took was the fiscal centralization that happened in the 
2000s. Compared with the 1990s, when subnational governments often received 
the right to use financial resources at their discretion, the period of recentralization 
multiplied the proportion of finances transferred to the regions that was controlled 
by the federal government. At the same time, the regional budgets saw a decrease 
in the volume of financial resources stemming from regional sources. As a result, 
on the one hand, Russian governors have suffered from a lack of finances to 
develop their own policy agendas without the federal center’s approval. On the 
other hand, the federal government has enjoyed the opportunity to accuse regional 
officials of violating the rules on spending federal funds.
 These means of federal control are aimed at decreasing the level of informa-
tional asymmetry within the Russian political system. In order to have a low 
level of institutional uncertainty, the Kremlin blocked opportunities to realize the 
“fire alarm” model of control. As a result, it had to spend a lot of money to estab-
lish an effective system of police control over the regional governments.
 At the same time, this control system completely depends on the Russian Pres-
ident, who is the only actor able to make decisions concerning the fate of any 
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 governor suspected of corruption or even more serious crimes. Therefore, these 
control mechanisms are clumsy and ineffective—as they carry large costs, the 
country continues to suffer from extremely poor public administration at the 
regional level.
 Under the regime of competitive authoritarianism, elections continue to be a 
source of uncertainty of outcomes. This fact explains the active use of federal 
budgetary funds in political interests. The analysis of intergovernmental transfers 
demonstrates that the influence of political factors depends on the level of political 
competitiveness and the level of uncertainty of results in the political system. The 
annual redistribution of transfers is affected by the logic of the political business 
cycle. A traditional reading of this principle links public policy, which the govern-
ment provides, with the electorate’s attitudes and preferences. In the context of 
studying intergovernmental relations, I explain the observed results in another 
way: in given circumstances, regional governments are responsible for achieving 
needed electoral results. The center is ready to spend money to decrease the uncer-
tainty of outcomes, but this fact does not mean that governors once again receive 
political control over the federal center the way they did in the 1990s. The regional 
governments lose this advantage as soon as the electoral campaign period ends.
 All these pieces of evidence allow me to conclude that territorial governance 
in the Russian Federation of the 2000s and the 2010s is an example of the 
authoritarian leaders’ struggle with increasing uncertainty. Vladimir Putin and 
his team are strategic actors who skillfully make institutional changes (including 
centralization and decentralization in different fields of public administration) to 
neutralize regional elites as possible political challengers. The political and 
administrative decentralizations of 2012 confirm this conclusion. The established 
model of federal control over the regional governments and the well- functioning 
system of authoritarian institutions have allowed the return of popular guberna-
torial elections. The center has the needed safeguards to protect itself from a real 
opposition victory. At the same time, no one governor can be successful without 
the federal government’s support. The new wave of administrative decentraliza-
tion has loaded the subnational units with additional responsibilities that cannot 
be fulfilled without federal financing.
 Thus, authoritarianism in Russia demonstrates excellent results in addressing 
the problem of political uncertainty in the field of intergovernmental relations. 
Driven by this task, the authoritarian leader has eliminated any manifestations of 
regional autonomy. To handle the information asymmetry inherent in the structure 
of government in such a large and complex country, he has created a vast control 
mechanism. Consequently, the intergovernmental relations in Russia brilliantly 
support Vladimir Putin’s political survival. Yet they are not designed to effectively 
develop economic and social well- being in Russia or its individual territories.
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Appendix 1
Table A1.1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Years N Min. and max. Mean Standard 
deviation
A sum of transfers per 
10 000 regional residents 
(in thousands of rubles)1
1998–1999 155   3.65–273.12  71.08  39.3
2000–2003 312   0–435.07 141.34  74.14
2004–2007 312   0–597.73 216.78  94.49
2008–2011 312 132.9–1070.8 349.47 128.81
2012–2015 312 177.35–1113.95 372.8 154.67 
2000–2008 702   0–723.9 194.05 104.53
2009–2015 546 139.31–1113.95 367.87 145.04
Note
1 The variable was subject to a square root transformation.
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Appendix 5
Excerpt from the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation1
Article 71
The jurisdiction of the Russian Federation includes:
a adoption and amending of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and 
federal laws, control over their observance;
b federal structure and the territory of the Russian Federation;
c regulation and protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen; cit-
izenship in the Russian Federation, regulation and protection of the rights of 
national minorities;
d establishment of the system of federal legislative, executive and judicial 
bodies, the rules for their organization and activities, formation of federal 
bodies of state authority;
e federal state property and its management;
f establishment of the principles of federal policy and federal programs in the 
sphere of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural, and national develop-
ment of the Russian Federation;
g	 establishment	 of	 the	 legal	 basis	 for	 a	 single	 market;	 financial,	 currency,	
credit, and customs regulation, money issue, the principles of pricing policy; 
federal economic services, including federal banks;
h federal budget, federal taxes and dues, federal regional development funds;
i	 federal	power	systems,	nuclear	power-	engineering,	fissionable	materials,	federal	
transport, railways, information and communication, outer space activities;
j foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international 
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation, issues of war and peace;
k foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation;
l defence and security; military production; determination of rules of selling 
and purchasing weapons, ammunition, military equipment and other military 
property; production of poisonous substances, narcotic substances and rules 
for their use;
m determination of the status and protection of the state border, territorial sea, 
air space, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf of the Russian 
Federation;
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n	 judicial	system,	procurator’s	office,	criminal,	criminal	procedural	and	penal	
legislation, amnesty and pardoning, civil, civil procedural and arbitration 
procedural legislation, legal regulation of intellectual property;
o	 federal	law	of	conflict	of	laws;
p meteorological service, standards, metric system, horometry, geodesy and 
cartography,	names	of	geographical	units,	official	statistics	and	accounting;
q state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;
r federal state service.
Article 72
1 The joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the 
Russian Federation includes:
a providing for the correspondence of the constitutions and laws of the 
republics, the charters and other normative legal acts of the territories, 
regions, cities of federal importance, autonomous region or auto-
nomous areas to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and 
federal laws;
b protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen; protection of 
the rights of national minorities; ensuring the rule of law, law and order, 
public security, and the border zone regime;
c issues of possession, use, and disposal of land, subsoil, water, and other 
natural resources;
d delimitation of state property;
e utilization of natural resources, protection of the environment and 
ensuring ecological safety; specially protected natural territories, pro-
tection of historical and cultural monuments;
f general questions of upbringing, education, science, culture, physical 
culture and sports;
g coordination of issues of health care; protection of the family, maternity, 
paternity, and childhood; social protection, including social security;
h carrying out measures against catastrophes, natural calamities, epidem-
ics, elimination of their aftermath;
i establishment of common principles of taxation and dues in the Russian 
Federation;
j administrative, administrative procedural, labor, family, housing, land, 
water, and forest legislation; legislation on subsoil and environmental 
protection;
k personnel of the judicial and law enforcement agencies; the Bar, notary 
offices;
l protection of the traditional habitat and way of life of small ethnic 
communities;
m establishment of common principles of organization of the system of 
bodies of state authority and local self- government;
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n coordination of international and foreign economic relations of the sub-
jects	of	the	Russian	Federation,	fulfillment	of	international	treaties	and	
agreements of the Russian Federation.
2 The provisions of this Article shall be equally valid for the republics, territ-
ories, regions, cities of federal importance, autonomous regions or auto-
nomous areas.
Note
1 This translation of the Russian Constitution was found in “Konstitutsiya RF (Proekt 
Prezidenta)” (The Constitution of the Russian Federation (the President’s Project)), 
Konstitutsii RF (Akternativnye Proekty), vol. 2, Moscow, 1993.
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